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Abstract
Cloud computing is omnipresent nowadays, as it allows for a fine-grained
partitioning of data center resources and for flexibly providing access to these
resources to any device that is connected to the Internet. This partitioning
and provision of resources is achieved by hosting several Virtual Machines
(VM)on the same physicalmachine. TheseVMs are rented out to customers
to whom they look as if they were physical machines. Due to this ability to
commercially rent out data center resources in a flexible, efficient, and fine-
grainedmanner, cloud computing is deployed by virtually all companies and
many private customers. However, commercial clouds are not always able to
satisfy privacy and performance concerns of customers or they do not com-
ply with regulations. Therefore, many companies and institutions also oper-
ate a private cloud, allowing them to complementVMs rented fromcommer-
cial cloudswithVMs hosted in their private cloud. In contrast to commercial
clouds, the performance of VMs in a private cloud is not captured by Service
Level Agreements, and therefore, all VMs are treated as processes of equal
importance. As users operate different numbers of VMs and these utilize dif-
ferent amounts of physical resources, this equal treatment of VMs leads to
users receiving unequal amounts of physical resources.
Thus, this thesis improves this situation by defining an efficient approach
to enforce fairness in private clouds. An investigation of steps that practi-
cally allocate data center resources reveals that cloud resources are effectively
controlled by changing priorities of VMs to access physical resources of their
host, subsequently termed prioritization of VMs. Additionally, it is shown
experimentally that no assumptions on respective utility functions can be
made, when prioritizing VMs. These findings stand in contrast to the ma-
jority of work on fair data center resource allocations, which suggests the en-
forcement of fairness via scheduling and makes strong assumptions on util-
ity functions. Realistically, well-defined utility functions or a well-structured
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negotiation process cannot be assumed for the prioritization of VMs, thus,
hosts are conceptualized as “self-serving buffets”.
The premiss of this thesis that it is fair to constrain greedy consumers in
favor of less greedy consumers in such a self-serving buffet, requires a met-
ric that quantifies the greediness of consumers based on their multi-resource
self-servings from a shared resource pool. Accordingly, the Greediness Met-
ric is developed based on a questionnaire amongmore than 600 participants
on the intuitive understanding of greediness and fairness. This Greediness
Metric is formulated, evaluated, and outperforms all commonly knownmet-
rics to quantify multi-resource self-servings.
Based on a novel, formal cloudmodel, the GreedinessMetric is refined to
quantify the greediness of cloud users. Thus, greediness fairness is defined as
the procedure of prioritizing VMs inversely to the greediness of their users.
Under idealistic assumptions, enforcing greediness fairness provides shar-
ing incentive, Pareto efficiency, strategy proofness, and envy freeness, just
as Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) does, which determines the state-of-
the-art of fair data center multi-resource allocations. However, in contrast
to DRF, enforcing greediness fairness based on the new Greediness Metric
also provides incentives to users (a) to configure their VMs correctly, (b)
to do that to the best of their knowledge in case of uncertainty, and (c) to
neither unnecessarily partition workloads to multiple small VMs nor to con-
centrate workloads to one monolithic VM. A simulative investigation out-
lines how enforcing greediness fairness coordinates the resource allocation
among nodes and improves the fairness among users. Furthermore, the sim-
ulative investigation shows that deploying the refined Greediness Metric to
prioritize VMs results in an allocation that lies between the allocations gen-
erated, when using the metric used by DRF and the straight-forward metric
of summing up resource amounts. Thus, the refined Greediness Metric is
considered superior to prioritize VMs, as it leads to intuitive fairness among
users and provides incentives to them to configure their VMs correctly.
To demonstrate the practical applicability of this approach, OpenStack is
extended by a prototypical nova service called “nova-fairness” that enforces
greediness fairness according to the newmetric and is compatible with most
of the known hypervisors. The processing overhead of the nova-fairness is
evaluated in experiments and it is proven that it enforces fairness amongusers
by coordinating theVMprioritizationonhosts. This is combinedwith ames-
saging scheme that makes the nova-fairness highly scalable.
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In summary, this thesis defines intuitive multi-resource fairness without
access to any consumers’ utility functions. The respective fairness definition
is applied to prioritize running VMs and, thereby, enforces fairness most ef-
fectively. Analytical and simulative investigations show this approach’s supe-
riority to existing data center fairness, which is further backed by its practical
feasibility being certified by the prototypical extension of OpenStack.
v
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Kurzfassung
Cloud computing ist heutzutage allgegenwärtig, da es erlaubt, Daten-
center-Ressourcen fein-granular zu partitionieren und flexibel jedem Gerät,
das mit dem Internet verbunden ist, zur Verfügung zu stellen. Diese Partitio-
nierung und Bereitstellung der Ressourcen erfolgt durch Virtuelle Maschi-
nen (VMs), von denen mehrere auf der gleichen physischen Maschine ge-
hosted werden können. VMs werden an Nutzer vermietet und können von
diesenwie physischeMaschinen benutzt werden.Wegen dieserMöglichkeit,
Datencenter-Ressourcen kommerziell, flexibel, effizient und fein-granular zu
vermieten, wirdCloudComputing von nahezu allen Firmen und vielen End-
nutzern verwendet. Allerdings können kommerzielle Clouds nicht immer
Privatheit- und Performanz-Ansprüchen der Kunden gerecht werden oder
verstossen gegen Regularien. Daher unterhalten viele Firmen und Institutio-
nen eine private Cloud, die es ermöglicht, die von kommerziellen Clouds
gemieteten VMs mit VMs in der privaten Cloud zu komplementieren. Im
Gegensatz zu kommerziellen Clouds ist in privaten Clouds die Perform-
anz von VMs nicht durch Service Level Agreements vorgegeben, weshalb
VMs in einer privaten Cloud als Prozesse gleicher Priorität behandelt wer-
den. Da Nutzer oft unterschiedlich viele VMs kontrollieren und letztere ver-
schiedeneMengen unterschiedlicher physischer Ressourcen benutzen, führt
die Gleichbehandlung von VMs dazu, dass Nutzer unterschiedlicheMengen
physischer Ressourcen erhalten.
Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, durch die Definition eines effizienten
Ansatzes, Fairness in privaten Clouds zu gewährleisten: Eine Untersu-
chung der Schritte, durch die Datencenter-Ressourcen in der Praxis ver-
teilt werden, zeigt, dass Cloud-Ressourcen effektiv kontrolliert werden kön-
nen, wenn die Prioritäten, mit denen VMs auf die physischen Ressour-
cen ihres Hosts zugreifen können, angepasst werden. Dies wird nachfol-
gend als VM-Priorisierung bezeichnet. Zusätzlich wird durch Experimen-
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te gezeigt, dass bei der VM-Priorisierung keine Annahmen über Präferenz-
Funktionen gemacht werden können. Diese Ergebnisse stehen im Wi-
derspruch zur Mehrheit der Arbeiten über faire Datencenter-Ressourcen-
Verteilung,welche versucht, Fairness durchScheduling zu gewährleistenund
hierbei starke Annahmen über Präferenz-Funktionen macht. Da wohldefi-
nierte Präferenz-Funktionen oder wohlstrukturierte Verhandlungsprozesse
bei der VM-Priorisierung nicht angenommen werden können, konzeptuali-
siert dieseDissertationphysischeMaschinen als
"
Selbstbedienungs-Buffets\
für VMs.
Die Prämisse dieser Dissertation, dass es fair ist, gierige Konsumenten
zum Vorteil von weniger gierigen Konsumenten einzuschränken, macht die
Definition einer Metrik notwendig, die die Gier von Konsumenten basie-
rend auf denMulti-Ressourcen-Bündeln, welche sie sich aus einem geteilten
Ressourcen-Pool genommenhaben, quantifiziert. Zu diesemZweckwird die
Greediness-Metrik basierend auf einerUmfrage entwickelt, beiwelcher über
600Teilnehmer zu ihrem intuitivenGier- undFairness-VerständnisAuskunft
gaben. DieseGreediness-Metrik wird formuliert, evaluiert und für besser als
jede allgemein bekannte Metrik zur Quantifizierung vonMulti-Ressourcen-
Bündeln befunden.
Basierend auf einem neuartigen, formellen Cloud-Model wird die
Greediness-Metrik verfeinert, um die Gier von Cloud-Nutzern zu quantifi-
zieren. Die Priorisierung von VMs antiproportional zur Gier ihrer Besitzer
wird alsGreediness-Fairness definiert.Unter idealistischenAnnahmen resul-
tiert die Durchsetzung von Greediness-Fairness in Sharing Incentives (dem
Anreiz, Ressourcen zu teilen), Pareto-Effizienz, Strategy Proofness (Nicht-
Manipulierbarkeit) undNeid-Freiheit, genausowie es auch für dieDominant
Resource Fairness (DRF) der Fall ist, die anerkannter Maßstab für die fai-
re Datencenter-Multi-Ressourcen-Verteilung ist. Allerdings gibt die Durch-
setzung von Greediness-Fairness im Gegensatz zu DRF den Nutzern auch
Anreiz (a) ihre VMs korrekt zu konfigurieren, (b) dies gemäß ihrer besten
Einschätzung zu tun, falls sie sich unsicher sind, und (c) Arbeitslasten we-
der auf unnötig viele VMs zu partitionieren, noch die Arbeitslasten künstlich
aufwenigemonolitischeVMs zu konzentrieren. Simulationen zeigen,wie die
Durchsetzung vonGreediness-Fairness die Ressourcen-Verteilung zwischen
physischenMaschinen koordiniert und somit die Fairness zwischenNutzern
verbessert. Die Simulationen zeigen auch, dass die Ressourcen-Verteilung,
die aus der Durchsetzung von Greediness-Fairness resultiert, zwischen den
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beiden Ressourcen-Verteilungen liegt, welche daraus resultieren, VMs nicht
gemäss derGreediness-Metrik zu priorisieren, sondern gemäss der vonDRF
benutzten Metrik und der naheliegenden Metrik, die alle Ressourcen in ei-
nem Bündel aufsummiert. Somit ist die Greediness-Metrik die beste Wahl
zur VM-Priorisierung, da hieraus intuitiv faire Ressourcen-Verteilungen re-
sultieren und den Nutzern Anreize gegeben werden, ihre VMs korrekt zu
konfigurieren.
Die praktische Anwendbarkeit des von dieser Dissertation vorgeschlage-
nen Ansatzes wird demonstriert, indem OpenStack durch den prototypi-
schen Nova-Service
"
Nova-Fairness\ erweitert wird, welcher Greediness-
Fairness durchsetzt und mit einer Vielzahl verschiedener VM-Monitore
kompatibel ist. Durch Experimente wird der durch die Ausführung von
Nova-Fairness verursachte Mehraufwand evaluiert und es wird gezeigt, wie
Nova-Fairness die VM-Priorisierung zwischen physischen Maschinen ko-
ordiniert, um die Fairness zwischen Nutzern zu erhöhen. Die von Nova-
Fairness benötigte Kommunikation zwischen physischen Maschinen ist
durch ein hochskalierbares Nachrichtenschema möglich.
Zusammenfassend entwickelt diese Dissertation eine intuitive Definition
der Multi-Ressourcen-Verteilungs-Fairness ohne Zugriff auf die Präferenz-
Funktionen der Konsumenten zu benötigen. Diese Fairness-Definition wird
inClouds effizient umgesetzt, indemPrioritäten,mit denenVMs auf die phy-
sischen Ressourcen ihres Hosts zugreifen können, angepasst werden. Analy-
tische und simulative Untersuchungen zeigen die Überlegenheit dieses An-
satzes gegenüber bereits existierenden Datencenter-Fairness-Ansätzen. Die-
se Überlegenheit wird zusätzlich durch die praktische Anwendbarkeit unter-
mauert, welche durch eine prototypische OpenStack-Erweiterung demon-
striert wird.
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1
Introduction
Cloud computing provides access to a large pool of computational re-sources to any device that is connected to the Internet. For exam-
ple, clouds allow executingmassive parallelizedworkloads that take too long,
whenexecutedona singlemachine, andoutsourcingworkloadsofmobile de-
vices to increase their battery life. While virtualization is at least forty years
old [32], it recently was rediscovered to provide data center resources in a
highly flexible manner and, thereby, enable cloud computing [49, 91]. Vir-
tualization logically partitions aphysicalmachine, subsequently referred to as
node, by Virtual Machines (VM), which allows to homogenize the hardware
of nodes, isolate users, and efficiently process varying workloads. Therefore,
VMs on the same node share the node’s resources, such as Central Process-
ing Unit (CPU) time, RandomAccessMemory (RAM), disk Input/Output
(I/O), and network access. Overcommitting nodes allows achieving high re-
source utilization [7, 22]. Therefore, tradeoffs between the performance of
individual VMs sharing a node have to bemade, when the resource demands
of those VMs peak simultaneously. Performance tradeoffs imply solving a
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multi-resource allocation problem, i.e., it is insufficient to allocate resources
in isolation [23, 30, 44, 89], as the performance of VMs depends on a com-
bination of resources.
From outside a data center, a VM appears to be a physical machine, i.e.,
just as users can connect remotely to physical machines inside the data cen-
ter they can connect to VMs. Thus, VMs allow data center owners, subse-
quently referred to as Cloud Service Providers (CSP), to efficiently pack-
age and lease their computational resources by renting out VMs to private
and commercial customers. Therefore, cloud computing has rapidly gained
popularity over the last years. A drawback for cloud customers, when rent-
ing VMs, is that they have to entrust their data to the CSP and often do not
knowwhere their data is located geographically. Furthermore, VMs of differ-
ent customers share nodes, which may impede the performance of individ-
ual VMs or lead to data leakage. Therefore, many companies operate a pri-
vate cloud to execute performance or privacy critical workloads and, thereby,
complement VMs rented from commercial CSPs. Also, institutions such as
universities or university chairs operate their own private cloud, e.g., for re-
search purposes or because it provides physical access to the infrastructure.
Accordingly, private clouds also gain popularity [16].
In contrast to commercial clouds, VMs of a private cloud are provisioned
without payment. This difference is important as a payment is associated
with a Service Level Agreement (SLA). In particular, when a VM is rented
from a commercial cloud, an SLA prescribes the performance the VM has
to deliver. Accordingly, the CSP allocates resources to the VM, such that it
does not violate the SLA. In contrast, in private clouds, no SLAs exist and,
therefore, VMs are treated as node processes of equal importance. However,
the following minimal example shows that this approach is suboptimal. As-
sume there is only node and two equitable users instantiate one VM and two
VMs, respectively. As there is only one node, all three VMs are hosted by this
node. All VMs execute a CPU heavy workload, wherefore each of the three
VMs attempts to utilize as much CPU time as possible. As VMs are treated
as equal processes, all VMs receive an equal amount of CPU time. This im-
plies that the user, who operates two VMs, receives twice as muchCPU time
as the user, who only operates one VM. As users are equitable, the user, who
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only operates one VM, has reason to complain that the other user receives
twice the amount of CPU time.
Many institutions manage their cloud resources manually, i.e., individu-
ally decide on every request to start a VM and, if need be, manually identify
and restrict “misbehaving” VMs during runtime. This process does not scale
administratively. For example, even for the minimal example above, adjust-
ing the allocation would take several command line calls (assuming that the
unbalancedCPUallocation has already been identified) and the result would
be inflexible, e.g., when u2 shuts down one VM, the allocation has to be cor-
rected again. Therefore, a mechanism is desirable, which minimizes admin-
istrative overhead by automatically ensuring certain allocation criteria. Such
a mechanism would also allow for introducing novel charging schemes for
commercial clouds, such as cloud flat rates [83], where SLAs apply per user
and not per VM.
1.1 Cloud Fairness
The two most prominent allocation criteria are efficiency and fairness [10,
12, 13, 15, 18, 30, 44]. While efficiency is important, it can only partially
serve as an allocation goal. The reason is that when efficiency, i.e., high usage
of resources, is the only criterion, users have the incentive to insert endless
loops into their code [30] in order to artificially increase resource utilization
and, therefore, efficiency when allocating more resources to them. To avoid
that users artificially inflate their resource utilization, it must be ensured that
users receive equitable resource shares, i.e., the allocation is fair. As it turns
out, fairness is particularly hard to define in clouds, for the following reasons.
Firstly, fairness is an intuitive concept, that is, its definition differs from
person to person [83]. While it is generally perceived as fair, to allocate to
users equitable (resource) bundles, equitability is hard to define in themulti-
resource case, because bundles are not objectively comparable. Cloud users
do have different demands over different resources [14, 89, 93, 109]. For ex-
ample, a certain set of cloudusersmay requiremoreCPU for theirworkloads,
while others requiremoreRAM.A third user groupmay deploy the cloud for
backups and, therefore, mostly requires disk-space and bandwidth. Hence,
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users must receive bundles with different resource ratios, while these bun-
dles cannot be compared objectively and, thus, equitability is hard to mea-
sure. In economics this non-comparability of bundles is solved by declaring
envy freeness [15] an important fairness criterion, i.e., that no user u prefers
to swap the resources u receives with the resources another user receives. Al-
though this defines a sound and formal approach to fairness, its verification
requires knowing users’ utility functions. A user’s utility functionmaps each
bundle to a number quantifying the user’s valuation for the bundle [95]. In
clouds, suchutility functions have to be derived frommonitoring data, which
is not only technically challenging and mathematically complex [114], but
may also be hindered by privacy constraints.
Secondly, defining fairness such that it is applicable to clouds is aggravated
by the organization of resources: resources are partitioned to different nodes
and a user utilizes resources via VMs. A VM is hosted by a node and can
only receive resources from this node. Hence, while fairness is to be enforced
among users, resources have to be allocated to VMs of which users operate
different numbers and the resource demands of VMs (even of the same user)
differ.
Thirdly, in clouds users have to configure their VMswith virtual resources,
e.g., Virtual CPU (VCPU) or Virtual RAM (VRAM), and these VRs are an
indicator of how many resources the VMs will require. Based on this in-
formation the CSP places VMs on nodes to optimize resource utilization.
Therefore, misconfiguring VMs will unnecessarily decrease the node utiliza-
tion [80] and it is, therefore, fair to allocate fewer resources to users, who
misconfigure their VMs.
1.2 ResearchQuestions
Themain goal of this thesis is to develop amechanism that ensures a fair (and
efficient) multi-resource allocation among users of a cloud when the perfor-
mance of individual VMs is not contracted. Based on the above discussion,
therefore, the following research questions guide this thesis.
Research Question 1. How to best control cloud resources? In partic-
ular, steps to allocate cloud resources are (a) deciding which VM is started
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next, which is most commonly leveraged and termed scheduling, (b) decid-
ing which node hosts the VM,which is a combinatorial and not an allocation
problem, and (c) allocating node resources to running VMs, whereat time-
shared resources are controlled by priorities and not absolute numbers.
Research Question 2. Which general resource dependencies with re-
spect to VM performance exist when allocating node resources to run-
ning VMs? If such dependencies exist, they can be modeled as utility func-
tions in the subsequent theoretical investigations; otherwise, very broad and
generic assumptions have to be made.
ResearchQuestion 3. How can the greediness of consumers be quanti-
fied based on themulti-resource bundles they served themselves froma
common resource pool? This question arises because ResearchQuestion 2
finds that resource and performance dependencies are not predictable when
allocating node resources to running VMs. Therefore, cloud fairness can-
not be defined via traditional approaches that rely on the existence of well-
defined utility functions and a well-structured negotiation process. Instead,
this thesis assumes that it is fair to constrain greedy consumers in favor of less
greedy consumers when an overload of resources in a shared self-serving re-
source pool arises and, therefore, requires a sound and intuitive greediness
metric.
ResearchQuestion4. Howcan thedefinitionofgreedinessbe refined to
define cloud fairness? This research question addresses the problem that in
clouds resources are utilized by VMs, while fairness is to be enforced among
users (users have different quotas and operate different numbers of VMs of
different configurations). Therefore, the greediness metric has to be refined,
such that (a) it is applicable to this complex technical reality and (b) users
have the incentive to configure their VMs properly when less greedy users
are prioritized at the cost of greedy users. Providing this incentive is advan-
tageous, as the more the VMs’ configuration is aligned with their actual con-
sumption, the more efficiently the CSP can place VMs on nodes.
Research Question 5. How can the new cloud fairness definition be
practically enforced, when allocating node resources to running VMs?
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This problem has to be solved by developing an extension of a publicly de-
ployed cloud software stack, such that the cloud fairness definition is suc-
cessfully enforced.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
Driven by the explicit research questions posed, this thesis shows that cloud
resources are most effectively controlled by changing the allocation of node
resources to running VMs and that no assumptions on utility functions can
bemadeduring this process. Subsequently, an according comprehensive the-
oretical model for cloud resource allocation is developed based on which
(a) cloud fairness is defined as prioritizing VMs inversely to the greediness of
their owners, whereat greediness is determined by a greediness metric that is
developed based on a questionnaire among more than 600 participants, and
(b) a cloud simulator is developed that compares this greediness metric to
other metrics in the context of this fairness definition. Lastly, OpenStack,
which is thede facto standard for private cloud software stacks andalso serves
as a foundation forpublic clouds, is extended toenforce theproposed fairness
definition. Thus, as a result of this approach the outcomes of the thesis cover:
1. Based on (a) an investigation of the practical processes of data cen-
ter resource allocation and (b) an extensive review of data center fair-
ness approaches, changing the allocation of node resources to running
VMs is identified as most potent to control cloud resources. The liter-
ature review also identifies characteristics that are highly desirable for
data center and, therefore, cloud resource allocation.
2. The performance of VMs executing different workloads is bench-
marked to show that VM performance cannot be predicted based on
theVM’s virtual resources or the resources theVMutilizes. In particu-
lar, resource performance dependencies are highly diverse and some-
times even counterintuitive. This proves that assumptions on util-
ity functions, as made by most works on data center resource multi-
resource allocation, are inappropriate and, thus, properties proven
based on these assumptions hardly hold in reality.
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3. A questionnaire among more than 600 participants is conducted and
evaluated to conclude on an intuitive understanding of greediness
when no utility functions but only the resources consumers served
themselves from a shared resource pool are known. The greediness
metric [81, 83] is developed as a result and it is shown how it defines
an intuitive understanding of multi-resource fairness.
4. A detailed model for cloud multi-resource allocation is developed
upon which a very practical and intuitive definition of cloud fairness
among users is defined. This fairness definition is tailored to be ap-
plied to allocating node resources during VM runtime [80] and incor-
porates a refined greediness metric. An analytical investigation shows
that this fairness definition has all desirable characteristics identified
by the literature review and provides incentives for users to configure
their VMs correctly [84]. A simulative investigation shows that the
refined greediness metric is superior to other metrics, when incorpo-
rated into the fairness definition.
5. OpenStack is extended in its implementation by a decentralized fair-
ness service to enforce fairness according to this fairness definition by
controlling CPU time,RAM, disk I/O, and network access [80]. The
extension’s functionality is certified by experiments regarding CPU
overhead and fairness enforcement.
1.4 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 first gives a formal definition of allocation problems followed by a
detailed, technical discussion of the organization of data center resources in
order to point out wheremulti-resource allocation problems arise andwhich
steps are necessary to allocate cloud resources. Subsequently, important the-
oretic aspects of allocation problems are discussed and put into the practical
context of data centers. Chapter 2 closes with an exhaustive discussion of
approaches to data center multi-resource fairness and compares them with
respect to the theoretical and practical aspects discussed beforehand.
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Chapter 3 investigates the performance of VMs executing different work-
loads and shows that the dependency of node resources and their effects on
VMperformance are highly complex and virtually unpredictable. To account
for this lack of utility functions and awell-defined allocation process, fairness
is defined as prioritizing consumers inversely to their greediness. The greedi-
nessmetric is developedbasedonaquestionnaire amongmore than600 indi-
viduals. Cloud fairness is defined as prioritizing VMs inversely to the greedi-
ness of their owners, whereat owner greediness is determined by refining the
greedinessmetric in accordance with a novel model for cloudmulti-resource
allocation that is developed based on the technical discussion of Chapter 2.
Chapter 4 develops a cloud simulator that prioritizes VMs inversely to
their greediness and uses different metrics (including the refined greediness
metric) to define greediness. Secondly, anOpenStack extension called nova-
fairness is developed to prioritize VMsof cloud users inversely to their greed-
iness.
Chapter 5 shows that the cloud fairness definition proposed in Chapter 3
has the same desirable properties as DRF, which is the most prominent ap-
proach to achieve data center fairness. Unlike DRF, this fairness definition
also provides an incentive to configure VMs correctly, as shown by analyt-
ical and simulative analyses. Next, simulations compare the refined greed-
iness metric to other commonly used metrics and confirm that the refined
greediness metric is best suited to determine a prioritization order of VMs.
Subsequently, experiments evaluate nova-fairness in terms of CPU overhead
and fairness enforcement. Lastly, it is described how themessaging overhead
among nodes running nova-fairness can beminimized,making nova-fairness
highly scalable.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes this thesis’ main contributions and high-
lights its main results. Based on the achieved results conclusions are drawn
and an outlook to possible future works presented.
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2
Basics and RelatedWork
This chapter presents formal definitions that are important for the re-mainder of the thesis and details the technical background of data cen-
ter resource allocation. Clouds are a special case of data centers, where vir-
tualization is used to provide resources in a highly flexible manner [78].
Section 2.1 formally defines (multi-resource) allocation problems and
their important characteristics. Section 2.2 details how data center resources
are allocated in practice and where multi-resource allocation problems arise,
which identifies how cloud resources are best controlled. In order to in-
vestigate which resource dependencies with respect to performance exist in
clouds, Section 2.3 compares utility functions that have been proposed to
model multi-resource allocation in data centers so far. While Section 2.4 dis-
cusses single-resource allocation paradigms that have been extended to data
center multi-resource allocation, Section 2.5 describes all key characteristics
for practically relevant data center resource allocations. Through this dis-
cussion formal requirements, which an intuitive definition of multi-resource
fairness must suffice, are identified. Section 2.6 studies and compares in the
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closest possible detail approaches that have been suggested to solve multi-
resource allocation problems in data centers, thereby providing guidance for
how to extend general multi-resource fairness definitions to clouds and how
to enforce them. Table 2.1 lists frequently used abbreviations.
2.1 Allocation Problems
Fairness problems arise inmany areas of (human) coexistence, e.g., when ask-
ing the question of how a governing coalition should be formed in a parlia-
mentary system or how this coalition, once formed, should allocate cabinet
ministries [15]. However, (resource) allocation problems are probably the
most basic context in which fairness questions arise [78].
Let R = (r1; r2; : : : ; rr) be a set of r resources, where resource ri 2 R
is available in the amount of  !ri . An allocation of R to c consumers
in C = (c1; c2; : : : ; cc) can be denoted by a matrix A 2 Rrc0 withPc
j=1 aij   !ri , for all i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; rg, where cj receives amount aij of ri.
An allocation problem is defined as follows:
Given: (a) A set of resourcesR = fr1; r2; : : : ; rrg, (b) a set of consumers
C = fc1; c2; : : : ; ccg, and (c) certain information about the consumers,
someofwhich consumers provide about themselves, or away to interactwith
them.
Problem: Define an Allocation Mechanism (AM) that determines an
allocation A of R to Cwith designated characteristics.
Designated characteristics are discussed in Section 2.5. A subset of re-
sources of R is referred to as bundle. Accordingly, the resources that ci 2 C
receives are referred to as ci’s bundle and denoted by Ai. Every consumer ci is
characterized by utility function ui : Rr ! R, which specifies how happy ci is
with each possible bundle, and ui(Ai) is ci’s utility. Consumers are assumed
to be selfish and to know the AM.Therefore, ci will provide false information
to the AM, if it changes A, such that ci’s utility increases. Knowing the class
of consumers’ utility functions (cf. Section 2.3), may allow for designing an
AM that limits the possibility for strategic manipulation and for proving that
it achieves designated characteristics.
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Table 2.1: Abbreviations frequently used
Abbreviation and Term Defined in Section
AM AllocationMechanism 2.1
AP Allocation Policy 2.1
CEEI Competitive Equilibrium 2.4.2from Equal Incomes
EF Envy Freeness/to be envy-free 2.5.1
MR Microarchitectural Resource 2.2
MRA Multi-resource Allocation 2.1
NR Node Resource, i.e., PR or MR 2.2
PE Pareto Efficiency/to be Pareto-efficient 2.5.3
PR Physical Resource 2.2
SI (to provide) Sharing Incentive 2.5.2
SP Strategyproofness/to be strategyproof 2.5.4
VE Virtual Encapsulation 2.2
VM Virtual Machine (special case of VE) 2.2
VR Virtual Resource 2.2
Allocation problems are classified based on different criteria, for example,
whether resources are divisible and/or homogeneous, whether there is only
one resource or multiple resources, which information is known about con-
sumers (in the best case all utility functions are known), and the class of util-
ity functions (cf. Section 2.3). An extensive overview of allocation problems
classes and their applications can be found in [19].
Many allocation problems allow for the notion that more of a resource
is better or at least not worse. This allows to objectively compare the value
of two bundles by the size of these bundles, when only a single resource is
to be allocated. However, when there is more than one resource, two bun-
dles may contain more of different resources and, therefore, it depends on
the consumer, which bundle is more valuable. This aggravates defining fair-
ness, which usually demands to allocate consumers equitable bundles, and
finding efficient allocations, as consumers must be allocated resources in dif-
ferent ratios in order to maximize efficiency. As these problems do not exist,
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when only a single resource is to be allocated, an important aspect of alloca-
tion problems is, whether one or multiple resources are to be allocated. The
allocation of multiple resources is referred to as Multi-Resource Allocation
(MRA) in this thesis and, accordingly, an allocation problem with multiple
resources as MRAproblem.
In economics a plethora of allocation problems is investigated [15, 65]
and many AMs were proposed. However, these results are not applicable to
data centers due to the following three reasons.
1. Economics usually deal with one-time allocation problems, i.e., an al-
location problem has to be solved once, while in computer science
most resources have to be allocated continuously, which also implies
tight runtime requirements. Particularly significant is that reallocating
resources in this continuous process may be costly.
2. In data centers many technical constraints prohibit applying AMs de-
veloped in economics, as these AMsmake idealistic assumptions, e.g.,
well-defined utility functions and a well-structured negotiation pro-
cess.
3. Economics usually consider the tradeoff consumers have to make be-
tween resources, while in computer science the opposite is the case, as
resources are needed in certain ratios [26, 38]. This difference often
expresses itself by the class of utility functions that is assumed.
Therefore, basic fairness notions from economics are transferable to data
center MRA, while more complex results, such as AMs, cannot. Even many
AMs developed for data center MRAmake idealistic assumptions, e.g., that
resources are always required in static ratios [30, 44]. In order to differentiate
theoretic and practical results, an AM for which at least a prototypical imple-
mentation for data centers exists is denoted an Allocation Policy (AP). In
order to evaluate the practical applicability of AMs, the technical discussion
of MRA in data centers follows.
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2.2 Multi-resource Allocation in Data Centers
A data center consists of nodes that are connected via middleboxes, such as
switchesor routers. MRAproblemsare facedonbothdevices. Nodesprocess
workloads and communicatewith one another and the Internet via flows that
traverse middleboxes [78].
On nodesMRAproblems arise when allocating Physical Resources (PR)
such as CPU time, RAM, disk I/O, and network access and when allocat-
ingMicroarchitectural Resources (MR), such as cache capacity andmemory
bandwidth. PRs and MRs are referred to as Node Resources (NR). No ap-
proach discussed in Section 2.6 tackles the allocation of PRs and MRs. To
clearly denote which resources are allocated, abbreviation PRs does not in-
cludeMRs, althoughMRsare alsophysical. OnmiddleboxesMRAproblems
arise, as flows contend for PRs such as CPU time,RAM, and network access.
Virtualization is applied to homogenize the hardware of nodes, to isolate
users, and to efficiently processes varying workloads. Therefore, users pro-
cess their workloads in Virtual Encapsulations (VE), e.g., Virtual Machines
(VM) or containers, such asDocker [25] or LXC [113]. The node that hosts
a VE is called the VE’s host. Virtualization is applied in most data centers
and led to the introduction of the term cloud computing. When VMs are
used for virtual encapsulation an entire operating system runs inside each
VE. Accordingly, users can handle their VEs, as if they were physical ma-
chines, which allows them to deploy almost any software inside and gives
the data center operator the flexibility to move VEs between heterogenous
nodes. Due to this flexibility from the user’s as well as the operator’s perspec-
tive, renting VMs in a data center is an attractive businessmodel. However, it
also implies that users oftendonot know,where theirVMs are geographically
located, and data center operators often do not know, which NR utilization
to expect from a VM, as almost any software can run inside a VM. VMs and
other types of VEs are defined by Virtual Resources (VR), e.g., virtual CPU
(VCPU) or virtualRAM (VRAM), which helps to anticipate how much re-
sources they utilize. VRs of a VMare often chosen from a range of flavors, i.e.,
a flavor is a set of VRs that a VM of that flavor has.
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As every VM is configured with a set of VRs, VMs not only differ in terms
of the NRs they physically utilize but also in terms of their VRs. This makes
defining fairnessmore complex, than defining fairness under the assumption
of VEs that are homogenous in terms of their configuration. This thesis fo-
cuses on the general case of heterogenous VE configurations and, therefore,
defines clouds as data centers, where VMs are used as VEs.
2.2.1 NodeMulti-resource Allocation
In order to utilize data center resources users start VEs. Which requests are
granted, is decided by the data center operator byVE scheduling. VE schedul-
ing is decided based on factors such as how many resources each VE owner
currently utilizes by running VEs. The subsequent VE placement tackles the
problem of finding a suitable node for the VE to be started. VE scheduling
and placement is aggravated by potential placement constraints. In particu-
lar, the placement constraint of a VE specifies a subset of nodes that qualifies
to host the VE. A placement constraint depends on factors such as the nodes’
hardware, e.g., the node must have GPUs, software, e.g., the node must run a
certain kernel version, or other factors, e.g., the node must have public IP ad-
dresses [104]. VE scheduling and VE placement are conducted by the data
center’s orchestration layer. Optimal VE placement implies solving an APX-
hardmulti-dimensional BIN-packing problem[59, 112]. AsVEplacement is
a combinatorial and not an allocation problem, it is not subject of this thesis.
After VEs are scheduled and placed, VEs compete forNRswith other VEs
on the same node during their runtime and the node’s hypervisor (its oper-
ating system) is responsible for ruling resulting contention. In other words,
the node’s hypervisor allocates the node’s NRs to running VMs. The alloca-
tion of PRs is termed PR allocation and the allocation of MRs is termedMR
allocation.
2.2.1.1 Proportional Priorities
The allocation of time-sharedNRs, such asCPU time, disk I/O, and network
access, is controlled by Proportional Priorities (PP). In particular, a PP is a
non-negative number assigned per NR and VM. The ratios of PPs of VMs
sharing a NR define the percentages that VMs receive of this NR. For exam-
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ple, when two VMs v1 and v2 share a NR r and have PPs 1 and 2, respectively,
v1 receives 11+2 of r and v2 receives
2
1+2 . In case some VMs do not fully utilize
their share, the leftover is allocated in the same manner to VMs that request
more of this NR. Thus, PPs do not waste NRs, since a NRs will always be
fully allocated, if at least one VM requests it.
The allocation paradigm of PPs is best known as weighted max-min fair-
ness [86]. Operating systems allow to allocatemost time-sharedNRsbyPPs.
However, the name to refer to PPs differs depending on the NR: In the con-
text of CPU PPs are termed shares, in the context of disk I/O weights, and in
the context of network access they are associated to certain queuing disciplines
or traffic classes.
2.2.1.2 Dependence of Allocation Steps
The different steps of data center resource allocation (VE scheduling, VE
placement, and NR allocation) are intertwined: Depending on which VEs
are scheduled andwhere they are hosted, the contention amongVEs forNRs
may turn out differently. In reverse, if a node’s NRs are highly utilized during
runtime, VEs hosted by this node can be live migrated to another node. Fur-
thermore, while the data center orchestration layer can ensure that all users
can start VEs of approximately the same amount of VRs, this is of no use for
users’, if their VEs come off poorly during NR allocation.
2.2.1.3 Job Scheduling
Many works on data center MRA, consider job processing. Here, each user
wants to process a job, which is a large batch of data that is partitioned to
and processed by tasks. Tasks of the same job/user have homogeneous re-
source requirements and each task runs inside a VE.Therefore, when consid-
ering job processing it is often assumed that all VEs of a user have the same
resource requirements. Resource allocation in job processing is controlled
by job scheduling, i.e., determining which user can launch a task next. Thus,
MRA in job processing is referred to as job scheduling subsequently. How-
ever, in general, it cannot be assumed, that all VEs of a user have the same
resource requirements, and even for job scheduling this assumptions is often
optimistic (cf. Section 2.3.3.2).
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2.2.1.4 Comparison of PRs andMRs
MRs, such as CPU cache capacity and memory bandwidth, are inherently
substitutable: Data from the RAM is transferred to CPU using memory
bandwidth and stored in the CPU cache, such that it does not have to be
transferred again and performance increases. Accordingly, when CPU cache
size increases, less memory bandwidth is necessary, as more data can be
fetched from the cache instead ofRAM.Thus, the substitution ofMRs [114]
does not require additional mechanisms.
Also PRs are substitutable in several cases. For example, (a) paging re-
duces RAM requirements by use of CPU time and disk space or (b) com-
pression saves storage or bandwidth by use ofCPU time [23]. However, pag-
ing and compression define higher-levelmechanisms, that have to be actively
deployed by an operating system to substitute PRs. Furthermore, they may
decrease performance. Therefore, contrary to MRs, substitutabilities of PRs
cannot be assumed.
2.2.1.5 Overcommitment
Overcommitting nodes allows to achieve a high utilization. For example,
VMs are often placed on nodes such that the sum of VRs of a node’s VMs
exceeds the node’s PRs. Overcommit ratios determine the factor by which
the sum of VRs of a node’s VEs can exceed the node’s PRs, e.g., when the
CPU overcommit ratio is 15, a node with 4 CPU cores can host VMs with at
most 60 VCPUs in total. Accordingly, if a sufficient number of VEs increases
the utilization of an overcommitted PR to a certain level, the node’s PRs are
insufficient to support all VEs’ requirements.
Higher overcommit ratios increase the degree of utilization and the
chance of overload. Due to this utilization-overload-tradeoff, there is no best
overcommit ratio. Thus, overcommit ratios differ among data centers, de-
pendent on thedata center operator’s risk-adversity and the expecteduser be-
haviour. Overcommit ratios also differ among PRs, as the overload of some
PRs is more critical than the overload of others. For example, if the node’s
CPU time is the bottleneck, VEs will run proportionally slower. If RAM is
the bottleneck, an over-proportional slowdown occurs (due to heavy pag-
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ing). Also, when the VE is a VM it may crash, as a VM’s operating system
needs a certain minimum amount ofRAM. Furthermore, multiplexing CPU
is easier, because it is time-shared, while RAM is space-shared. Thus, data
center operators select overcommit ratios dependingon thePR, e.g., the over-
commitment ratio of CPU is often 10 or more, while the overcommitment
ratio ofRAM is often at most 1.5.
2.2.2 MiddleboxMulti-resource Allocation
In addition to general (computing) nodes, middleboxes, such as switches
or routers, are the second important instance in data centers, where crucial
multi-resource allocation problems arise. Middleboxes connect data center
nodes with one another and the Internet. Just as data center users contend
for NRs via VEs, they contend for middlebox resources via (network traf-
fic) flows. These flows consist of packets and originate from or terminate at
the users’ VEs. Middleboxes perform functions as diverse as intrusion detec-
tion,HTTPcaching, and firewalling. While flows utilize different amounts of
bandwidth, depending on their data rate, they also require different amounts
of CPU,RAM, and other middlebox resources, depending on which of these
functions are applied. Therefore, work on fair middlebox MRA became nu-
merous in the past years [29, 37, 58, 102, 106–108, 116] and is often referred
to as fair queueing.
Contrary to NRs, middlebox resources are inherently time-shared and
someworksonmiddleboxMRAassume thatpackets utilize resources succes-
sively [29]. This allows definingmiddlebox fairness over a period of time, not
demanding that the resource allocation is fair at every point within that pe-
riod. In contrast, VEsutilizeNRs inparallel andover anundefined time-span.
Therefore, fair node MRAdemands determining an allocation that is gener-
ally fair and not only over a period of time. Furthermore, middlebox fairness
definitions can also be based upon packet attributes, such as active/virtual
time and timestamps. These definitions are not applicable to node MRA, as
VEs do not have these attributes.
As (a) fairness concepts designed for fair nodeMRAare often extendable
tomiddleboxMRAbut not vice versa and because (b) the discussion ofmid-
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Figure 2.1: MRA in data centers
dleboxMRAdemands the introductionof several technical details, this thesis
does not discuss the allocation of middlebox resources.
2.2.3 Example
Figure 2.1 illustrates the discussion above by an example. The figure shows a
data center that is shared among user ug and ur. The data center consists of
four nodes that are connected to one another and the Internet via a middle-
box.
Node 1 is shown in detail and hosts two VEs of ug and three VEs of ur, as
depicted by the colors. Both users have requested to start more VEs, where-
fore the data center operator has to decide, which of these VEswill be started
next and which node will host it. Node 1’s hypervisor is responsible for the
NR, i.e., PR and MR, allocation to the hosted VEs. As ur processes tasks of
the same job inside the VEs, the NR utilization of ur’s VEs is homogeneous.
The according homogeneity of PR utilization is depicted by the same pattern
of colored stripes that connect the hypervisor to ur’s VEs. ug processes dif-
ferent workloads in the VEs, wherefore ug’s VEs utilize different amounts of
NRs. As nodes are overcommitted, the requests of the VEs on Node 1 can
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exceed the NRs that are available on Node 1. The allocation of MRs to the
VEs on Node 1, as well as flows and the middlebox resource allocation are
not depicted in the figure.
Figure 2.1 shows that fairness cannot be achieved by leveraging one of the
allocation steps exclusively. In particular, if VEs are scheduled such that both
users have the same number of VEs, this does not imply fairness. The rea-
son is that VEs can utilize different amounts of NRs even when they have
the same VRs, wherefore users utilize very different NR amounts of the data
center. Therefore, it is important to leverage the NR allocation to promote
fairness. However, this requires to coordinate hypervisors of different nodes.
In particular, Node 1 cannot establish fairness among users solely with its lo-
cal information, as Node 1 does not know how many NRs VEs of the two
users receive on other nodes.
Utility functions that have been suggested tomodel different steps of data
centerMRAare presented subsequently and contrastedwith the practical re-
ality of data centers.
2.3 Utility Functions
Utility functions are considered an essential characteristic of allocation prob-
lems [78] and most data center MRA approaches assume a certain class of
utility functions to describe how the combination of different resources in-
fluences the performance the user perceives. Thus, utility functions are de-
termined by technical factors. However, for data centers realistic utility func-
tions are often hard or even impossible to obtain. In particular, often VEs do
not know their utility function. Consequently, utility functions would have
to be compiled from monitoring VEs, which is (a) costly, not only because
resourcemonitoring is practically challenging, but also because deriving util-
ity functions from the profiling data is mathematically complex [114], and
(b) may violate privacy constraints of users. Nonetheless, many data center
MRA approaches make assumptions on utility functions to ease the defini-
tion anddiscussionof fairness. Those assumedutility functions are discussed
subsequently and compared in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Comparison of utility functions
Utility Function Area Drawbacks
Perfectly Mainly theory No substitutabilities
Complementary but also scheduling
Homogeneous Mainly theory Large/unspecific class,
functions of but also scheduling thus, hard to achieve
degree one andMR allocation results
Leontief Scheduling No substitutabilities,
no diminishing returns
Cobb-Douglas MR allocation Implies substitutabilities
2.3.1 Perfectly Complementary Functions
A utility function is perfectly complementary, if the lack of a resource can
never be compensatedwith another. Thus, for each utility, which a consumer
can achieve, there is exactly one bundle without redundant resources that re-
sults in this utility (resources are redundant, if they could be removed from
the bundle without decreasing the consumer’s utility). Although it is theo-
retically possible to substitute PRs in certain cases, PRs are usually not sub-
stitutable (cf. Section 2.2.1.4). Thus, the utilization of PRs can be assumed
to be perfectly complimentary.
2.3.1.1 Area
While perfectly complementary utility functions include Leontief utility
functions (cf. Section 2.3.3), which are applied tomodel job scheduling, per-
fectly complementary utility functions so far have not found another appli-
cation case in data centers.
2.3.1.2 Drawbacks
By definition perfectly complementary utility functions do not allow to cap-
ture substitutability, which apply when allocatingMRs.
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2.3.2 Homogeneous Functions of Degree one
A function f : Rn ! R is homogeneous of degree one, if, for a 2 R and
v 2 Rr, f(a  v) = a  f(v). In other words, a homogenous function of degree
one shows a multiplicative scaling behavior.
2.3.2.1 Area
Amongst others, Leontief andCobb-Douglas functions are homogeneous of
degree one, which are used to model job scheduling (cf. Section 2.3.3) and
MR allocation (cf. Section 2.3.4).
2.3.2.2 Drawbacks
It is hard to achieve theoretical results, that are attractive to be applied in prac-
tice, when homogeneous utility functions of degree one are assumed, since
this class of functions is large (the more specific assumptions about utility
functions are, the easier positive results can be achieved).
2.3.3 Leontief Functions
Leontief utility functions are the most prominent example of perfectly com-
plementary utility functions in data center resource allocation and model
that a consumer ci requires resources in a specific ratio. Thus, ci’s Leontief
utility function is described by a resource requirement vector vi 2 Rr0 that
describes the ratio in which ci requires r resources. The utility ci derives from
bundle (x1; x2; : : : ; xr) is defined by
ui(x1; x2; : : : ; xr) = min

x1
vi1
;
x2
vi2
; : : : ;
xr
vir

: (2.1)
[54] provides insights on allocation rules under Leontief utility functions
independent of their application in data centers. Leontief utility functions
can be extended to finite demands, i.e., consumers have a certain maximum
amount of resources they request, which is also known as the knee model
[23, 24] and subsequently referred to as finite Leontief utility functions.
Leontief utility functions can also be extended to indivisible demands, i.e.,
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consumer utility increases stepwise and not continuously with the amount
of received resources.
2.3.3.1 Area
Leontief utility functions are applied to model job scheduling. As all VEs
of the same user are assumed to have the same resource requirements, this
implies fixed ratios in which a user requires resources. In combination with
the assumption that arbitrary small tasks can be launched, Leontief utility
functions are justified.
2.3.3.2 Drawbacks
Jobs may have different classes of tasks with different resource requirements
[98], e.g., map and reduce tasks. This poses an argument that Leontief utility
functions are too simple to model job scheduling.
Leontief utility functions do not capture substitutability or diminishing
returns, i.e., that at some point the satisfaction from receiving a certain re-
source lessens. [114] points out that computing Leontief utility functions
from profiling data is potentially NP-hard, as it requires non-convex opti-
mization.
2.3.4 Cobb-Douglas Functions
When consumer ci has a Cobb-Douglas utility function, a ratio of resources
exists that gives ci a utility most efficiently. The lack of a resource r relative to
this optimal ratio can be compensated by allocatingmore of other resources.
However, this compensation gets more and more “expensive” the more of
r is lacking and the more unevenly other resources are used for compensa-
tion. Just as for Leontief utility functions, the Cobb-Douglas utility function
of ci is defined by a vector vi 2 Rr. The utility ci derives from the bundle
(x1; x2; : : : ; xr) is then defined by
ui(x1; x2; : : : ; xr) =
rY
j=1
xvijj : (2.2)
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Since resource quantities are connectedmultiplicatively, Cobb-Douglas util-
ity functions allow to model substitutabilities and dependencies. In a nor-
malized presentation, numbers in the vector vi sum up to 1, which allows
to compare different valuations of different consumers on the same scale.
By choosing exponents  1, diminishing returns can be modeled. Cobb-
Douglas utility functions can be derived from sampling data by classical re-
gression methods [114].
2.3.4.1 Area
Cobb-Douglas utility functions are proposed in [114] to model utility func-
tions whenMRs are allocated.
2.3.4.2 Drawbacks
Cobb-Douglas utility functions allow to substitute resources by other re-
sources. However, not all resources are substitutable (cf. Section 2.2.1.4),
which prevents Cobb-Douglas utility functions from being applied.
2.3.5 Example
Figure 2.2 shows the Leontief (lt) and Cobb-Douglas (cd) indifference
curves for requirement vector (0:3; 0:7) and utilities 1 and 3. All bundles de-
scribed by an indifference curve provide the sameutility. As the twoLeontief
indifference curves are rectangular and parallel to the “resource” axes, utility
cannot be increased by only receiving more of one resource. In particular,
the bundles described by the vertex of the indifference curves are the mini-
mal bundles, i.e., without redundant resources, that provide the utility 1 and
3. In contrast, the Cobb-Douglas indifference curves converge towards the
axes, which shows that substitution, although increasingly expensive, is pos-
sible. Indifference curve ind belongs to a consumer who only cares about the
amount of resources but not their ratio.
In addition to those utility functions discussed, single-resource allocation
paradigms are theoretical concepts for resource allocation in data centers.
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r1
r2
lt = 1
cd = 1ind = 0.5
lt = 3
cd = 3
Figure 2.2: Five indifference curves for different utility functions.
2.4 Single-resource Allocation Paradigms
Max-min fairness and proportional fairness are allocation paradigms defined
for the allocation of a single resource and extended toMRA[78].
2.4.1 Max-min Fairness
Max-min fairness, also known as the Rawlsian notion of the egalitarian social
welfare, is one extreme of fairness notions, as it maximizes the utility of the
most unhappy consumer without consideration of the overall efficiency. It is
frequently applied in computer science, in particular, bandwidth allocation
[27]. [31] extends max-min fairness by placement constraints, to allocate a
single resource provided by different nodes.
2.4.2 Proportional Fairness
Proportional Fairness is introduced in [46] and puts a stronger emphasis on
efficiency than max-min fairness does. In particular, proportional fairness
demands allocating resources to consumers in proportion to how efficiently
they use them, i.e., in proportion to how strongly these resources increase
their utility. Formally, a proportionally fair allocation Amaximizes
cX
i=1
log ui(Ai): (2.3)
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To maximize the value that Equation 2.3 yields, more resources have to be
allocated to those consumers, whose utility increases fast. However, the log-
function implies that the value of the equation increases slower, when allo-
cating resources to a consumer, who already has a high utility, and, therefore,
avoids neglecting consumers with slowly increasing utilities.
An alternative definition of a proportionally fair allocation A is that for
any other allocation A0 the sum of proportional changes to the consumers’
satisfaction is not positive, i.e.,
cX
i=1
ui(A0i)  ui(Ai)
ui(Ai)
 0: (2.4)
Proportional fairness can be extended to weights [12]. As noted in [21]
the Nash bargaining solution (maximizing the product of utilities) and the
Competitive Equilibria from Equal Incomes (CEEI, split resources equally
among consumers and subsequently assign prices to the resources, such that
trading clears themarket) are well regarded solutions inmicroeconomics for
bargaining and fairness and equivalent to proportional fairness for a large
class of utility functions, e.g., homogeneous utility functions [65].
2.4.3 Extension toMRAby BundleMeasures
Toapply the allocationparadigms above toMRA,every bundlemust be char-
acterized by a scalar. In the case of a single resource this scalar is trivially
the amount of the only resource in the bundle. However, when multiple re-
sources are allocated, consumers receive a vector of resources. Thus, in order
to apply the allocation paradigms to MRA, a bundle measure is necessary,
i.e., a metric that objectively (and not on a per consumer basis) quantifies the
value of bundles and, thereby, maps allocation vectors to scalars.
The most intuitive bundle measure is the L1 norm, which determines the
value of a bundle by adding up how much of the different resources relative
to the overall supply the bundle contains. Asset fairness [30] extends max-
min fairness toMRAby using the L1 norm as bundlemeasure. The L1 norm
defines the value of a bundle by the bundle’s dominant share, which is the
largest amount relative to the overall supply of any resource in the bundle,
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i.e., only the resource that is contained most of in the bundle is relevant for
the bundle’s value. Dominant resource fairness (cf Section 2.6.1) extends
max-min fairness toMRAby using the L1 norm as bundle measure. Bundle
measures are not constrained to norms but everymonotonic and continuous
function can be used as bundle measure.
Extending max-min fairness to MRA by using bundle measure M is ab-
breviated by M-max-min fairness in this thesis. Therefore, asset fairness is
a synonym for L1-max-min fairness and dominant resource fairness is a syn-
onym for L1-max-min fairness.
When single-resource allocation paradigms are extended to MRA, they
ideally result in the following characteristics.
2.5 Characteristics
The following fairness and efficiency characteristics recurring throughout lit-
erature are considered relevant for data centers [78]. The relations of these
characteristics and the definitions of previous Sections 2.3 and 2.4 are illus-
trated inFigure 2.3. Thefiguredepicts the inclusionof utility functions by the
rotated symbol,< denotes that the characteristic on the right is stronger
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than the characteristic on the left, and=) indicates which definitions imply
Pareto efficiency.
2.5.1 Envy Freeness (EF)
Envy freeness ensures that no consumer can complain that another consumer
receives more. An allocation is envy-free (EF), if no consumer c prefers the
bundle of another consumer over the bundle c receives [13, 23, 30]. EF is
essential for an intuitive understanding of fairness, since envy is a clear sign
of unfairness. Its verification and enforcement requires to know consumers’
utility functions, as the latter are necessary to determine, whether consumers
do envy other consumers.
If the c consumers arrive in c steps and never release resources once allo-
cated, an allocation is dynamic EF, if a consumer ci envies a consumer cj only
if cj arrived before ci did and cj has not received resources since ci arrived [45].
AnAM is (dynamic)EF, if it always returns an allocation that is (dynamic)
EF.
2.5.2 Sharing Incentives (SI)
Sharing Incentives (SI) ensures that no consumer is better off, when re-
sources are shared naively. The equal division divides every resource equally
among consumers (or, if consumers are associated with weights, proportion-
ally to the consumers’ weight). An allocation provides SI, or, for the sake of
brevity, an allocation is SI, if every consumer c is at least as good off as cwould
be under the equal division.
SI finds notably more reference in the context of data centers than in
economics and is widely accepted as a desirable goal for data center Multi-
Resource Allocation (MRA). Thus it surprises that SI is ambiguous, when
the realistic assumption is made, that resources are partitioned to different
nodes. Therefore, [103, 109] refine SI as follows. An allocation A is strong
SI, if every consumer c is at least as good off under A, as cwould be when the
resources of every node are divided equally. A is weak SI, if an equal divi-
sion exists, that gives every consumer at most as much utility as A. An equal
division is an allocation that gives each consumer a c-th of every resource,
whereat it is not specified how resources are provided by individual nodes.
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Therefore, usually equal divisions exist that allocate consumers zero of some
resource on every node. This makes weak SI indeed a weak characteristic.
Coalitional game theory considers the question of how a coalition of
agents should divide the coalition’s payoff. In this context, coalitional game
theory defines the “core of payoff divisions” as the set of payoff divisions, for
which no agents have incentive to leave the coalition to form a smaller coali-
tion that allows them to receive a bigger payoff [95]. Thismotivates to define
that an allocation is core SI, if no subset of consumers can do better by form-
ing a coalition to divide their equal shares exclusively in this coalition.
AnAM is SI, strong SI, weak SI, or core SI, if it always returns an allocation
that is SI, strong SI, weak SI, or core SI, respectively.
2.5.3 Pareto Efficiency (PE)
Paretoefficiencyensures thatnoallocationexists that is unambiguouslymore
efficient than the current allocation. Pareto efficiency does not capture fair-
ness but efficiency and is desirable under virtually all circumstances. An allo-
cation is Pareto-efficient (PE), if no allocation exists that makes at least one
consumer better off, while making no consumer worse off [38]. PE is neces-
sary for overall efficiency but not sufficient.
[38] introduces the concept of non-wastefulness, which demands that no
resource desired by any consumer is left unallocated and that no consumer
c receives resources c has no use for. It is pointed out that under perfectly
complementary utility functions any non-wasteful allocation is PE.This triv-
ial achievement of PE increases the relevance of fairness.
Proportional fairness implies PE: Assume proportionally fair allocationA
is not PE. Because A is not PE, an allocation A0 exists, that gives each con-
sumer at least the same utility and at least one consumer more utility. Then
the left side of Equation 2.4 is positive. However, then A is not PE.
If the c consumers arrive in c steps and never release resources once allo-
cated, achieving PE and EF in every step is impossible: PE demands to al-
locate most resources to the consumers who have already arrived, which are
then envied by consumers arriving in subsequent steps. Therefore, an alloca-
tion Ak in step k is defined to be dynamic PE, if Ak allocates at most a (k=c)-
fraction of every resource and is PE among those allocations that allocate at
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most a (k=c)-fraction of every resource, i.e., none of these allocations makes
at least one consumer better off, while making no user worse off. While dy-
namic PE and EF are generally incompatible, dynamic PE and dynamic EF
are not [45]. An allocation is defined to be cautious dynamic PE if it can ul-
timately guarantee EF and is PE among those allocations that can ultimately
guarantee EF.
An AM is (dynamic/cautious dynamic) PE, if it always returns an alloca-
tion that is (dynamic/cautious dynamic) PE.
2.5.4 Strategyproofness (SP)
Contrary to former characteristics, strategyproofness can only hold for an
AM but not for an allocation. An AM is strategyproof (SP) or truthful, if
consumers cannot increase their utility by providing false information, e.g.,
the AM gives incentives to consumers to report their true utility function.
SP is generally hard to prove and often impossible to achieve.
Group SP is a stronger version of SP and demands that, whenever a coali-
tion of consumers coordinates their misreporting, there is at least one con-
sumer in the coalition that will beworse of. This straightforward extension of
SP to coalitions is similar to the extension of SI to coalitions in Section 2.5.2.
In practice SP is not necessarily as important as one might expect: [115]
points out “that as long as fairness (however one may decide to define it) is
maintained, there is no way that the system can distinguish between a client
that genuinely requiresmore resources and one that is trying to game the sys-
tem.” [12, 13] shows that APs exist that are not SP in theory, but consumers
cannot game the AP in practice, because they lack necessary information.
[114] shows that APs exist that are not SP in general but for a sufficiently
large number of consumers. This characteristic is termed SP in the large.
Utilization incentive is introduced in [77] and a special-case of SP, as it
demands that no consumer can benefit from under-reporting demands. Uti-
lization incentive ensures that consumers do not utilize less of an underuti-
lized resource to receive more of a resource under contention.
Ideally the theoretical concepts discussed so far are achieved by data cen-
ter MRAapproaches.
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2.6 MRAApproaches for Data Centers
While basic and generic notions for fairness and efficiency have been dis-
cussed above, MRA fairness approaches for data centers need to be de-
tailed [78]. Thus, Table 2.3 summarizes the respective findings and this
section discusses existing approaches in proportion to papers published on
them. Thus, shortcomings of approaches are discussed in the same set of pro-
portions. The abbreviations in the columnApproach define in a single row of
this table one separate approach, which is detailed in the subsections below.
Each subsection discusses first for which area of data center resource alloca-
tion this approach is designated, which alsomotivates utility functions (sum-
marized inTable 2.3 columnsArea andUtility Functions). Secondly, each sub-
section discusses the fairness definition proposed by the approach (Fairness
Definition column). Whether an approach is SP, SI, PE, or EF is specified in
the four rightmost columns, while not explicitly stated in the sections. Fur-
thermore, the discussion here details the approaches’ implementations. Fi-
nally, if applicable, shortcomings and extensions are discussed.
2.6.1 Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF)
Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) [30] is the most prominent approach
toMRA fairness in data centers. DRF has been extended in many directions
and compares bundles by their dominant resource, i.e., the value of a bundle
is defined by the amount (normalized by the overall supply) of the resource
that is contained most in the bundle. Therefore, all other resources in the
bundle are ignored.
2.6.1.1 Area and Utilities
DRF is applied to job scheduling, wherefore Leontief utility functions are
assumed (cf. Section 2.3.3.1).
2.6.1.2 Fairness Definition
DRF defines fairness as dominant resource fairness (cf. Section 2.4.3). Thus,
every user receives the same dominant share, if users request a strictly pos-
itive amount of every resource. Due to the assumption of Leontief utility
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functions, the dominant share that a user receives precisely determines the
amount of all other resources received.
2.6.1.3 Implementation
ADRF AM is proposed in [30], which allows users to start tasks with differ-
ent resource requirements. A DRF AP is implemented in the Mesos cluster
resource manager to show that DRF improves throughput and fairness com-
pared to standard slot-based fair sharing schemes [30, 40].
2.6.1.4 Shortcomings
While DRF is the de facto standard for MRA in data centers, it shows short-
comings.
2.6.1.4.1 Assumptions and Practice
All proofs for DRF’s desirable characteristics are based on Leontief utility
functions. However, the DRF AP proposed in [30] allows users to change
the ratio of their resource requests and users may indeed havemore complex
utility functions (cf. Section 2.3.3.2). [60] provides an example of an unfair
DRF allocation, when Leontief utility functions do not hold.
2.6.1.4.2 Intuitive Fairness
DRF chooses the L1 norm to quantify bundles, but never justifies this
choice. [38] points out thatmany other functions including allLi2N+ norms
are feasible. Each alternative results in a unique allocation that can be found
in polynomial time. It is hard to argue in favor for one of these alterna-
tives. Moreover, the L1 norm is inappropriate, when non-perfectly com-
plementary utility functions are assumed, because the L1 norm is oblivious
to all non-dominant resources in a bundle. However, even for Leontief utility
functions DRF allocations can be intuitively unfair: Consider the following
example, which points to a problem similar to the problems in [11, Section
3.2], [56, Section 7], and Section 3.2.1. Assume there are two resources, each
of which is available in one infinitely divisible unit, and three users with de-
mands (1; 0); (0; 1); (1; 1), i.e., the first user only requests the first resource,
the seconduser requests only the second resource, and the thirduser requests
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both resources in equal amounts. DRF allocates the first user 0:5 units of the
first resource, the same for the seconduser and second resource, and the third
user receives 0:5 units of both resources. Therefore, the third user receives
the same amount of resources as the other two users combined, which is in-
tuitively unfair (cf. Section 3.2.1). This example can be extended to m > 2
resources and m + 1 users, where one user receives the same amount of re-
sources as all otherm users combined. In these examples, theDRFAMgives
incentive to users with asymmetric utility functions to form a coalition with
their equal shares and divide it among them. Therefore, this example shows
that, while DRF is SI, it is not core SI (cf. Section 2.5.2). Notably, even if the
newly formed coalition allocates their resource share according to DRF, the
coalition partners are better off than in the “grand coalition”. Therefore, even
without new allocation strategies, users can increase their allocation simply
by forming coalitions.
2.6.1.4.3 Efficiency
[74] justifies DRF’s potentially poor overall efficiency by impossibility re-
sults for AMs that are SP or EF or SI. However, [12, 13] show that applying
proportional fairness to the dominant shares (instead of the max-min fair-
ness) greatly increases overall efficiency (cf. Section 2.6.5). Although apply-
ing proportional instead of max-min fairness makes the AMnon SP, [12, 13]
argue that in data centers users nonetheless have insufficient information to
game the AM.
2.6.1.5 Extensions
[30] left many questions open that are theoretically interesting and made
many assumptions that are practically too simplistic. These theoretical ques-
tions were investigated in follow up works just as DRF was extended to the
more realistic assumptions that user demands are finite and resources are
distributed over multiple nodes. Furthermore, DRF was extended from re-
source sharing in space to resource sharing in time, to make it applicable to
middleboxes, which is not subject of this thesis, and it was extended by user
hierarchies. These extensions are discussed next and constitute important
research directions for less developed approaches.
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2.6.1.5.1 Theoretical Extensions
[74] investigates DRF from an economic point of view and establishes the
groundwork for many other DRF extensions. In particular, [74] shows that
DRF retains its desirable characteristics when users are weighted and even
when they do not require every resource (the latter assumption was crucial
for many arguments in [30]). Also, DRF’s poor performance with respect to
overall efficiency is justifiedby impossibility results forAMs that are SP, orEF
or SI. It is shown that perfect fairness cannot always be achieved, when users
have indivisible demands. Additionally, an AM that achieves fairness to the
best possible extent given these impossibilities is presented. It is argued that
this algorithm can be implemented for dynamic scenarios, i.e., where users
change their demands over time.
A different economic perspective onDRF can be found in [38], which ex-
tends DRF in terms of utility functions and bundle measures to define Gen-
eralized Resource Fairness (cf. Section 2.6.3).
2.6.1.5.2 Finite Demands and Joining of Users
[45] presents (a) a DRF AM that is SI, dynamic EF, dynamic PE, and SP in
every step and (b) a DRF AM that is SI, EF, cautious dynamic PE, and SP
in every step. [55] improves the runtime of the first AM introduced in [45]
frompseudo-polynomial to linear. The comparison to an optimal offlineAM
shows that the AM, although online, is nearly optimal. [57, 62] present a
DRF AM that (a) works for finite Leontief utility functions, (b) is SI, dy-
namic EF, dynamic PE, and SP in every step, and (c) runs in O(u2 log u),
where u is the number of users. This runtime is an advantage over the (also)
polynomial AMs of [45].
[56] extendsDRF to finite Leontief utility functions by comparing alloca-
tions by their lexicographic value. In particular, the fairness of allocations is
compared by ordering the dominant shares increasingly and comparing the
resulting vectors lexicographically. An AM is presented that determines an
allocation that is optimal according to this metric. It is proven that the AM
is group SP, EF, PE, and SI. Although the definitions and AM work for all
norms, i.e., Li2N+[1, arguments in favour of using the L1 norm are pre-
sented.
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2.6.1.5.3 Multiple Nodes
[28, 61, 85, 94, 103, 109, 117] extend DRF to the case, where resources are
distributed over multiple heterogenous nodes. [28, 61, 85] assume indivisi-
ble demands, while [94, 103, 109, 117] assume infinitely divisible demands.
All approaches, except [94], define the dominant share of a user relative to
the sum of node resources.
[94] is the first work to extend DRF to multiple nodes. A formula of [44]
is extended todefine theOptimizationProblem(OP).This extensiondefines
the value user u receives as the sum of u’s dominant shares over all nodes. As
thesedominant shares are calculated relative to the respectivenode’s capacity,
the same dominant share may correspond to different amounts of resources
depending on the node. However, this is not addressed. An AM for solving
theOP repeatedly to converge toward a solution is presented and the authors
demonstrate fast convergence. However, the number of variables in the OP
is equal to the product of nodes and users. Thus, the question of how long
one iteration takes arises but is not addressed.
[85] explicitly addresses VEs scheduling andVE placement. [85] focuses
on PE instead of EF or SP. This focus is justified by impossibility results in
[74] for indivisible demands. No formal proof of PE is provided.
[28] proves that no deterministic AM is SI, PE, and SP simultaneously.
This result motivates the subsequently presented non-deterministic AM that
is ex-ante (a) dominant resource fair, (b) PE, and (c) SP under the idealistic
assumption that all users are utilitymaximizers, which implies that theymust
not be risk averse. Theconcrete algorithmic implementationof thisAMis left
open.
[109] is an extended version of [103]. [103, 109] formulate anOPwith as
many variables as the product of nodes and users (just as [94]) and discuss
the ambiguity of SI, when resources are distributed overmultiple nodes. The
OP results in a DRF allocation that is EF, PE, group SP, weak SI, and signifi-
cantly better than enforcing DRF at each node individually. It is argued that
not achieving strong SI is the tradeoff for the high overall efficiency. It is also
sketched how this approach can be extended to (a) weighted users, (b) finite
demands, and (c) indivisible demands.
35
[117] highlights the complexity of finding a solution for the OP formu-
lated in [103, 109]. Thus, [117] presents two distributed AMs to approxi-
mate DRF in a distributed environment. It is assumed that every node can
only communicate with few other nodes about known users and their bun-
dles. Simulations show that these distributedAMs scale and achieve a similar
level of DRF as a centralized implementation.
2.6.1.5.4 User Hierarchies
[11] extends DRF by user hierarchies. The presented AP is implemented
for Hadoop YARN and allows to organize users in a weighted tree structure,
where the leaves are users and each inner node has a positive weight, which
denotes its relative importance. [11] points out a key-feature called sibling
sharing, which enables resources to stay within a sub-organization in the hi-
erarchy, when users finish within that sub-organization.
2.6.2 Bottleneck-based Fairness (BBF)
Bottleneck-based fairness (BBF) is introduced in [24] for virtualized envi-
ronments and demands that every user, if not satisfied, receives a “fair” share
of at least one resource that is depleted.
2.6.2.1 Area and Utilities
BBF is designated to be enforced by hypervisors among VMs to allocate a
node’s PRs. Most work on BBF assumes finite Leontief utility functions [23,
24], while BBF is also applicable to perfectly complementary, continuous,
and strictly monotonic utility functions [38].
2.6.2.2 Fairness Definition
An allocation is bottleneck-based fair or allows for “no justified complaints”,
if every user either receives all requested resources or at least the equal share
on a bottleneck resource, i.e., a resource which is fully utilized, and the other
resources in proportion to this bottleneck resource based on the user’s utility
function.
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2.6.2.3 Implementation
[38] presents a polynomial time AM to find a BBF allocation for finite Leon-
tief utility functions. While theAM is of theoretical interest, it is too complex
to be applied in practice.
[115] describes the following multi-resource on-line scheduling policy
that achieves BBF without knowing users’ utility functions in advance. For a
resource r and a user u, u’s gap of r is the difference betweenwhat u receives of
r and the equal share of r, i.e., the less u receives of r, the larger u’s gap of r. u’s
minimal gap over all bottleneck resources is u’s priority that is used to sched-
ule all resources. A problem with this approach is that bottleneck resources
are often determined by allocation decisions taken before.
2.6.2.4 Shortcomings
Enforcing BBF is neither SP nor EF. However, [13] shows that in realistic
settings users do not have enough information to successfully game a BBF
AM.
2.6.2.5 Extensions
[23] proves that for finite Leontief utility functions a BBF allocation always
exists, even if there aremultiple bottleneck resources. [38] proves that for all
perfectly complementary, continuous, and strictly monotonic utility func-
tions a BBF allocation always exists.
[13] defines Bottleneck Max Fair (BMF) allocations as those BBF alloca-
tions, where every user receives a bundle of at least one bottleneck resource
that is maximal for that resource. It is demonstrated that a BMF allocation
(a) always exists, (b) is similar to the proportionally fair allocation (cf. Sec-
tion 2.6.5) but simpler to calculate, and (c) is more efficient than the DRF
allocation.
2.6.3 Generalized Resource Fairness (GRF)
Generalized Resource Fairness (GRF) is defined in [38] and puts DRF in a
theoretical context by allowing more utility functions and bundle measures.
As theonly constant commonality amongDRFandGRF ismax-min fairness,
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GRFcan also be viewed as an investigation ofmax-min fairness in the context
of multiple resources.
2.6.3.1 Area and Utilities
No practical application case is proposed, as GRF is developed out of tech-
nical curiosity. However, GRF theoretically has several application cases, as
perfectly complementary utility functions are assumed.
2.6.3.2 Fairness Definition
Generalized Resource Fairness (GRF) generalizes DRF with respect to the
bundle measure and utility functions [38]. In particular, GRF allows all
monotonic and continuous functions as bundle measures and all perfectly
complementary utility functions. Therefore, DRF is a special case of GRF
and the only constant commonality of DRF and GRF is the enforcement of
max-min fairness. Another special case of GRF is asset fairness. [38] shows
that for every instantiation ofGRF the according allocation is unique and can
be found in polynomial time. GRF is PE, but [38] does not discuss charac-
teristics such as SP, SI, or EF.
2.6.3.3 Implementation
[38] presents a pseudo-polynomial AM to calculate a GRF allocation. The
AMneeds access to users’ utility functions. [56] presents an AM to find allo-
cations for a constrained version ofGRF,when resources are distributed over
different nodes (cf. Section 2.6.1.5.3). This version of GRF is constrained to
finite Leontief utility functions and norms as a bundle measure.
2.6.4 Resource Elasticity Fairness (REF)
Resource Elasticity Fairness (REF) is defined in [114], complies with well
regarded fairness definitions from economics, and, therefore, has many de-
sirable characteristics.
2.6.4.1 Area and Utilities
[114] aims to allocate cache capacity and memory bandwidth and profiles
different applications to convincingly argue that Cobb-Douglas utility func-
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tions are well suitable to model diminishing returns and substitution effects
of theseMRs. It is argued, that also the dependency of otherMRs, e.g., num-
ber of processor cores, can be modeled by this class of utility functions.
2.6.4.2 Fairness Definition
Resource Elasticity Fairness (REF) is defined via an AM.The produced so-
lution is shown to be a Nash bargaining solution and a CEEI, which are both
well regarded fairness definitions from economics.
2.6.4.3 Implementation
TheproposedAM receives user’s reported utility functions as input and is SP
in the large already for tens of users. Cycle-accurate processor and memory
simulators are used to show that the AM causes an overall efficiency loss of
less than 10% (efficiency is measured by the number of instructions commit-
ted per cycle), compared to when no fairness mechanism is active.
2.6.5 Proportional Dominant resource Fairness (PDF)
Proportional Dominant resource Fairness (PDF) is introduced in [12, 13]
and extends proportional fairness to MRAby using the L1 norm as bundle
measure. Therefore, PDF can be viewed as a modification of DRF by replac-
ing the max-min-fairness with proportional fairness.
2.6.5.1 Area and Utilities
PDF is designated for job scheduling, wherefore Leontief utility functions
are assumed. (cf. Section 2.3.3.1).
2.6.5.2 Fairness Definition
PDF extends proportional fairness toMRAby using the L1 norm as bundle
measure. As proportional fairness trades off a certain degree of fairness for
efficiency, PDF shows a higher overall efficiency than DRF.
2.6.5.3 Implementation
[13] presents AMs to implement the PDF for scheduling as well as queuing
problems.
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2.6.5.4 Shortcomings
PDF uses Leontief utility functions to model job scheduling. However,
Leontief utility functions are often too simple for this purpose (cf. Section
2.3.3.2).
PDF is not SP. However, [12, 13] argues that under the realistic assump-
tion that the population of users follows a stochastic process, users are unable
to game PDF, even if they have partial knowledge about the requirements of
other users.
2.6.6 Proportional Fairness Theory (PFT)
Proportional FairnessTheory (PFT) investigates proportional fairness from
an mechanism design perspective. The results achieved in [21] are theoreti-
cally interesting but practically not applicable due to very low efficiency.
2.6.6.1 Area and Utilities
[21] aims at theoretical insights and considers homogeneous functions of de-
gree one as utility functions. The results achieved in [21] are theoretically ap-
plicable to the allocation ofMRs and job scheduling, becauseCobb-Douglas
functions and Leontief functions are homogeneous of degree one. However,
for these special cases, stronger results exist (cf. Section 2.6.4 and 2.6.5).
2.6.6.2 Fairness Definition
PFT defines fairness as proportional fairness. SP is achieved by largely sacri-
ficing efficiency.
2.6.6.3 Implementation
[21] presents an AM to which each user announces a bundle of resources.
TheAM then allocates the announced bundle scaled down by a factor, which
depends on the bundle’s comparativeness. The AM is SI and gives each user
c at least 1=e = 0:368 of c’s proportional fair utility, i.e., of the utility c would
get from a perfectly proportionally fair allocation.
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2.6.6.4 Shortcomings
In order to be SP, the AM may hold back resources. This approach is the-
oretically justified by showing that no AM that is SI can guarantee to every
user a utility greater than 0.5 of the proportional fair utility. Although the ef-
ficiency of the AM is low, the AM is interesting, because it gives a constant
factor approximation to every user of the user’s proportionally fair allocation.
2.6.7 Priority-based Sharing (PBS)
[47, 48] introduce fairness via Priority-based Sharing (PBS) and point out
that clusters, which provide several PRs such as CPU, RAM, GPUs, and
HDDstorage, are often sharedbasedonpriorities, which are calculated solely
based on utilized CPU time. Accordingly, situations are possible, where a
user utilizes 100% of a machine’sRAM, but only 10%CPU, whichmakes the
remaining 90%ofCPUunusable, while the user is only accounted 10%usage.
2.6.7.1 Area and Utilities
PBS is applied to job scheduling and makes scheduling decisions based on
the current resource utilization of users, wherefore utility functions are not
specified.
2.6.7.2 Fairness Definition
[47, 48] introduce fairness via penalty functions. A penalty function aggre-
gates a user’s currentmulti-resource utilization to a (priority) scalar. Theuser
with the highest priority can launch the next task.
2.6.7.3 Implementation
An AP implemented for the TORQUE resource manager is used in produc-
tion as of Nov. 2013 [47].
2.6.7.4 Shortcomings
Asutility functions arenot specified, characteristics SP, SI, PE, andEFcannot
be discussed.
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2.6.7.5 Extensions
[47, 48] identify the following penalty functions as most advantageous.
2.6.7.5.1 Arithmetic Functions
[48] is dedicated to finding a penalty function P that suffices the following
five requirements.
1. P takes several resources into account.
2. P calculates the penalty based on several resources, not only based on
the dominant share: When users have the same dominant share, their
priority is distinguished by the utilization of other resources.
3. P has to result in a maximal penalty, whenever a user completely uti-
lizes a resource of a node. In particular, this maximal penalty has to
hold irrespective of howmuch is utilized of the other resources, since
it blocks the respective node.
4. P increases linearly with the utilization of resources, to not give incen-
tive to artificially partition workloads.
5. P shall allow for associating weights with resources.
Different penalty functions are compared with respect to these require-
ments and it is proven that Requirement 2, 3, and 4 cannot be achieved si-
multaneously. It is shown that defining P as the sum or product of (relative)
utilizations yields penalty functions that suffice all but Requirement 3 or 4,
respectively.
2.6.7.5.2 Improved Processor Equivalent
[47] improves theProcessorEquivalent (PEQ)metric. The improvedPEQis
available in theMaui andMoab schedulers [1]. A task’s PEQ is the dominant
share over CPU andRAMrelative to the data center-wide capacity times the
data center-wide CPU capacity.
A drawback of PEQ is that it does not account for, when a node is com-
pletely blocked: consider node n that has moreRAM than CPU relative to
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the data center’s average. Furthermore, assume n is completely occupied by
task ti, because ti utilizes all of n’sRAM.Then, ti’s PEQ is determined by its
RAM utilization. Now assume, instead of ti, task tj runs on n and uses all
of n’s CPU. tj’s utilization ofRAM is sufficiently small, such that tj’s PEQ is
determined by its CPU utilization. Accordingly, tj’s PEQ smaller than ti’s
PEQ. However, because both ti and tj entirely utilize one of n’s resources,
both block n completely. Therefore, ti and tj effectively occupy the same data
center resources and should have the same PEQ. To overcome this problem,
[47] calculates a task’s penalty as the dominant sharewith respect to the node
capacity insteadof data center-wide capacity. Tomakedominant shares com-
parable across nodes they are normalized by the nodes’ CPU capacity (fur-
thermore, wall time normalization is applied). While this determines an im-
provement, a task’s penalty is still sensitive to scheduler decisions. That is,
depending on a task’s host, the task’s PEQ is different. This is undesirable,
because tasks can only take limited influence on the scheduler. To achieve
scheduler insensitivity, the penalty of a task is calculated with respect to each
node type that could host the task. The smallest of these penalties defines the
task’s final penalty. The penalty of a user is the sum of penalties of the user’s
tasks.
2.6.8 Reciprocal Resource Fairness (RRF)
Reciprocal Resource Fairness (RRF) is similar to asset fairness and loosely
defined in [60] by an AP.
2.6.8.1 Area and Utilities
RRF is designated to share PRs among VMs that belong to users, who have
rented these PRs together. The sharing is established based on ad hoc needs,
wherefore utility functions are not specified.
2.6.8.2 Fairness Definition
RRF generalizesmax-min fairness tomultiple resource types and is designed
to be (a) SI, (b) SP, and (c) to provide gain-as-you-contribute fairness. Goal c
means that a user receives spare PRs from other users proportionally to how
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many PRs this user cedes to other users. While a formal definition for Goal
c is not available, [60] states that asset fairness is considered optimal.
2.6.8.3 Implementation
A prototypical RRF AP for Xen is provided. Firstly, PRs are traded between
users based on their needs. Secondly, VMpriorities are adapted by the users,
who own the VMs, depending on the VMs’ requirements.
2.6.8.4 Shortcomings
When aVMdoes not utilize all PRs it is entitled to basedon its “shares”, those
PRs are not always fully utilized by other VMs but RRF counts those PRs, as
if they were. As Goal c and the AP are not uniquely formalized, RRF cannot
be considered a concrete definition of fairness but only as an AP.
2.6.9 Task Share Fairness (TSF)
Task Share Fairness (TSF) is defined in [104, 105] and based on max-min
fairness. TSF allows for placement constraints and has many desirable char-
acteristics.
2.6.9.1 Area and Utilities
TSF is applied to job scheduling, wherefore Leontief utility functions are as-
sumed (cf. Section 2.3.3.1). However, each user also states a boolean place-
ment constraint vector that indicates for each node in the data center, if the
node can host the user’s tasks. Furthermore, it is assumed that resources are
partitioned to different nodes.
2.6.9.2 Fairness Definition
Fairness is defined as max-min fairness among task shares of users. The task
share of a user u is defined as the ratio of the number of tasks u currently runs
and the number of tasks u could run, if u had no placement constraints and
there were no other users in the data center.
[104] shows that TSF is SI, SP, EF, and PO. It is highlighted, that under
placement constraints, no extension of DRF to multiple nodes (cf. Section
2.6.1.5.3) has these characteristics.
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2.6.9.3 Implementation
A TSF AP for Apache Mesos allows the user with the lowest task share to
launch the next task. Placement constraints are specified by white- or black-
lists.
2.6.10 Other
The following approaches are not reflected in Table 2.3, because they do not
propose definitions of but present theoretical perspectives on data center
MRA fairness or show how to arrange fairness and efficiency requirements.
2.6.10.1 Fairness Quantification and Efficiency Tradeoffs
An area of fairness research in computer science is quantifying fairness of
an existing allocation. Notably, this quantification is not even straightfor-
ward, when only a single resource has to be allocated. The question to be
answered is, given an allocation vector v 2 Ru0, where vi is what user ui re-
ceives, how fair is the allocation (quantified by a real number)? An early and
prominent attempt to quantify fairness is Jain’s Index [43] and a second ap-
proach is α-fairness [118]. The latter approach allows to specify a bounded
fairness-efficiency compromise by parameter α. [51] determines a family of
fairness measures by a function fβ : Ru0 ! R parameterized by β 2 R. For
certain values of β, fβ equates to Jain’s index [43], α-fairness [118], or other
prominent fairness measures, such as entropy [90]. Thus, [51] shows that
these fairness measures lie on a continuum of functions, although they are
conceptually different.
[44] develops a framework to address MRA fairness-efficiency tradeoffs
under the assumption of Leontief utility functions. To this end, two fami-
lies of fairness functions are developed, based on fβ. However, the two fami-
lies are equal except that one familiy measures the bundle of a user ui by ui’s
dominant share and the other familiy measures ui’s bundle by the ratio of
what ui receives to ui’s resource requirement vector. Therefore, these fami-
lies effectively operate on a scalar per user and not a vector, which constrains
their applicability to MRA problems with Leontief utility functions. [107]
extends the framework of [44] to multi-resource sharing in time to investi-
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gate fairness-efficiency tradeoffs, whenflows are scheduledbasedonmultiple
resources. [101] also addresses the fairness efficiency trade-offs for Leontief
utility functions and presents an AP that achieves high utilization, while also
ensuring SI, EF, and PE. As the allocation of multi-tiered storage is investi-
gated, only two resources (hard disk and solid state drive) are allocated and
these resources are directly comparable by their input/output operations per
second.
2.6.10.2 General Framework
[41] theorizes a job scheduling framework, where the scheduler does not
know the size of jobs until their completion. Evenwhen all jobs are known in
advance, instantiated problems are NP-hard. The formulation of the frame-
work is generic, wherefore it can be applied to queuing and scheduling prob-
lems. Three classes of problems are discussed and it is shown that propor-
tional fairness performs well for all of them. Due to the generality of the
problem, the results are weak, according to the authors.
2.6.10.3 Fair Slowdown or Stretch
MRAfairness in data centers can also be defined as equalizing the slowdown
(also known as stretch) that users experience, when the data center’s load
increases. This approach is, for example, taken by [18] to define fairness
in desktop grids. Also [52] pursues this idea by considering the fairness
of “progress shares” that “capture the contribution of each resource to the
progress of a job”. [98] adopts this fairness measure to determine a fair and
efficient mixture for multiclass workflows.
While the slowdown can be considered a substitute for utility functions,
which are not available in data centers, computing the slowdown requires
to run workloads on an unloaded data center to determine a performance
baseline to calculate the slowdown in a loadeddata center [52]. Furthermore,
the equal slowdown approach is not SI or EF [114]. Thus, defining multi-
resource fairness as fair slowdown not only bears theoretical shortcomings
but also practical overhead.
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2.6.10.4 Tetris
[33, 34] present the multi-resource job scheduler Tetris, which shows how
efficiency (in terms of makespan minimization) and fairness (according to
different definitions) can be integrated in practice. The Tetris AP is im-
plemented for Hadoop YARN and its primary goal is the minimization of
makespan. Fairness is integrated by a knob mechanism: when resources be-
come available, all pending tasks are sorted by a customizable fairnessmetric.
The knob k 2 (0; 1] determines the fraction of the queue, from which the
best fitting task in terms of resource utilization is selected. Thus, for minimal
k efficiency is ignored to achieve the highest possible fairness. To determine
how well a task fits, CPU, RAM, disk I/O, and network access of pending
tasks are estimated by monitoring previous tasks of the same job. Tetris also
addressesVE/task placement. The allocation of disk I/O andnetwork access
is controlled by token buckets, which is not detailed by any means.
2.7 Discussion
After formally defining multi-resource allocation problems, this chapter
showed thatmulti-resource allocation problems arise in data centers (a) dur-
ing scheduling, (b) on middle boxes, and when allocating node (c) PRs and
(d)MRs. Utility functions suggested in literature tomodel these different al-
location processeswhere discussed and single-resource allocation paradigms
and their extension to MRA investigated. After discussing desirable charac-
teristics for data centerMRA,different approaches todata centerMRAwhere
discussed and compared in terms of dimensions discussed before hand. The
discussion showed that establishing fairness indata centers byMRA is a com-
plex task for the following reasons.
1. Fairness is to be established among users by allocating NRs to their
VEs, whereat users operate different numbers of VEs.
2. Different heterogenous NRs, such as CPU,RAM, Disk I/O, network
access, cache capacity, and memory bandwidth, are to be allocated,
while dependencies among NRs differ from VE to VE and are fluctu-
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ant over time and often unavailable due to technical or privacy con-
straints.
3. Heterogenous resources prohibit an objective comparison of resource
bundles (this comparison is trivial, if there is only one resource),
which complicates the definition of fairness.
4. VEs as well as NRs are partitioned over different nodes.
5. NRs are allocated in two steps: VE scheduling (which VE to start
next) and NR allocation (how to allocate NRs to running VEs).
Many approaches achieve desirable characteristics (strategyproofness,
sharing incentives, Pareto efficiency, or envy freeness). It was found that
some of these characteristics are trivially achieved under those assumptions
made by these approaches or that they are not relevant in data centers. Two
important single-resource allocation paradigms are max-min fairness and
proportional fairness. Both have been extended tomultiple resources by dif-
ferent approaches and proportional fairness was proven to outperformmax-
min fairness in terms of efficiency under realistic assumptions.
Several approaches (DRF, PDF, PBS, and TSF) leverage exclusively VE
scheduling to establish fairness in data centers. However, VE scheduling can-
not control NR allocations directly. Particularly, when (a) the NR utiliza-
tion of VEs is hard to predict, (b) highly fluctuant, and (c) VEs potentially
run over very long periods, VE scheduling does not ensure that all users re-
ceive a fair amount of NRs. Other approaches focus directly on NR alloca-
tions (BBF and REF). However, these approaches are applied per node and
the NR allocation among nodes is not coordinated. Furthermore, some ap-
proaches are unspecific in their fairness definition (RRF) or solely of the-
oretic interest (GRF). A further shortcoming of several approaches is that
they prove their desirable characteristics on the assumption of Leontief util-
ity functions (DRF and PDF), while Leontief utility functions are too sim-
plistic in general. Also, it was found that some of these characteristics are
trivially achieved under the assumptions made by these approaches or that
they are not relevant in data centers.
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Therefore, an approach is needed, that overcomes these shortcomings
by adapting priorities of VEs to access PRs in a manner that is coordinated
among nodes and intuitively fair among users. Particularly DRF, which has
been extended inmany directions, has been shown to not comply with an in-
tuitive understanding of fairness. In addition, the approach to be developed
must not make any assumptions on utility functions, because dependencies
of PRs are unavailable due to technical or privacy constraints. It is also desir-
able, that this approach provides incentives to users to precisely specify the
PRs their VEs will utilize, which will allow the data center operator to sched-
ule VEs efficiently.
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ANovel Fairness Definition for Clouds
Physical Resource (PR) allocation is the most potent step to controlcloud resources and utility functions are the most important aspect,
when theoreticallymodeling allocation problems. Because controlling cloud
resources through PR allocation was a relatively unexplored research field
before this thesis, this chapter begins by investigating which utility func-
tions are applicable to model PR allocation in Section 3.1. The investigation
shows that the dependency of PRs and their effects on VM performance are
highly complex and virtually unpredictable. Unfortunately, the lack of a well-
defined class of utility functions aggravates defining fairness. Thus, in order
to find a fairness definition to be enforced among users of a private cloud, this
lack has to be circumvented. This thesis does so by defining fairness as pri-
oritizing consumers inversely to their greediness, which accounts for these
technical constraints. Therefore, Section 3.2 investigates an intuitive under-
standing of greediness by a questionnaire among more than 600 individu-
als. Based on the questionnaire results, Section 3.3 develops a novel bundle
measure termed the Greediness Metric (GM) that measures the greediness
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of consumers, when they serve themselves from free-for-all resource pool.
Cloud fairness is defined as prioritizing VMs inversely to the greediness of
their owners, whereat owner greediness is determined by a refined GM. It is
proven that this definition provides several desirable incentives to users.
3.1 Utility Functions of VMs
Utility functions (cf. Section 2.3) describe how combinations of resources
influence the performance perceived by users. Therefore, utility functions
(a) indicate in which ratios resources have to be allocated, in order to max-
imize user satisfaction and efficiency, and (b) are determined by technical
factors. Thus, resource/performance dependencies and, accordingly, utility
functions change depending on which resources are allocated. As PR allo-
cation has so far rarely been investigated but is designated to be leveraged in
this thesis, this section investigates PR/performance dependencies that exist
during PR allocation in an attempt to conclude on a class of utility functions
that is suited to model PR allocation. In particular, PR/performance depen-
dencies are investigated by measuring the scores a VM achieves on different
benchmarks and the PRs that the VM utilizes, while varying the VM’s VRs
and stress on the host system.
3.1.1 Methodology
This thesis investigates the nature of utility functions that VMs have dur-
ing runtime, by examining how combinations of PRs, which are (a) made
available to a VM and (b) utilized by the VM, affect this VM’s performance
[17, 111]. Therefore, differentworkloads are executed on aVMwith a chang-
ing number of VCPUs and VRAM (this influences how many PRs the VM
can access) and varying load levels of the host system (this simulates con-
tention among VMs and also influences howmany PRs the VM can access).
A machine with a 2.5 GHz AMD Opteron 6180 SE processor with 24
cores and 6 and 10 MB of level 2 and 3 cache, respectively, and 64 GB of
ECC DDR3 RAM with 1333 Mhz is used as host system. This configura-
tion was regarded a high-end data center node in 2011 and, thus, was a good
representative of an average data center node, when the measurements were
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conducted in 2014. VM and host have a x86-64 architecture and runUbuntu
14.04.2 LTS, Trusty Tahr, which was the latest Ubuntu release, when the ex-
periments were conducted. All reconfigurations of the VM as well as mea-
surements were conducted by a python script.
3.1.1.1 MeasurementMethod
Every program is a process that consists of one ormore threads, i.e., a process
is an accumulation of threads. Threads are the atomic resource consumers
in computing environments. Therefore, if all possible resource consump-
tion patterns that threads can exhibit are known, consumption patterns of
processes (this includes VMs) can be deduced. However, measuring at the
thread level is technically challenging. Furthermore, the resource utilization
of a process is not simply the sum of resource utilization of its threads, be-
cause threads often share their process’ memory or other resources. There-
fore, measuring threads to conclude on the resource consumption of a pro-
cess is unnecessarily complicated. Accordingly, resource consumption is
measured directly at the VM level, as follows.
3.1.1.1.1 CPU time
The CPU time consumed by a VM is measured via its qemu [9] process.
In particular, KVM in conjunction with qemu was used for virtualization,
wherefore, a VM is a qemu process on the host system. The CPU utilization
of this process is measured via psutil, which is a python module.
The VM’s access to CPU time was altered by the VM’s number of VCPUs
(this requires restarting theVM)andbypinning theVM’sVCPUs to physical
CPU cores and also pinning stress tests [4] to these cores.
3.1.1.1.2 RAM
A significant amount of RAM is typically shared among processes. Most
tools thatmeasureRAMutilizationof individual processes count such shared
memory pages as if they were exclusively utilized by a process and, therefore,
overestimate memory usage. To avoid such overestimation, the VM’sRAM
utilization is determined viasmem’s Proportional Set Size (PSS)metric [92].
ThePSSof a process p is definedby p’s privatememory plus the proportionof
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shared memory pages, i.e., the more processes share a memory page, the less
this page increases p’s PSS. However, it is possible that theRAM utilization
measured for aVMslightly exceeds theVM’sVRAM(cf. Figures 3.1, 3.2, and
3.3), because theVMprocess also ownsRAMpages that are (a) necessary for
virtualization and emulation and (b) independent of theVM’sVRAM(those
pages cannot be used by the guest OS asRAM).
The VM’s RAM access is altered by changing the VM’s VRAM. Just as
changing the VM’s VCPU this requires restarting the VM.
3.1.1.1.3 Permanent Storage I/O
TheVM’s permanent storage I/O is measured via psutil in read/write op-
erations and bytes read/written. However, as most of the VM’s permanent
storage content is cached in the host’s RAM, the VM’s permanent storage
I/O is insignificant and, therefore, not discussed subsequently. For the same
reason, the VM’s permanent storage I/O is not altered. [97] studies the role
permanent storage I/O plays for a VM’s utility function in more detail.
3.1.1.1.4 Network Access
VMs are connected to the physical network via a virtual network interface.
Thus, the VM’s network traffic is measured via the traffic on this virtual in-
terface. However, all tested workloads are local, where they do not produce
traffic on this interface. For the same reason, network access is not altered in
the experiments. [97] studies the role network access plays for a VM’s utility
function in more detail.
3.1.1.2 Workloads
Workloads are simulated by benchmarks of the Phoronix test suite [76].
Using benchmarks to simulate workloads has the advantage, that VM per-
formance, i.e., utility, is clearly captured by the benchmark score. A pro-
gram/benchmark is called a “single-core” program/benchmark, if it only has
a single thread, i.e., cannotutilizemultipleCPUs inparallel. In contrast, a pro-
gram/benchmark is called a “multi-core” program/benchmark, if it is multi-
threaded, i.e., can utilize multiple CPUs in parallel. The following bench-
markswere selected, to representworkloads that are oftenexecuted in clouds.
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3.1.1.2.1 Apache
Clouds frequently host web servers and Apache is the globally most popu-
lar web server software. Therefore, the Apache benchmark is selected as a
workload. This workload measures how many requests the Apache server
can sustain concurrently. Therefore, the higher the score, the better.
3.1.1.2.2 Nginx
The secondmost popular webserver is nginx. Just as the Apache benchmark,
this benchmark measures how many requests the nginx server can sustain
concurrently. Therefore, the higher the score, the better.
3.1.1.2.3 Aio-stress
The speed of permanent storage I/O (hard disk or solid state drive) is critical
for the performance of a large variety of applications. Therefore, this speed is
assessed by the aio-stress benchmark. The higher the score, the better.
Data a VMbelieves to reside in permanent storagemay actually be cached
inRAM by the hypervisor. Therefore, executing this benchmark or any per-
manent storage access in a VM, not necessarily results in accessing the phys-
ical permanent storage (cf. Section 3.1.1.1.3).
3.1.1.2.4 Phpbench
Older websites may be based on PHP. Therefore, phpbench is selected as
benchmark as well. phpbench performs 106 (simple) tests in order to bench
various aspects of the PHP interpreter. The higher the score, the better.
3.1.1.2.5 Pybench
Python is a popular scripting language. Therefore, the pybench bench-
mark was selected to represent a workload. Pybench measures the execu-
tion time of Python functions such as BuiltinFunctionCalls and NestedFor-
Loops. Therefore, the lower the score, the better.
3.1.1.2.6 7zip
Data is compressed to reduce storage or traffic requirements. Therefore,
compression is a common task in clouds and a wide range of compression
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algorithms exists. The 7zip benchmark was chosen as the representative of
compression tasks in these investigations. The benchmark uses 7zip’s inte-
grated benchmark feature and a higher score means better performance.
3.1.2 Results
This thesis achieved the results presentedbelowbydeploying the setup above
to investigate how VM performance changes depending on the amount of
RAM and CPU the VM has access to and how the shortage of one of those
PRs influences the utilization of the other PR. Also, it was investigated how
stress on the host system influences the VM’s performance.
3.1.2.1 RAM
The VRAM of a VM is altered and the effects on the VM’s performance ob-
served [8]. The smallest amount of VRAM is 100 MB, because less VRAM
results a kernel panic while booting the VM. Although more VRAM allows
a VM to utilize more RAM, the VM not necessarily utilizes all RAM avail-
able. Therefore, theperformance is not only contrastedwith theVM’sVRAM
but also with theRAM the VMmaximally utilizes over its runtime. For each
VRAMconfiguration 10measurements are conducted. The subsequent sub-
sections measure performance by selected benchmarks. Before the bench-
mark is started, the VM utilizes 230 MB ofRAM (if its VRAM allows to uti-
lizes this amount).
3.1.2.1.1 Apache
Figure 3.1 shows the Apache scores achieved and the amount of RAM uti-
lized by a VM depending on different amounts of VRAM.When the VM ex-
ecutes Apache, the VMprocess never utilizes more than 390MB ofRAM. In
particular, for a VMwith 100 to 350MB of VRAM the amount ofRAM that
is maximally utilized continuously increases but does not further increase,
when more than 350 MB of VRAM are added. Therefore, Figure 3.1 shows
that a VMwith less than 350MB of VRAMutilizes allRAM that is available,
which seems to imply, that this amount ofRAM is critical for performance.
However, Figure 3.1 also depicts that the Apache score only increases for up
to 250 MB of VRAM and that this increase is marginal compared to the in-
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Figure 3.1: Apache scores achieved and amount of RAM utilized de-
pending on the amount of VRAM
crease ofRAM that is utilized. Therefore, the dependency between VRAM
andutilizedRAMismuch stronger than the dependency betweenVRAM/u-
tilizedRAMandApache score. In particular, while theRAMutilizationmore
than doubles, the Apache scores vary by less than 10%. This is particularly in-
teresting, because this configuration range includes 100MBofVRAMwhich
constrains the VM’sRAM utilization to less than half of what the VM alone
(without executing any workload) would utilize.
3.1.2.1.2 PHP
Figure 3.2 shows that when the VM executes phpbench, the VMprocess uti-
lizes 270 MB of RAM at most. Although the VM is constraint in its RAM
utilization, when it has less than 250 MB of VRAM, there is no correlation
between the achievedphpbench score and theVM’sVRAM,as the phpbench
score does not increase.
3.1.2.1.3 Python
Figure 3.3 shows the same results as Figure 3.2: the VM process utilizes 270
MB ofRAMat most and even when the VM is constraint in itsRAMutiliza-
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Figure 3.2: phpbench scores achieved and amount of RAM utilized de-
pending on the amount of VRAM
tion, the pybench score does not suffer. Therefore, also the phpbench score
is independent of the VM’s VRAM.
3.1.2.1.4 Findings
RAM, which is actively utilized by a VM (be it on startup or when executing
an application), not necessarily impacts the VM’s performance. In particu-
lar, even if the RAM utilized by a VM varies from 100 MB to 350 MB, the
VM’s Apache score, i.e., its ability to sustain concurrent server requests, only
changed by 10%. For other benchmarks (phpbench and pybench) the score
was entirely independent of the availableRAM.This is particularly interest-
ing, becausenot even aVMwith100MBofVRAMshoweddecreasedperfor-
mance, while this is theminimum amount ofRAMthat avoids a kernel panic
and even a VM that not executes any workload utilizes more, if possible.
3.1.2.2 CPU
Effects of increasing the number of VCPUs and stressing the host CPU are
discussed next.
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Figure 3.3: pybench scores achieved and amount of RAM utilized de-
pending on the amount of VRAM
3.1.2.2.1 Multi Core Penalty
Increasing the number of VCPUs of a VM can decrease its performance. In
particular, Figure 3.4 plots the Apache scores achieved by a VM with 1 to 9
VCPUs, whereat 16 measurements per configuration were conducted. The
figure shows that the best performance is achieved, when the VM has three
or four VCPUs, while additional VCPUs linearly decrease the Apache score.
As the figure depicts, up to three VCPUs significantly increase performance
and four VCPUs perform equally well. However, adding additional VCPUs
continuously decreases performance. This effect, which is termedmulti-core-
penalty, occurred independent of whether VCPUs were pinned to physical
CPUs. Figure 3.4 also demonstrates that, while three VCPUs perform best
for an unstressed host, two VCPUs perform best, when the host is stressed.
Figure 3.4 also shows the Apache score, when the benchmark is executed
natively, i.e., directly on the host and not inside a VM.Themulti-core-penalty
does not occur for this native execution, which shows that it is caused by the
virtualization layer. However, also when executed natively, the Apache score
does not increase for more than seven cores but starts to scatter more.
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Figure 3.4: Apache scores achieved with different numbers of cores by
native or virtual execution
What remains unclear iswhy aVMwith threeVCPUs clearly outperforms
the native execution. Also it has to be investigated, if the multi-core-penalty
only occurs for the KVM or also other hypervisors. This effect is not to be
confused with the well known problem of virtualization overhead. See [25]
for more details.
Figure 3.5 illustrates a similar effect for the aio-stress benchmark, where
a VMwith one VCPU constantly achieves a higher aio-stress score than any
VM with more VCPUs. In particular, the aio-stress score of a VM with only
one VCPU is on average a 30% higher than the aio-stress score of VMs with
more VCPUs. However, unlike the Apache benchmark, the aio-stress score
does not decrease further with the number of VCPUs.
As discussed above, more than four VCPUs result in lower Apache scores.
Despite this decrease, the VM’s utilization of CPU time increases with the
number of VCPUs. In particular, Figure 3.6 shows that for 9 VCPUs the uti-
lized CPU time is roughly twice as high as the CPU time utilized by one to
three VCPUs. This figure also indicates that three VCPUs actually need less
CPU time than two VCPUs (while achieving a significantly better Apache
score than two VCPUs), when the host system is not stressed. More impor-
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Figure 3.5: aio-stress scores achieved by VMs with varying numbers of
VCPUs
tantly, one and two VCPUs seem to be more moderat with respect to CPU
time usage (9% less), when a stressed host is compared to a not stressed host.
However, this trend inverses for four and more VCPUs, i.e., stress on the
cores the VCPUs are pinned to also increases the CPU time requirements
by roughly 8%.
Therefore, the utilized CPU time does not correlates with the VMperfor-
mance in a distinct way.
3.1.2.2.2 Multi Core Advantage
Themulti-core-penalty shows thatmulti-coreworkloadsmayperformworse,
when executed in a VM with multiple VCPUs. Similarly, the performance
of single-core workloads can benefit, when executed in a VM with multiple
VCPUs. In particular, this occurs, when the host system is under stress.
As an example, Figure 3.7 illustrates the nginx scores achieved with dif-
ferent numbers of VCPUs. The figure shows that two VCPUs perform sig-
nificantly better than one VCPU but adding more than three VCPUs does
not increase performance. However, every additional VCPU increases the
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Figure 3.6: CPU time utilized by VMs with varying number of VCPUs
executing the Apache benchmark
nginx score, when the host is stressed. Nonetheless, the scores achieved on a
stressed host are significantly lower in general.
The reason for this increase is that the VM runs as a (qemu) process and
the entitlement to CPU time of this process increases with the number of
VCPUs. When CPU time is under contention, this entitlement is taken into
account to allocate CPU time to contending processes. This mechanism is
termedmulti core advantage.
Figure 3.8 shows themulti core advantage for phpbench. In particular, the
phpbench score is the same for all numbers of VCPUs, when the host is not
stressed. When the host is stressed, the VM achieves this “unstressed perfor-
mance” for four or more VCPUs. For pybench the multi core advantage also
occurred. However, for pybench already two VCPUs achieve the unstressed
performance.
3.1.2.3 Dependency of CPU andRAM
After investigating the effect of CPUs andRAMon performance, the depen-
dency of these two PRs is investigated.
62
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Number of VCPUs
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
ng
inx
 S
co
re
 d
ivi
de
d 
by
 1
00
0
VM execution
VM execution on stressed host
Figure 3.7: nginx scores achieved by VMs with varying numbers of VC-
PUs
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3.1.2.3.1 VCPUs andMaximalRAMUtilization
No dependency between CPU andRAM usage was found in general. How-
ever, the 7zip benchmark revealed an interesting dependency of VCPUs and
RAMutilization (cf. Figure 3.9). As Figure 3.9a shows, for one to three VC-
PUs a VM executing the 7zip benchmark utilizes 1GB ofRAMand for every
two additional cores theRAMutilization increases by 400MB (the VM had
9 GB of VRAM).
Thedistinct pattern inwhichRAMisutilizedgives reason tobelieve, that it
is essential for performance. Therefore, Figure 3.9b compares the 7zip scores
achieved by VMswith 1 and 9GB of VRAM.As Figure 3.9a shows, themore
VCPUs a VM has, the more it will be constrained by only having 1 GB of
VRAM, while 9 GB of VRAM not even constrain a VM with 24 VCPUs. In
line with this observation, Figure 3.9b shows that the difference between the
7zip scores achieved byVMswith 1 and 9GBof VRAMgrowswith the num-
ber of VCPUs. However, the score difference is rather moderate compared
to the large difference in terms ofRAM utilization. In particular, a VM with
24 VCPUs utilizes more than 5 GB of RAM, if available. This is five times
as much, as a VM with 1 GB of VRAM utilizes. However, the 7zip scores
achieved by these VMs only differ by 15%.
3.1.2.3.2 CPU time andRAMUtilization Pace
Several benchmarks increaseRAM utilization steadily over time to a certain
point. The pace with which this point is reached, often depends on the CPU
time that the VM receives. For example, when a VM received 50% of the
CPU time that it would receive from an unstressed host, the pace with which
RAMwas utilized also decreased by 50%.
Therefore, while the numberVCPUsmay influence themaximalRAMus-
age (cf. Section 3.1.2.3.1), the speed with whichRAM is utilized depends on
the CPU time received from these VCPUs.
3.1.2.4 New Findings
Most work on data center resource allocation assumes that resources such as
CPU andRAM are required in static or at least well defined ratios and that
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Figure 3.9: RAM utilization and performance, depending on the number
of VCPUs and amount of VRAM, of a VM executing the 7zip benchmark
the resulting performance is clearly defined (cf. Chapter 2). The results of
this section do not confirm these idealistic assumptions.
Section 3.1.2.1 did not find any significant effect of VRAMonVMperfor-
mance. Notably, even forworkloads that seem to beRAMcritical, as they uti-
lizeRAMindistinct patterns, orworkloads runningonVMswith just enough
VRAM to avoid a kernel panic during boot, no significant effect was found.
Section 3.1.2.3.1 showed that even if a lack of RAM impedes performance,
the impediment is minor compared to the amount of RAM that is missing.
In contrast, a lack ofRAMbandwidth significantly effects performance [35]
but is rarely considered, when investigating data center fairness. Another
counter-intuitive finding is that when multi-core benchmarks are executed
inside a VM, the performance often decreases, whenmore VCPUs are added
to the VM (cf. Section 3.1.2.2.1). In contrast, single-core benchmarks profit
from additional VCPUs, when the host is under stress (cf. Section 3.1.2.2.2).
Section 3.1.2.3 showed that the amount ofRAM that is utilized by a VM
may depend on the number of VCPUs and that the speed with which it is
utilized depends on the CPU time allocated to the VM’s VCPUs.
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Therefore, it is concluded that no assumption on utility functions can be
made, when defining cloud fairness.
3.2 Fairness and Greediness Questionnaire
The dependency of different resources, when utilized by VMs, and their ef-
fects onVMperformance are (a)highly complex, (b)fluctuating, and(c) also
depend on the workload that is executed by the VM.Therefore, assumptions
on utility functions in clouds cannot be made. This makes it impossible to
apply traditional fairness definitions that rely on assumptions on utility func-
tions. Also assumptions on a well structured negotiation process cannot be
made, as VMs utilize PRs of their host as needed (within the hard limits de-
fined by their VRs) in a highly fluctuating manner. In particular, a node can
be thought of as “self-serving buffet” for the VMs that are hosted, as VMs re-
quest PRs and the node provides for these PRs, if available. Since the host
has the possibility to deny or prioritize VM requests, fairness has to be in-
troduced by rationing PR access, when overload occurs. Thus, cloud fairness
has to be defined via a prioritization mechanism that constrains VM access
to PRs, when PR overload occurs, such that all users are have access to a fair
amount of PRs.
Therefore, when abstracted from the cloud context, fairness has to be de-
fined by answering the following question: when different consumers access a
free-for-all resource pool and overload on some resources occurs, which consumers
must be constrained in order to enforce fairness? The premiss of this thesis is
that it is fair to constrain consumers in proportion to their greediness, i.e., the
greedier a consumer serves herself from the resources pool, the more her ac-
cessmust be constrained in favor of other consumers. This, in turn, raises the
question of how the greediness of consumers can be defined and quantified based
on their multi-resource self-servings? When this question can be answered, an
allocation is fair, when (a) this greediness quantification is aligned for all con-
sumers and (b) greedy consumers are constrained in favor of less greedy con-
sumers.
To thoroughly investigate this question, a questionnaire was developed to
evaluate an intuitive understanding of fairness an greediness. DRF’s confor-
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mance with an intuitive understanding of fairness was also evaluated in this
questionnaire, since (a) DRF is the most prominent approach for fairness in
data centers (cf. Section 2.6.1) and (b) respective replies serve as checks for
questionnaire reply qualities. Therefore, this questionnaire allows to derive
a justified and intuitive understanding of fairness and greediness, for the case
where little or no information about consumers’ utility functions is available.
Avoiding any explicit information on utility functions was decided on pur-
pose, because in case of PR allocation, utility functions are not known (cf.
Section 3.1). Appendix A.1 shows the original questionnaire in full and de-
scribes how participation was requested.
The questionnaire specified real-life scenarios in terms of three questions
Q1, Q2, and Q3 to not distract participants by technical terms and let them
fully concentrate on the question of fairness. For example, Q3 describes a
scenario, where three bakers purchase together three ingredients for cakes.
Thebakers prepare different recipes and split the ingredients by putting them
on a table from which every baker serves herself. This was done until at least
one resource on the table was depleted, which prohibited the utilization of
the other resources. While this is a specific scenario the underlying prob-
lem is generic: Commonheterogenous resources are split among individuals
with different demands by letting them serve themselves. This implies mu-
tual trust and poses the question of how individuals, who could try to exploit
the system, can be identified, that is, how disproportionate consumption can
be defined. The transferability to clouds is evident: just as the bakers, VMs
serve themselves from a pool of common resources (the PRs of their host).
All questions were designed in order avoid any selection bias. For exam-
ple, inQ3 participants were asked to establish a ranking over the three bakers
and a bias was avoided by allowing participant to create this ranking via a
drag and drop menu, as shown in Figure 3.10. In contrast to a list of all rank-
ings, where some rankings appear first and are, therefore, more likely to be
selected, this drag and drop menu made it equally easy to select any ranking
in an intuitive manner.
Questionnaire participants had to chose between different options of al-
locations or define rankings of consumers. Additionally, participants were
offered to explain their answers in text boxes. The questionnaire did not ad-
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Figure 3.10: Drag and Drop menu with which participants had to spec-
ify their answer to Q3
dress any particular target group. Out of 721 participants, who started the
questionnaire, 604 completed it.
3.2.1 Choosing theMost Fair Allocation (Q1)
Q1 was designed to evaluate a key building block of DRF: the use of the L1
norm to measure the value of a bundle, i.e., that the value of a bundle is de-
fined solely by the resource that it contains in the largest proportion (cf. Sec-
tion 2.6.1). The scenario described covers two resources r1 and r2 of which
six and twelve units where available, respectively. These resources have to be
allocated to three consumers c1, c2, and c3. c1 only requires r1, c2 only r2, and
c3 requires for each unit of r1 two units of r2. This results in seven possible al-
locations to allocate all resources and do not give consumers resources they
have no use for. However, most of these allocations are intuitively unfair, e.g.,
in two of these allocations at least one consumer receives no resources at all.
Because the scenario describes that resources are requested in static ratios,
it is transferable to allocation problems in data centers, where these Leontief
utility functions (cf. Section 2.3.3) are the standard assumption [23, 30].
Participants were presented with four of the seven possible allocations
and asked to choose the allocation that seemed most fair to them. The al-
locations to choose from were presented numerically and graphically to par-
ticipants (cf. Appendix A.1.1). Table 3.1 shows the allocations participants
had to choose from and the respective labels (allocation A11, A12, A13, and
A14). Figure 3.11 shows that A11 and A14 were only chosen by a minority
of the 721 participants (0.4% and 1.1%, respectively) and most participants
deterred between A12 and A13 (30.0% and 68.5%, respectively). The three
allocations that were not displayed were even more extrem in terms of re-
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Table 3.1: The four options A11, A12, A13, and A14 in Q1 of the ques-
tionnaire to allocate the two resources r1 and r2 to the three consumers
c1, c2, and c3
A11 A12 A13 A14
Consumer r1 r2 r1 r2 r1 r2 r1 r2
c1 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0
c2 0 4 0 6 0 8 0 10
c3 4 8 3 6 2 4 1 2
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Figure 3.11: Number of participants who selected the different answers
to Q1
source distribution than A11 and A14. As the latter two allocations received
very lowacceptance, those three allocations leftoutwouldhavebeen selected
by even less participants. Therefore, leaving out those three allocations did
not create a selection bias but instead allowed participants to focus on the
important choice between A12 and A13.
The arguments below support A12 and were frequently given by partici-
pants in the text boxes that allowed to explain their answer.
• c1 and c2 only compete with c3 for resources, but not with one another.
A fair allocation splits resources equally between those who contend
for them.
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• All receive an equal amount of what they want.
• This is the only allocation where nobody can complain that someone
has more of the same resource.
• All consumers have equal utilities.
• When prices are introduced based on available units, this option gives
the same value to all consumers.
The arguments below support A13 andwere frequently given by participants
in the text boxes that allowed to explain their answer.
• When prices are introduced based on available units, this option gives
the same value to all consumers.
• c1 and c2 receive 2=3 of one resource and c3 1=3 of two resources, which
makes 2=3 for everybody. On a similar note, some participants re-
jected A12, because c3 gets as much as c1 and c2 combined.
• Because c1 and c2 only want one resource, they should get more of it
than c3, as c3 wants both resources.
• This option is the result of a simple auction or when all consumers get
an equal share of both resources and then trade.
• The range of numbers of units given to consumers is the smallest. In
particular, for A13 the range is 4-6-8, while it is 3-6-9 for A12.
3.2.2 Allocating Based on Resource Requests (Q2)
Q2was designed to validate how participants allocate scarce resources based
on requests. This problem is relevant in clouds, because, when a host expe-
riences congestion, it has to decide which requests to accept and which to
delay or reject. In Q2 three resources r1, r2, and r3 (for each eight units were
available) had to be split between the two consumers c1 and c2 (cf. Appendix
A.1.2). All three resources were initially contended, but the contention for
r1 can be resolved in bilateral negotiations, with c1 receiving two units and c2
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Table 3.2: The three options A21, A22, and A23 in Q2 of the question-
naire to allocate the three resources r1, r2 and r3 to the two consumers c1
and c2
A21 A22 A23
Consumer r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3
c1 2 4 4 2 5 5 2 4 5
c2 6 4 4 6 3 3 6 4 3
A21 A22 A23
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Figure 3.12: Number of participants who selected the different answers
to Q2
six. However, these negotiations left open how r2 and r3 had to be allocated.
c1 demanded five units of both resources and c2 demanded four units of both.
Participants had to decide, whether one consumer has to cease both missing
units or each consumer should cease one. Accordingly, the most fair option
had to be chosen from allocations A21, A22, and A23 as shown in Table 3.2.
628 participants answered this question, as illustrated in Figure 3.12.
From the information given by participants in the text boxes, the following
frequent arguments were compiled, indicating the subjective perception of
fairness.
A21 was supported by 13.9% of the participants. The arguments below
were most frequently given by those participants to justify their choice.
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• Since r1 is not under contention anymore, it does not need to be con-
sidered for the allocation of r2 and r3. Consequently, c1 and c2 should
get a fair, that is, equal, amount of r2 and r3.
• Because c2 receives more of the first resource, c2 will probably also re-
quiremore of the other resources, and thus should not be constrained
on these.
• The consumer, who demands the greater amount of a contented re-
source, should cease the deficit, because relative to his demand this
deficit is smaller than for someone who demands less.
A22was supported by 23.7% of the participants. The argument belowwas
most frequently given by those participants to justify their choice.
• Because c1 gets 4 units less of the first resource compared to c2, c1
should get four units more of the other resources.
A23 was supported by 62.4% of the participants. The argument below was
most frequently given by those participants to justify their choice.
• Since r1 is no more under contention, it does not need to be consid-
ered for the allocation of r2. Assuming that the demands reflect actual
needs (rather than negotiating positions), the most fair thing to do is
splitting the scarcity equally, i.e., both get one resource less than re-
quested.
3.2.3 Estimating Greediness (Q3)
Q3was designed to collect information on how the greediness of consumers,
who served themselves from a pool of common resources, is perceived. In
addition, insights are collected on how proportionality and value of resource
bundles is perceived, when no information about consumers’ utility func-
tions is available. Thus, Q3 is most important for the investigation of an in-
tuitive fairness understanding, as it provides insights on how resources that
different VMs on the same host utilize can be compared.
Q3—as defined inAppendixA.1.3—is based on three scenarios S31, S32,
and S33, were three consumers c1, c2, and c3 had served themselves from a
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Table 3.3: The three scenarios S31, S32, and S33 in Q3 of the ques-
tionnaire, where three consumers c1, c2, and c3 served themselves from a
pool of three common resources r1, r2 and r3
S31 S32 S33
Consumer r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3
c1 4 3 3 4 2 4 4 1 4
c2 2 1 5 1 4 3 1 4 3
c3 4 2 1 1 6 2 1 6 2
Remainder 2 3 0 6 0 0 6 1 0
pool of three common resources r1, r2, and r3 (likeVMson the samehost). To
split these resources, each consumer had allocatedhimself a certain bundle as
shown in Table 3.3. The three consumers had to be ranked according to how
their greedinesswasperceived, all beingbasedon the amounts the consumers
had allocated themselves.
3.2.3.1 Metrics
Many participants tackled Q3 by proposing a metric to assess the value of
bundles. Thesemetrics encompasses the following four: cost, costscarcity,
cost\scarcity, and DoRe. All of those metrics are intuitive, as they have a
straight-forward informal and formal definition and were suggested by par-
ticipants with no expert background. While this intuitiveness is a merit of
these metrics, all of them have drawbacks, as was identified by the question-
naire and is discussed in Sections 3.2.4.3 and 3.2.4.4.
3.2.3.1.1 Cost
The cost metric is the simplest metric and was often suggested by partici-
pants. The value of one unit of resource ri is defined as p= !ri , where p is a
constant and !ri is the number of units available of ri. The value of a bundle
is the sum of values of its resources. For example, for p = 1 the value of c2’s
bundle in S31 is
2
12
+
1
9
+
5
9
=
5
6
:
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This metric is equivalent to the the L1 norm and the sum-based-penalty
function presented in Section 2.6.7 and [48]. The term cost-metric chosen
here reflects the wording frequently chosen by questionnaire participants,
who suggested this metric.
3.2.3.1.2 Costscarcity (CS)
The costscarcity metric is a natural extension of the cost metric. The value
of one unit of resource ri is defined as a(ri)p= !ri 2, where a(ri) is the amount
that is allocated in total of ri. The value of a bundle is defined as the sum of
values of those resources contained. For example, for p = 1 the value of c2’s
bundle in S31 is
2  10
122
+
1  6
92
+
5  9
92
=
29
54
:
3.2.3.1.3 Cost\scarcity (C\S)
The cost\scarcity metric is another natural extension of the cost metric and
defines the value of a resource just as the costmetric. However, the value of a
bundle is defined only over resources that are depleted, i.e., resources where
a(ri) = !ri . For example, for p = 1 the value of c2’s bundle in S31 isj 10
12
k
 2
12
+

6
9

 1
9
+

9
9

 5
9
=
5
9
:
3.2.3.1.4 DoRe
DRFdefines the value of a bundle by theL1 norm, i.e., by the biggest share of
any resource relative to the overall amount of the resource, which is captured
here by the DoRe (DOminant REsource) metric. For example, the value of
c2’s bundle in S31 is:
max

2
12
;
1
9
;
5
9

=
5
9
:
According to the L1 norm, the bundles of c1 and c2 in S33 are equally valu-
able. This tie is broken by considering the second biggest share in the bun-
dles, wherefore c1’s is more valuable.
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Figure 3.13: Number of participants who selected the different rankings
(represented by triplets) in the three scenarios of Q3
3.2.3.2 Frequency Investigations
In this section numerical results of Q3 are presented. The implications of
these results are discussed in Sections 3.2.4.3 and 3.2.4.4. For some rank-
ings the free text indicated that the participant had assumed real life values
of the resources and ranked the consumers accordingly. These rankings, as
well as, incomplete rankings were removed, wherefore the presented results
are based on 552 answers.
Subsequently, consumer rankings are denoted by triplets. For example,
when the first consumer is ranked moderate, the second consumer is ranked
most greedy, and the third consumer is ranked least greedy, this is denoted
by the triplet (2,1,3).
Figure 3.13 illustrates for each scenario how many participants selected
each ranking and highlights the rankings that correspond to the metrics dis-
cussed in Section 3.2.3.1. Table 3.4 shows which ranking corresponds to
which metric for the three scenarios. Furthermore, Table 3.4 provides the
percentage of participants, that answered with the respective ranking (de-
duced directly from numbers of Figure 3.13). Because these rankings given
by most participants do not match the same metric over the three scenarios,
Table 3.5 shows the quantity of the sixteenmost prominent combinations of
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Table 3.4: Percentages of most frequent rankings in Q3
Metric S31 S32 S33
DoRe (2,1,3): 52.7% (2,3,1): 36.8% (2,3,1): 37.7%
Cost (1,2,3): 38.0% (1,3,2): 35.5% (1,3,2): 22.5%
CS (1,2,3): 38.0% (1,3,2): 35.5% (2,3,1): 37.7%
C\S (2,1,3): 52.7% (3,2,1): 22.5% (1,2,3): 13.4%
Table 3.5: Quantity of participants who selected the most frequently
selected combinations of rankings in Q3
Quantity S31 S32 S33 Conforming with
79 (2,1,3) (2,3,1) (2,3,1) DoRe
55 (1,2,3) (1,3,2) (2,3,1) CS
43 (1,2,3) (1,3,2) (1,3,2) Cost
32 (2,1,3) (3,2,1) (1,2,3) C\S
30 (2,1,3) (1,3,2) (1,3,2)
28 (2,1,3) (3,2,1) (3,2,1)
27 (1,2,3) (3,2,1) (3,2,1)
24 (2,1,3) (2,3,1) (3,2,1)
22 (1,2,3) (2,3,1) (2,3,1)
20 (1,2,3) (2,3,1) (3,2,1)
18 (2,1,3) (2,3,1) (1,3,2)
17 (2,1,3) (1,3,2) (2,3,1)
16 (2,1,3) (2,3,1) (1,2,3)
12 (1,3,2) (1,3,2) (1,3,2)
9 (2,1,3) (1,3,2) (1,2,3)
8 (2,1,3) (3,2,1) (2,3,1)
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rankings (which cover 79.6% of all participants). In addition to these com-
binations, three combinations were selected five and seven times each, two
combinations were selected four and six times each, 4 combinations were se-
lected three times, and 15 combinations were selected one and two times
each.
3.2.4 Discussion
This section draws conclusions from the questionnaire’s results. Section
3.2.4.1 concludes that A13 is the intuitively fair allocation, as it found signifi-
cantly higher acceptance among participants than A12 and some arguments
given in support of A12 were false. Section 3.2.4.2 proves that most partici-
pants consider it fair to allocate the deficits and not the actual resources fair,
even when the deficit is calculated from requirement statements that cannot
be verified. Unfortunately, suchmechanism gives incentives to consumers to
exaggerate demands and is, therefore, not applicable in many real world sce-
narios, such as cloud resource allocation. Section 3.2.4.3 points out that the
rankings given by participants often are not consistent with the same metric
over all three scenarios and analyses participants’ arguments to conclude on
how they made a decision. Section 3.2.4.4 argues that all metrics have disad-
vantages. This includes theDoRemetric, which achieves the highest possible
compliance with participants’ rankings. Its insufficiency stems from the facts
that it (a) achieves this high compliance for the wrong reasons, i.e., it works
differently than participants argued, wherefore examples can be constructed
where it results in rankings that contradict the arguments of participants, and
(b) fails to identify A13 of Q1 as most fair allocation.
3.2.4.1 Choosing theMost Fair Allocation (Q1)
Only the first two arguments in favor of A12 are correct. The third argument
(nobody can complain that someone has more of the same resource) is in-
correct, because c1 receives least of r2 and c2 least r1. The fourth argument
(all consumers have equal utilities) lacks foundation, because nothing was
said about utilities of consumers, only about ratios in which they request re-
sources. The fifth argument states that all receive the same value, which is
actually the case for A13. Therefore, the arguments given in text boxes in
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favor of A13 are more versatile and credible than those in favor of A12. Be-
cause A12 and A13 were chosen by 30.0% and 68.5% of the participants, re-
spectively, that is, A13 was chosen more than 2.25 times as often as A12, it is
concluded that A13 determines the intuitively fair allocation.
TheDRFallocation isA12. Therefore, this result shows thatDRF,which is
thede facto standard indata centermulti-resource fairness (cf. Section2.6.1),
does not comply with an intuitive understanding of fairness. This discussion
is deepened in Section 3.2.4.4.
3.2.4.2 Allocating Based on Requests (Q2)
While supporters of A21 and A23 stated that the allocation of r1 does not
need to be considered, when allocating r2 and r3, both concluded differently
on how r2 and r3 should be allocated: supporters of A21 argued that it is fair
to allocate the resources fair, i.e., give both an equal amount of the resources,
while supporters of A23 argued that it is fair to allocate the deficit fair, i.e., give
each consumer one resource less, although this means that c2 receives two
more additional. Allocating the deficit in a fair manner, was frequently justi-
fied by the assumption that demands reflect actual needs. In general, partic-
ipants considered the information important, which consumer ceased more
demands for r1 andwhetherdemands reflect actual needsornegotiationposi-
tions. AlthoughA22 ismost fair according to all metrics discussed in Section
3.2.3.1, only 23.7% of participants selected it. In contrast, A23 was selected
by 62.4% of participants, that is, almost three times as often. This shows that
most participants consider it fair to allocate the deficit fairly and not the ac-
tual resources.
Unfortunately, giving a larger amount of resources to consumers, who de-
mand more, gives incentives to cloud users to exaggerate demands, which is
already sometimes the case [30]. Therefore, this result, although interesting,
cannot be applied to allocate cloud resources, as it would allow for strategic
manipulation and potentially give incentive to waste resources.
3.2.4.3 Estimating Greediness (Q3)
Many participants stated to have struggled ranking the consumers, because
no information was given about how efficiently these consumers used their
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resources. Unfortunately, suchuncertainties are alsopresent in clouds, where
the performance of VMs can only in some cases be related to their resource
consumption.
Numbers of Table 3.4 show that these rankings according to the fourmet-
rics presented in Section 3.2.3.1 cover 90.7% (S31), 94.8% (S32), and 73.6%
(S33)of theparticipants’ rankings. Despite this high coverage itwasoften the
case that a participant’s ranking was conforming with different metrics over
the three scenarios. This indicates that participants have an intuitive under-
standing of greediness, which they try to justify proposing ametric, although
the metric does not work for all scenarios to produce the ranking they give.
The four most prominent combinations ((2,1,3), (2,3,1), (2,3,1)), ((1,2,3),
(1,3,2), (2,3,1)), ((1,2,3), (1,3,2), (1,3,2)), and ((2,1,3), (3,2,1), (1,2,3))
are conforming with DoRe, CS, Cost, C\S, respectively. However, as dis-
cussed next, the two top combinations often did not result from applying the
respective metric.
The most prominent combination was chosen by 79 participants. Al-
though this combination results from the DoRemetric, only one participant
argued according to this metric. Interestingly, participants who opted for
this combination provided more often explanations than those who opted
for other combinations. The most frequent argument was, that those who
exceed their equal share of a resource are considered greedy. Thus, in S31
c2 is the greediest due to the disproportional consumption of r3. Analog, in
S32 and S33 c3 is the greediest, because c3 exceeds the equal share of r2 by
50% and c1 is the second greedy, because c1 exceeds the equal share of r1 by
33%. The combination of rankings chosen by 55 participants is conforming
with the CS metric. Applying this metric implies several calculations, but
participants arrived at this ordering differently, as inferred from their com-
ments: most ordered the consumers according to the overall amount they
had used and broke the tie of c1 and c3 in S33 by c3’s 50% overconsumption of
r2. The combinations of rankings chosen by 43 and 32 participants are con-
formingwith the cost andC\Smetric, respectively. Most participants stated
that they had applied these metrics to arrive at the ranking. Note that, for
the combination of the C\Smetric, the ranking from S32 to S33 is inverted,
where in S32 c1 was least greedy and c3most greedy. Two participants already
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noted in their comments that this reordering is counter-intuitive, because c1
actually takes up less resources in S33, while consumptions of the other two
consumers are stable. Based on these and the results of Section 3.2.4.1 the
following conclusions on the sufficiency of those metrics are drawn.
3.2.4.4 Implications for ExistingMetrics
Although the metrics discussed in Section 3.2.3.1 cover the majority of par-
ticipants rankings, none of thesemetrics captures an intuitive understanding
of fairness: The C\S metric has a low conformance in S32 and S33 and for
S33 results in the inverted ranking of S32, which means that consumers can
decrease their ranking by adding additional resources to their bundle. This
not only is counter-intuitive, but also gives incentives to consumers to con-
sume more resources than needed. The Cost metric has an insufficient con-
formance in S33 and identifies c1 as “greediest” in S31, although c1 does not
cause the bottleneck, but precisely sticks to his equal share (a behavior that
is considered humble in S32 and S33). The sum- and the root-based-penalty
function presented in [48] result in the same rankings as theCostmetric and,
thus, are also not satisfactory. Similar arguments apply to the CS metric.
The DoRe metric is satisfactory at a first glance: For all three scenarios of
Q3 it results in themost frequent ranking and also in themost frequent com-
bination of rankings (cf. first body row of Table 3.4 andTable 3.5). However,
only one participant argued according to the DoRe metric, while the major-
ity argued that those who exceed their equal share are greedy. Therefore,
the high conformance of the DoRemetric stems rather from the fact that ev-
ery consumer exceeds his equal share on at most one resource, which allows
the DoRemetric to produce good results, because it only considers these re-
sources. To show that DoRemetric’s approach to ignore all but one resource
can lead to undesirable results, a sample allocation is presented in Table 3.6.
For this allocation all other metrics discussed in Section 3.2.3.1 give the in-
verse ranking of the DoRe metric. Also, according to the arguments made
by the participants, the DoRe ranking is unfair: The DoRe metric classifies
c1 as the consumer with the most valuable bundle, although c1 only receives
the least loaded resource. c3 cedes no resource at all and receives most of the
only scarce resource, but the DoRe metric classifies c3 as most humble.
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Table 3.6: An example of a problematic DoRe metric ranking
r1 r2 r3 Cost CS C\S DoRe
available 30 30 30
c1 18 0 0 1.80 1.68 0.00 0.60
c2 0 14 17 3.10 3.04 1.40 0.56
c3 10 16 12 3.80 3.69 1.60 0.53
Q1 of the questionnaire identified A13 as the intuitively fair allocation,
while the DRF allocation (therefore, also most fair according to the DoRe
metric) is A12. Because Leontief utility functions are assumed in Q1, i.e.,
resources are required in static ratios, and DRF is defined based on this as-
sumption, DRF should result in an intuitively fair allocation, when this as-
sumption holds. Therefore, while DRF is often applied, when Leontief util-
ity functions do not hold, Q1 shows that already for Leontief utility func-
tions, DRF may result in allocations that are not intuitively fair. Moreover,
consumers and resources can be added to this scenario, where consumer ci
requests only resource ri (and as before one consumer requests all resources
evenly). Thereby, the perceived unfairness of DRF can be increased arbitrar-
ily, because the consumer requesting all resources would receive as much as
all other consumers combined (cf. Section 2.6.1.4.2). In other words, DRF
allocations exist with a higher degree of intuitive unfairness.
3.3 Approach
This section takes the following steps inorder todefine cloud fairness. The in-
sights gathered in Section 3.2 about an intuitive understanding of greediness
are deployed in Section 3.3.1 to develop a novel bundle measure termed the
GreedinessMetric (GM). GMquantifies the greediness of consumers based
on their multi-resource self-servings. Therefore, when consumers with un-
known utility functions serve themselves from a free-for-all resource pool,
it is fair to constrain consumers in proportion to their GM value in favor of
other consumers. Section 3.3.2 develops a formal cloud model and formu-
lates incentives that have to be provided to users. Section 3.3.3 refines GM
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such that it is applicable to this cloudmodel and Section 3.3.4 proves that en-
forcing fairness based on this refinedGMprovides the designated incentives.
3.3.1 GreedinessMetric
Due to the shortcomings of all existing metrics presented in Section 3.2.4.4
and their inability to capture an intuitive understanding of greediness, a new
Greediness Metric (GM) is developed. This GM is aligned with the argu-
ments of participants and accordingly (a) results in the most frequent rank-
ings for each of the three scenarios in Q3, (b) classifies A13 as the most fair
allocation, and (c) gives the “correct” ranking for the allocation in Table 3.6.
GM is a bundle measure and, therefore, maps each resource bundle in
an allocation to a rational number that can be associated to the greediness of
the consumer, who served herself the bundle. The GM sums up, what ex-
ceeds the equal share in each bundle, according to the most frequent ques-
tionnaire’s responses. However, it also deducts what is not consumed of the
equal share and is handed over to other consumers instead.
3.3.1.1 GMDefinition
Let matrixA 2 Rrc0 describe an allocation of r resources to c consumers, as
discussed in Section 2.1. The amount of ri that cj receives beyond his equal
share is then aij    !ri =c (if the difference is negative, cj does not utilize its
entire equal share of the resource).
If aij >  !ri =c, consumers other than cj have to cede some of their equal
shareof ri inorder to enable cj’s shareof ri. Therefore, the amount that exceeds
cj’s equal share is added to the greediness of cj.
If aij =  !ri =c, cj exactly receives his equal share, wherefore it does not
change cj’s greediness. In particular, if aij =  !ri =u for all i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; rg,
cj’s greediness is zero.
If aij <  !ri =c, cj’s cession of ri is credited to cj, i.e., subtracted from cj’s
greediness, to the extent that other consumers profit from this cession, which
is the case, when they utilize ri beyond their equal share. This extent not only
depends on how much of ri is utilized beyond the equal share by other con-
sumers, but also on howmuch of ri is ceded by other consumers. Therefore,
the credit factor for the cession of ri is the ratio of what is ceded of ri to what
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is consumed beyond the equal share of ri. To capture this notion formally,
b(ri) defines the sum of what consumers receive beyond their equal share of
ri, i.e.,
b(ri) :=
cX
j=1
max
 
0; aij  
 !ri
c

;
and c(ri) defines the sum of what consumers cede of ri, i.e.,
c(ri) :=
cX
j=1
max
 
0;
 !ri
c
  aij

:
Multiplying the amount that cj cedes of ri with b(ri)=c(ri) implements the
considerations above. Therefore, the greediness of cj is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1. The greediness of consumer cj 2 C is defined by
G(cj) :=
rX
i=1
c
r   !ri 
 
aij 
 !ri
c

8><>:
A if aij   !ric ;
B
Pc
j=1 max
 
0;aij 
 !ri
c

Pc
j=1 max
 
0;
 !ri
c
 aij
 else.
(3.1)
The factor c
r !ri normalizes resource units. Section 3.3.1.3 discusses the
normalization in detail. Note that, if c(ri) = 0, no consumer cedes ri and,
therefore, the else-part of Equation 3.1 is never reached (and no division by
zero occurs). While b(ri)c(ri) in the else-part dynamically influences in depen-
dence of the consumption of ri howmuch ceding ri is credited, this crediting
is also statically adjusted by Parameter 0  B  1. In return, 1  A
statically influences how much the exceeding of a resources is credited. Sec-
tion 3.3.4.4 determines a range of concrete values forA andB based on the
questionnaire results. In particular, whenA andB are determined accord-
ing to Equation 3.20, whereat 0  D  1, GM perfectly conforms with the
questionnaire results.
3.3.1.2 Examples
The complexity of the greediness metric is higher than of those metrics pre-
sented in Section 3.2.3.1. In order to help understanding how the different
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components of GMplay together, this section exemplarily calculates GM for
selected allocations of Q1 and Q3 of the questionnaire.
3.3.1.2.1 A12
In the scenario of Q1, one unit of r1 has a normalized value of c=(r   !r1 ) =
3=(2  6) = 0:25 and one unit of r2 has a normalized value of c=(r   !r2 ) =
3=(2  12) = 0:125. The equal shares are !r1 =3 = 6=3 = 2 and !r2 =3 =
12=3 = 4 for resource r1 and r2, respectively. c1 has a greediness of
G(c1) =
Overcons. of r1z }| {
0:25(3  2)A +
Ceding of r2z }| {
0:125(0  4)2+ 2
4
B = 0:25A   0:5B:
In particular, the fraction in the second summand results from c1 ceding four
units of r2 and c2 and c3 exceeding their equal share of r2 by two units each.
The subtraction in brackets results because c1 consumes zero units of r2, while
the equal share is 4.
For c2 the calculations are inverse, with respect to r1 and r2, i.e.,
G(c2) =
Ceding of r1z }| {
0:25(0 2) 1+1
2
B+
Overcons. of r2z }| {
0:125  (6 4) A = 0:25 A 0:5B:
Because c3 does not cede resources, c3’s greediness does not depend onB:
G(c3) =
Overcons. of r1z }| {
0:25  (3  2) A +
Overcons. of r2z }| {
0:125  (6  4) A = 0:5 A :
3.3.1.2.2 S32 and S33
S32 and S33 of Q3 are similar: the amounts of available resources are the
same, resulting in both scenarios in normalized values of 0:083, 0:083, and 0:1
and equal shares 4, 4, and 3 for r1, r2, and r3, respectively. Also the allocations
are the same, except that c1 cedes one unit more of r2 in S33 compared to
S32. Because this unit is not utilized by other consumers, this ceding is not
credited to c1, i.e., c1’s greediness does not change. In particular, the greediness
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of c1 is calculated as follows:
G(c1)=
Cons. of r1z }| {
0:083(4 4)A +
Cons. r2z }| {
0:083( 2B)+
Cons. of r3z }| {
0:1(4  3)A =0:1 0:16B;
Factor ( 2 B) in the Consumption of r2 is calculated by
(2  4)  2
2
B =  2 B
in S32 and in S33 by
(1  4)  2
3
B =  2 B:
3.3.1.3 Resource Normalization
Because different resources occur in different amounts, it is necessary to nor-
malize the offsets before summation (cf. Equation 3.1). To do so, a normal-
ization constant k > 0 needs to be fixed, such that k= !ri can be used as nor-
malization factor for every ri 2 R. This section motivates why GM defines
k = c=r, i.e., that k increases proportionally with the number of consumers
and decreases proportionally with the number of resources.
3.3.1.3.1 Increase with the Number of Consumers
The addition of a consumer is neutral, when it does not change the overall
availability of resources. Therefore, the neutral addition of a consumer must
not change the greediness of consumers that were already there. This implies
increasing k proportionally with the number of consumers, as shown subse-
quently.
Let A be an allocation of r resources to the consumers c1; : : : ; cc and let
es 2 Rr>0 be the equal share. Addx times es resources andaddx consumersof
which each precisely consumes es resources. Then these x added consumers
are neutral. To ensure that the greediness of c1; : : : ; cc does not change, k
must increase proportionally to the number of consumers, e.g., k = c before
the x consumers are added and k = c + x thereafter (if k would be con-
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stant, the greediness of consumers would decrease, when neutrally adding
consumers).
3.3.1.3.2 Decrease with the Number of Resources
The addition of a resource is neutral, when it does not change the relative
overall allocation of consumers. Therefore, the neutral addition of a resource
must not change the greediness of consumers. This implies decreasing k pro-
portionally with the number of resources, as shown subsequently.
Let r = 1, i.e., there is only resource r1 of which a certain amount is avail-
able. LetA1 be an allocationof r1 to c consumers. Add y resources and allocate
each of these in the same ratio asA1 allocates r1. Call this allocationAy. Then,
proportionally A1 and Ay allocate all consumers the same share of overall re-
sources. Therefore, the addition of the y resources is neutral. To ensure that
the greediness of consumers is the same for A1 and Ay, kmust decrease pro-
portionally with the number of resources, e.g., k = 1 before the y resources
are added and k = 1y+1 after the y resources are added (if kwould be constant,
the greediness of consumers would increase by factor y).
3.3.2 CloudModel
GM, as defined above, is not applicable to clouds for the following reasons.
GM defines the greediness of consumers, who share the same self-serving
store. Therefore, GM can be applied to VMs that share the same node. How-
ever, fairness is not to be enforced among VMs but among users and users
operate VMs on different nodes. Furthermore, even if fairness would have to
be enforced among VMs, it would have to be accounted for the VR config-
uration of VMs. In particular, VMs may vary significantly in the amount of
their VRs and, therefore, a VM with more VRs, should be allowed to utilize
more PRs before being identified as greedy and being constrained. Lastly,
prioritizing less greedy users should provide incentive users to configure the
VRs of their VMs correctly, as correctly configured VMs can be scheduled
more efficiently.
In order to deepen this discussion and allow for the refinement of GM
such that it is applicable to clouds, a formal and exhaustive model of cloud
multi-resource allocation is required. Because controlling cloud resources
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through PR allocation was a relatively unexplored research field before this
thesis, such model did not exist and is developed in Section 3.3.2.1. Section
3.3.2.2 formulates three incentives that shouldprovided, when enforcing fair-
ness in clouds and Section 3.3.2.3 develops a technical definition essential for
these incentives. Lastly, Section 3.3.2.4 differentiates two resource scales.
3.3.2.1 Cloud Representation
Formally a cloud is representedbya set of usersU = fu1; u2; : : : ; uug, a set of
nodesN = fn1; n2; : : : ; nng, anda setofVMsV = fv1; v2; : : : ; vvg. AVMis
owned by a user and hosted by a node, whereat the cloud scheduling policy
(and not the user) decides which node hosts the VM. Function own : V [
U ! U [ P(V) maps (a) a VM to its owner and (b) a user to the set of
VMs the user owns. Function host : V[N! N[P(V)maps (a) a VM to
the node that hosts the VM and (b) a node to the set of VMs the node hosts.
Function nbr : V ! P(V) maps v 2 V to the set of “neighboring” VMs,
i.e., VMs that run on v’s host, or, formally nbr : v 7! f_v 2 Vjhost(_v) =
host(v)g. Users and VMs are also referred to as entities.
VMs share their host’s PRs such as CPU time, RAM, disk I/O, and net-
work access. Let R = fr1; r2; : : : ; rrg be the set of PRs to be considered for
a fair allocation. VMs are defined by Virtual Resources (VRs), e.g., virtual
CPU (VCPU) and virtualRAM (VRAM), often chosen from a range of dif-
ferent flavors, i.e., a VM flavor is a set of VRs that a VM of that flavor has. For
now, it is assumed, that for every PR a virtual counterpart exists, although
this is not necessarily the case. However, a nonexistence can be treated easily
by defining such values based on VRs that exist. Especially in private clouds,
PRsmay bemanaged by quotas, i.e., each user has a quota that defines amax-
imum of VRs that the user’s VMs may have in total, which are denoted by
function quota : U! Rr0. Function phy : N! Rr0maps nodes to their
PRs. The information about phy(n) is also referred to as node n’s Node Re-
source Information (NRI) and theCloudResource Supply (CRS) is the sum
of NRI of all nodes in the cloud, i.e.,
crs :=
X
nj2N
phy(nj): (3.2)
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Figure 3.14: Dependencies among the definitions of Chapter 3
Function virt : V ! Rr0 maps VMs to their VRs and function util : V !
Rr0 maps VMs to the PRs they utilize, i.e., the load they impose on the PRs
(at a distinct point in time). Arithmetic operations on vectors are applied
point-wise.
Figure 3.14 illustrates the definitions required. The upper three circles
represent the three sets U, V, and N, as explained above. The lower three
circles represent the VRs, PRs, and greediness codomain. As there is more
than one VR and more than one PR, the former two sets are vector spaces,
while the greediness codomain is the set of real numbers. Functions are rep-
resented by arrows between the sets, e.g., virt pointing from V to the VRs
circle depicts that function virt maps VMs to their VRs. The endowment
function edwV (cf. Definition 3.2) determines a VM’s endowment to PRs
based on the VM’s VRs. Therefore, edwV connects the virt-arrow to the PRs
circle. However, edwV also depends on the PRs of the VM’s host. Therefore,
the end of phy is connected to edwV. Note that, although the edwV-arrow
begins in the VRs circle, function edwV actually maps from set V. GV maps
a VM to its greediness based in the VM’s PR utilization (util) and the VM’s
endowment (edwV). Therefore,GV connectsUsers toGreediness and is con-
nected to by the ends of util and edwV.
3.3.2.2 Incentives
A cloud budgets a certain amount of PRs for a VM based on the VM’s VRs.
Therefore, during VM scheduling, a node to host the VM will be selected
that can best serve the budgeted PRs. For example, placing “small” VMs on
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nodes with less remaining capacity increases the utilization of these nodes
and leaves nodes with more remaining capacity free to accommodate “large”
VMs that cannot be hosted by nodes with less remaining capacity. Accord-
ingly, a VM with a PR utilization that strongly deviates from what is bud-
geted based on the VM’s VRs, leads to either over-loaded or under-utilized
PRs on the VM’s host, i.e., higher stress for the cloud. Therefore, enforc-
ing fairness must give incentive to users to configure their VMs properly, i.e.,
their VMs must have the highest priorities, when the VMs’ configurations
perfectly match their PR utilization. This is referred to as the configuration
incentive.
However, users are not always able to precisely predict the PR utilization
of their VMs or the PR utilization will be fluctuant. Therefore, when users
are uncertain about the upcoming PR utilization of VMs, enforcing fairness
must make it advantageous for users to configure VMs to the best of their
knowledge. This is referred to as the uncertainty incentive.
Although it can be argued that several small VMs are easier to place on
nodes than one largeVM(with the same sumofVRs), several small VMs im-
ply higher PR usage, as every VM runs its own OS. Also some users may be
able to partition their workloads, while others are not. Therefore, enforcing
fairnessmust neither give incentive to partition VRs andworkloads tomulti-
ple small VMs nor to concentrate VRs andworkloads to onemonolithic VM.
Therefore, how a user partitions a fixed amount of VRs to VMs must not in-
fluence the prioritization of the user’s VMs, when the VMs are idle. This is
referred to as the partition incentive and is only demanded for idle VMs, as the
configuration incentive demands to relate a VM’s configuration to the VM’s
PR utilization and collides with the partition incentive, if VMs are not idle.
3.3.2.3 VM Endowments
The configuration incentive demands that configuring VMs in conformance
with the subsequent PR utilization is rewarded, when fairness is enforced.
The rationale behind this is that based on aVM’sVRs the cloud expects a cer-
tain load of the VMand schedules the VMon a node that canmost economi-
cally provide for this anticipated load. In particular, depending on the cloud’s
overcommit ratios and a VM’s VRs, the cloud budgets a certain amount of
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PRs for the VM. Accordingly, a VM’s endowment is defined as the amount of
PRs that are budgeted for this VM.This definition allows for multiple func-
tions edwV : V ! Rr0 to calculate the endowment. Subsequently, three
reasonable functions are discussed.
The straight-forward endowment function is to scale a VM’s VRs by the
ratio of the CRS to the number VRs that can maximally be assigned to VMs,
i.e.,
edwV(vi) 7! crsP
uk2U quota(uk)
 virt(vi): (3.3)
However, this formula does not account for the number of VMs that are actu-
ally instantiated. This can be overcome by defining the endowment function
to scale a VM’s VRs by the ratio of the CRS to the VRs of running VMs, i.e.,
edwV(vi) 7! crsP
vk2V virt(vk)
 virt(vi): (3.4)
However, depending on the ratio of VRs the VMwill be scheduled to differ-
ent nodes, wherefore the VM’s host’s PRs are the best indicator of howmany
PRs are budgeted for a VM. Accordingly, the endowment of a VM is defined
as follows.
Definition 3.2. The endowment of a VM vi is defined as vi’s proportional
share of vi’s host’s PRs and denoted by
edwV(vi) 7! min
 
virt(vi);
phy(host(vi))P
vj2nbr(vi) virt(vj)
 virt(vi)
!
: (3.5)
Definition 3.2 defines the endowment of a VM as the share of the VM’s
host’s PRs that is proportional to the VM’s VRs. By taking the point-wise
minimum, it is ensured that a VM’s endowment is not greater than the VM’s
VRs. This is desirable, as a VM can be scheduled to a node, that is currently
not “saturated” with VMs. In this case and without the minimization, the
VM’s endowment would exceed the VM’s VRs. As a VM’s VRs specify the
capacity that the VM’s owner planned for the VM, the cloud will never bud-
get more PRs for a VM than the VM’s VR, wherefore the minimization is
necessary.
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3.3.2.4 Overcommitment and Resource Scales
OvercommittingPRs (cf. Section 2.2.1.5) allows the sumof quotas to exceed
the CRS and the sum of VRs of VMs hosted by a node to exceed the node’s
PRs. In particular, the factor by which quotas and VRs exceed the CRS and
PRs is defined by the overcommit ratios. Therefore, quotas and VRs are on
the virtual scale andPRs are on the actual scale. AsDefinition 3.2maps aVM’s
VRs to a proportion of the PRs, endowments are also on the actual scale. In
particular, calculating the endowment canbe consideredmappingVRs to the
actual scale.
3.3.3 CloudGreediness and Fairness
This Section defines VM greediness and user greediness and based on these
definitions cloud fairness. It is assumed that PR amounts are normalized ac-
cording to the CRS.
3.3.3.1 VMGreediness
Definition 3.3 refines Definition 3.1 for VMs and is parameterized by δ to
account for different cloud utilization levels (cf. Section 3.3.4.3 and 3.3.4.4).
Definition 3.3. For 0  δ  1, function GδV : V ! R defines the VM
greediness of VM vi by
GδV(vi) :=
rX
j=1
edwV(vi)j + (util(vi)j   edwV(vi)j)  2δ + 2 8>>>><>>>>:
2 if util(vi)j  edwV(vi)j;
Dynamic Ceding Factor (DCF)z }| {
min
 
1;
P
vk2nbr(vi)max
 
0; util(vk)j   edwV(vk)j
P
vk2nbr(vi)max
 
0; edwV(vk)j   util(vk)j
 else.
(3.6)
The greediness of VM vi depends on util(vi) and edwV(vi), and these
two parameters of the VMs that run on the same node as vi. Thus, the
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VM greediness is a sum of values on the actual scale. The first summand
(
Pr
j=1 edwV(vi)j) is called the static greedinessof vi and the second summand
the dynamic greediness of vi.
Consumers inDefinition 3.1 are equal and, therefore, have the same equal
shares. In contrast, VMs have very different VRs and, therefore, endow-
ments, which represent their entitlements to the host’s PRs. Definition 3.3
takes these differences into account and “rewards” correct VM configuration
by a lower greediness (cf. Section 3.3.4.2). This leads to the following differ-
ences of Equation 3.6 and Equation 3.1.
1. The first summand (edwV(vi)j) inside the sum function of Equation
3.6 has no equivalent in Equation 3.1 and sums up vi’s endowment
(cf. Definition 3.2). This summand is necessary to ensure (a) that
the greediness of a VM is never negative and, therefore, instantiating
a VM never decreases a user’s greediness and (b) that the “cost” of in-
stantiating a VM increases with the VM’s VRs. Section 3.3.4.1 proves
that this allows providing the partition incentive.
2. Equation 3.1 uses the equal share ( !ri =u) and Equation 3.6 uses the
endowment as reference point to calculate the deviation from the ap-
propriate PR utilization. Section 3.3.4.2 proves that this allows to pro-
vide the configuration incentive.
3. Equation 3.6 ensures that the Dynamic Ceding Factor is not greater
1, and, therefore, ceding a PR is not “rewarded” stronger than what is
actually ceded of the PR.This is necessary for the case in which VMs
are scheduled to a node that is not yet “saturated” with VMs, i.e., the
sumof VRs of VMs hosted by the node is smaller than the node’s PRs.
This minimization is not necessary in Equation 3.1, as endowments
are defined by the equal share and, therefore, the sum of endowments
equals the overall supply.
4. Equation 3.1 uses the factorsA andB, while Equation 3.6 replaces
these factors by 4δ+2 and
2
δ+2 , respectively, for 0  δ  1. This change
allows to provide the uncertainty incentive and full compliance with
the questionnaire results, as discussed in Section 3.3.4.3 and 3.3.4.4.
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3.3.3.2 User Greediness
The greediness of a user ui is mainly determined by sum of greediness of ui’s
VMs. However, users can be heterogenous in terms of their entitlements to
the cloud’s resources. In particular, depending on the importance of users or
other differentiation criteria, users can have different quotas. Let two users
u1; u2 2 U instantiate an identical VM (in terms of VRs and actual PR uti-
lization) and let u1 have a larger quota than u2. Then, the greediness of u2
must be larger, since u2 imposes the same stress on the cloud as u1 but has
a smaller entitlement to the cloud’s resources. Therefore, a user’s greediness
must decrease with the user’s quota.
Auserui’s greediness contains the sumof greediness of ui’s VMs and there-
fore a sum of values on the actual scale. Thus, ui’s quota has to be mapped to
the actual scale, before factoring it into the ui’s greediness. This mapping is
done by the user endowment.
Definition 3.4. The user endowment of a user ui is defined as the share of the
cloud’s PRs that is proportional to ui’s quota and calculated by function
edwU(ui) 7! crsP
uk2U quota(uk)
 quota(ui): (3.7)
The sum of values in this vector is ui’s quota credit, which is defined by func-
tion
qtc :=
rX
j=1
edwU(ui)j: (3.8)
ui’s greediness is defined by the sum of ui’s VMs’ greediness subtracted by
ui’s quota credit.
Definition 3.5. The δ-user greediness of user ui 2 U is defined by
GδU(ui) :=
0@ X
vj2own(ui)
GδV(vj)
1A  qtc(ui): (3.9)
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3.3.3.3 Cloud Fairness
Definition 3.6 provides a highly practical definition of cloud fairness based
on the greediness metrics developed above. The definition accounts for the
constraints identified in Section 3.1 by avoiding assumptions on utility func-
tions and instead defining fairness via a prioritization scheme based on the
greediness of users.
Definition 3.6. Cloud fairness is the procedure of prioritizing VMs inversely
to the greediness of their users which is defined by Definition 3.5.
Definition 3.6 has the following three advantages:
1. Assumptions on utility functions are avoided by only taking into ac-
count (a) what the users’ entitlement to the cloud’s resources are
(based on their quotas), (b)which PRsVMsutilize, and (c) howVMs
are configured in terms of VRs.
2. The definition accounts for the fact that the allocation of most PRs is
managed by proportional priorities (cf. Section 2.2.1.1), and, there-
fore, the amount a VM receives of a PR cannot be configured but in-
stead proportional priorities have to be assigned, such that the desig-
nated allocation is approximated.
3. As Definition 3.1 captures an intuitive understanding of greediness
and Definition 3.5 is based upon this definition, it is intuitively fair
to constrain greedy users in favor of less greedy users. ThusDefinition
3.6 complies with an intuitive understanding of fairness.
Subsequently, Definition 3.6 is generalized to prove that the special case
it constitutes is most advantageous. In particular, the generalizations allow
defining greediness by various metrics and enforcing fairness on a per-user
or per-VM basis.
Definition 3.6 consist of two parts: (a) the procedure of prioritizing VMs
inversely to the greediness of their owners and (b) defining the owners’
greediness by Definition 3.5. Definition 3.7 generalizes Definition 3.6 by re-
laxing the latter part and allowing to define greediness by various metrics.
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Definition 3.7 is subsequently deployed to show that prioritizing VMs in-
versely to the greediness of their owners exhibits several desirable character-
istics, when greediness is defined by Definition 3.5 but not when defined by
common norms such as the L1 or L1 norm.
Definition 3.7. For metricM, theMg-policy is the procedure of prioritizing
VMs inversely to the greediness of their users which is defined by metricM.
Therefore, the GδUg-policy enforces cloud fairness as defined by Defini-
tion 3.6. Lastly, prioritizing VMs inversely to their own greediness is defined
and will be evaluated subsequently as well. Definition 3.7 and 3.8 are distin-
guished by the g and l subscript.
Definition 3.8. For metricM, theMl-policy is the procedure of prioritizing
VMs inversely to their greediness as defined by metricM.
3.3.3.4 Prioritization andMax-min Fairness
VM demands constantly change during runtime. In order to be applicable
in such dynamic environment and because PRs during VM runtime are con-
trolled by proportional priorities, fairness in Section 3.3.3.3 is formulated via
prioritization schemes. This raises the question of how a fair allocation looks
like according toDefinitions 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8, i.e., howdoes an allocation look
like that does not change when calculating priorities according to these defi-
nitions and allocatingmore PRs to VMswith higher priorities? Theorem 3.9
andCorollary 3.10 answer this question. It is assumed that VMdemands are
stable, as changing VM demands imply a changing allocation.
Theorem3.9. When VM demands are stable, an allocation A of the cloud’s PRs
to VMs that isM-max-min fair among users does not change when enforcing the
Mg-policy. Therefore, A is fair according to theMg-policy.
Proof. Let C be a cloud as defined in Section 3.3.2, whereat VM demands
are stable, and A be an allocation of C’s PRs to VMs, such that A isMg-max-
min fair among users (cf. Section 2.4.3). Take A as starting point and apply
theMg-policy as defined inDefinition 3.7, i.e., (a) calculate the greediness of
users according toMg, (b) assign priorities to VMs inversely the greediness
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of their owner, (c) and move PRs from VMs with lower priorities to VMs
with higher priorities.
Let v1; v2 2 V be two VMs. To prove Theorem 3.9, it has to be shown
that no PRs are moved between v1 and v2. When host(v1) 6= host(v2) this
follows immediately, as PRs cannot be moved between VMs that run on dif-
ferent hosts. Also when the VMs have the same priority, no PRs are moved
between them. Thus, assume that host(v1) = host(v2) and that
Mg(own(v1)) > Mg(own(v2)): (3.10)
Then v1 has a lower priority than v2 and the enforcement of fairness accord-
ing to Definition 3.6 demands moving PRs from v1 to v2. This increases
Mg(own(v2)). However, sinceA isMg-max-min fair,Mg(own(v2)) is already
maximizedbyA. In particular, Equation3.10 implies that at somepointwhen
generating A it was not possible to allocate more PRs to v2, while v1 could
still be allocated PRs. This was either the case because v2 was bottlenecked
on a PR that v1 did not request or v2 already received all the PRs it requests.
Therefore, it is impossible to move PRs from v1 to v2 and, thus, enforcing the
Mg-policy does not move PRs between v1 and v2. Therefore, enforcing the
Mg-policy does not change A and, thus, theMg-max-min fair allocation A is
also fair according to theMg-policy.
Theorem 3.9 implies that using the L1g- and L1g-policies enforce DRF
and asset fairness, respectively. The following corollary can be proven by a
slight adaption of the proof above.
Corollary 3.10. When VM demands are stable, an allocation A of the
cloud’s PRs to VMs that is M-max-min fair among VMs does not change
when enforcing theMl-policy. Therefore,A is fair according to theMl-policy.
3.3.4 Incentives Provision andQuestionnaire Compliance
This section proves that the incentives discussed in Section 3.3.2.2 are pro-
vided, when fairness is enforced according to Definition 3.6. Definition 3.6
provides these incentives, as it incorporates Definition 3.3. This section
closes by showing thatDefinition3.3 complieswith thequestionnaire results.
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3.3.4.1 Partition Incentive
The partition incentive demands to neither provide incentive to users to ar-
tificially partition workloads tomultiple small VMs nor to concentrate work-
loads to one monolithic VM. The following theorem shows that enforcing
cloud fairness as defined by Definition 3.6 provides the partition incentive.
Theorem3.11. Enforcing cloud fairness according to Definition 3.6 provides the
partition incentive.
Proof. AsDefinition 3.6 demands prioritizing VMs of a user u 2 U based on
u’s greediness GU(u), it has to be shown that GU(u) is independent of how
u partitions a fixed amount of VRs to idle VMs. Let V1;V2  V be two sets
of idle VMs that have the same sum of VRs and run on the same node, i.e.,P
v12V1 virt(v1) =
P
v22V2 virt(v2) and 8v 2 V1 [ V2 : util(v) = 0. It has
to be shown that the sum of greediness of both VM sets is equal.
Definition 3.2 implies
P
v12V1 edwV(v1) =
P
v22V2 edwV(v2) = e, for
some e 2 Rr. FromDefinition 3.3 and 8v 2 V1 [ V2 : util(v) = 0 follows
X
v12V1
GV(v1) =
X
v12V1
rX
j=1
edwV(v1)j   edwV(v1)j  2δ + 2  DCFj (3.11)
and
X
v22V2
GV(v2) =
X
v22V2
rX
j=1
edwV(v2)j   edwV(v2)j  2δ + 2  DCFj: (3.12)
Equation 3.11 can be rewritten as
X
v12V1
GV(v1) =
X
v12V1
rX
j=1
edwV(v1)j  (1  2δ + 2  DCFj) (3.13)
=
rX
j=1
X
v12V1
edwV(v1)j  (1  2δ + 2  DCFj) (3.14)
=
rX
j=1
ej  (1  2δ + 2  DCFj): (3.15)
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Analogously, Equation 3.12 can be reformulated as
X
v22V2
GV(v2) =
rX
j=1
ej  (1  2δ + 2  DCFj): (3.16)
Thus, Equations 3.15 and 3.16 imply that
P
v12V1 GV(v1) =
P
v22V2 GV(v2)
and, therefore, the partition incentive is provided.
3.3.4.2 Configuration Incentive
The configuration incentive demands that enforcing fairness must give in-
centive to users to configure their VMs such that the VMs’ configurations
perfectly match their PR utilization. The following theorem shows that the
configuration incentive is provided, when cloud fairness as defined by Defi-
nition 3.6 is enforced.
Theorem3.12. Enforcing cloud fairness according to Definition 3.6 provides the
configuration incentive.
Proof. The theorem is proven on a per VM basis. In particular, as the priori-
ties of VMs of a user are inverse to the user’s greediness and the user’s greedi-
ness includes the sum of greediness of the user’s VMs, it has to be shown that
the greediness of aVM isminimized, when the PRs it utilizes perfectlymatch
its endowment.
Let vi 2 V be a VM. Due to the first summand inside the sum function
of Equation 3.6, vi’s greediness increases linearly with vi’s endowment. Let
rj 2 R. If vi’s utilization of rj exceeds vi’s endowment to rj, vi’s greediness
increases by the according difference scaled by 4δ+2 . That is, if util(vi)j >
edwV(vi)j, vi’s greediness increases by 4δ+2  (util(vi)j  edwV(vi)j). Because
4
δ+2 > 1, for any 0  δ  1, vi’s greediness were less, if vi’s endowment to rj
were increased. However, increasing vi’s endowment to rj such that it exceeds
vi’s utilization of rj is unfavorable: if vi’s endowment to rj is greater than vi’s
utilization of rj, vi’s greediness decreases by the according difference scaled
by 2δ+2 and DCF. That is, if edwV(vi)j > util(vi)j, vi’s greediness decreases
by 2δ+2  DCF  (edwV(vi)j)   util(vi)j). Because 2δ+2  DCF  1, for any
0  δ  1, vi’s greedinesswere less (or at least not greater), if vi’s endowment
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to rj were decreased. It follows thatGV(vi) is minimized, if vi’s PR utilization
is equal to vi’s endowment, i.e., edwV(vi) = util(vi), in which caseGV(vi) =Pr
j=1 util(vi)j.
3.3.4.3 Uncertainty Incentive
For the subsequent discussion (this includes Section 3.3.4.4), GV is defined
asGδV whereat
4
δ+2 and
2
δ+2 are replaced byA andB, respectively.
Theuncertainty incentive demands, that there is no incentive to configure
a VMwith too many or too few VRs in case of uncertainty about its upcom-
ing utilization. The uncertainty incentive is provided when enforcing cloud
fairness according to Definition 3.6, as Definition 3.3 replaces factorsA and
B fromEquation 3.1 by 4δ+2 and
2
δ+2 respectively. Theproof of the following
theorem shows why this replacement works.
Theorem3.13. Enforcing cloud fairness according to Definition 3.6 provides the
uncertainty incentive.
Proof. The theorem is proven on a per VM basis. Let vi 2 V be a VM. To
measure howwell VM vi is configured, the Unnecessary Greediness Increase
(UGI) of vi is defined as the difference between the greediness of vi and the
lowest greediness possible given vi’s PR utilization, i.e.,
UGI(vi) := GV(vi) 
rX
i=j
util(vi)j: (3.17)
Assume that, when vi’s PR utilization remains z% under vi’s endowment,
the UGI is z and, when vi’s PR utilization exceeds vi’s endowment by z%, the
UGI is 2  z. Thus, configuring vi with z% too few VRs is twice as “costly”
than configuring vi with z% too many VRs. Thus, users have incentive too
configure VMs too large, if they are uncertain about the PR utilization. Con-
sequently, the uncertainty incentive is not provided, as the uncertainty in-
centive requires, that configuring a VM with z% too many or too few VRs
results in the same UGI.
Without loss of generality, assume that there is one PR r and that theDCF
isD . Let x > y > 0. Let v^ 2 Vwith edwV(v^) = x and util(v^) = x+ y, i.e.,
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v^ exceeds its endowment of x by y. ThenGV(v^) = x+A  y andUGI(v^) =
y  A   y holds. Let v 2 V with edwV(v) = x and util(v) = x   y, i.e., v
leaves y of its endowment of x unutilized. ThenGV(v) = x B D  y and
UGI(v) = y B D  y holds. In order to provide the uncertainty incentive,
A andBmust be determined, such thatUGI(v^) = UGI(v). This is the case
for
A = 2 B D ; (3.18)
where 0  D  1, as it represents the DCF. D has to be estimated by
the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) based on the expected cloud utilization,
which depends on factors, such as the cloud’s overcommit ratios.
When theCSP chosesD incorrectly, the uncertainty incentive is still pro-
vided in practice for the following reason. In order to take advantage of an in-
correct choice ofD , a user needs to know the ratio of the chosenD and the
actual DCF. However, the user has little information to determine the actual
DCF. Furthermore, theCSP does not need to announce the chosenD to the
user. Therefore, the user has insufficient information to determine the ratio
needed to make strategic VM configurations in caseD is chosen incorrectly.
One solution to Equation 3.18 is A = 4D+2 andB =
2
D+2 as imple-
mented by GDV . Thus, enforcing cloud fairness according to Definition 3.6
provides the uncertainty incentive.
The next section shows why this particular solution to Equation 3.18 is
chosen.
3.3.4.4 Questionnaire Compliance
The proof of Theorem 3.13 established a dependency between A andB,
such that enforcing cloud fairness according to Definition 3.6 provides the
uncertainty incentive. It was shown that GδV implements a specific solution
to this dependency. As the results of Q3 have already been fully exploited
to design GδV and the results of Q2 cannot be used (cf. Section 3.2.4.2), ex-
plicit results from questionnaire’s Q1 (cf. Section 3.2.1) lead to this specific
solution, as shown subsequently.
A11 and A14 were rejected by the vast majority of participants and are,
therefore, not considered further. As A13 was the most frequent choice and
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was selected by roughly twice as many participants, as the second frequent
choice A12, values for A andB are determined, such that the greediness
metric qualifiesA13 as twice as fair asA12, whereat fairness of an allocation is
quantified by the (maximal) difference of user greediness for this allocation.
Because the questionnaire specified real-life scenarios, no endowments were
specified. Thus, to apply GV, all endowments (function edwV in Equation
3.6) are defined as (2; 2), i.e., the equal share.
For A12,GV results inGV(c1) = GV(c2) = A   2B andGV(c3) = 2A .
For A13, GV results in GV(c1) = GV(c2) = 2A   2B and GV(c3) = 0.
Thus, for A12 the greediness range isA + 2B and for A13 it is 2A   2B.
Accordingly,A andB must be determined, such that the greediness range
of A12 is twice the greediness range of A13, i.e.,
A + 2B = 2  (2A   2B): (3.19)
Inserting Equation 3.18 into Equation 3.19 yields
A =
4
D + 2
and B = 2
D + 2
: (3.20)
Equation 3.20 and settingD = δ, finally justifies why GδV uses
4
δ+2 and
2
δ+2
as factors. 0  δ  1 holds, as δ, or ratherD , estimates theDCF (cf. Section
3.3.4.3), which is within this range. Therefore, in practice, δ has to increase
with the expected cloud utilization levels (the higher these levels, the more
likely it is that PRs are ceded and, thus, the DCF estimate has to increase).
δ determines how strongly a deviation of the PR utilization from the en-
dowment is penalized. For δ = 0, GδV penalizes exceeding the endowment
most strongly and, in turn, rewards cedingmost strongly. The opposite holds
for δ = 1. The conformance ofGwith all relevant results of the questionnaire
was verified numerically, whenA = 4δ+2 andB =
2
δ+2 for any 0  δ  1.
The results showG’s perfect compliancewith all questionnaire results for any
δ. Therefore, alsoGδV perfectly complies with the questionnaire, when equal
endowments are assumed.
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3.3.4.5 Comparison toOtherMetrics
By designing GM (cf. Definition 3.1) in line with the most frequent argu-
mentsmade inQ3of the questionnaire, GM is able to quantify the intuitively
perceived greediness of consumers based on the resources they served them-
selves from a shared resource pool. Therefore, in contrast to the metrics dis-
cussed in Section 3.2.3.1, which were frequently suggested for this purpose,
GM produces the rankings for all three scenarios of Q3 that were most fre-
quently selected by participants and also identifies the most frequently se-
lected answer to Q1 as most fair.
GM assumes that all consumers have equal entitlements to the resource
pool. This assumption was relaxed, when refining GM (cf. Definition 3.3)
to be applicable to VMs. This refined GM allows taking very different en-
titlements to resources into account. Moreover, these entitlements are not
captured by simple weights but by vectors, which allows accounting for dif-
ferent entitlements to different resources, which naturally fits the cloud con-
text, where VMs have different entitlements to different PRs.
By adding these entitlements statically to the greediness of a VM and by
adding or subtracting a certain number, based on how the actual consump-
tion deviates from these entitlements, the refined GM is able to take into ac-
count, how well VMs are configured. This allows providing three incentives
to configure VMs’ VRs to best match the anticipated subsequent PR utiliza-
tion. No other metric is able to provide these incentives.
Thus, the refined GM is the first metric that not only captures an intuitive
understanding of greediness but also is applicable in a highly technical con-
text, where different entitlements to different resources exist.
3.4 Discussion
Defining fairness is significantly easier, when utility functions of consumers
are known. As cloud users utilize resources via VMs, defining cloud fairness
would be simpler, if utility functions of VMs are known. Therefore, Section
3.1 broke the first ground in this unexplored research field of charting VM
utility functions, by investigating dependencies between VR combinations
a VM has access to and the VM’s performance. The results obtained were
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negative, as it was not possible to find consistent dependencies and even
counter-intuitive dependencies were discovered. For example, it was shown
that (a) in some cases the performance of a VM decreases with an increas-
ing number of VCPUs and (b) a VM’s performance often does not decrease,
when it has tightRAM constraints. Although there exist technical explana-
tions for these phenomena, their occurrence prohibits the use of utility func-
tions to define cloud fairness.
These negative results motivated a novel approach to define fairness in
Section 3.2. Conceptualizing cloud nodes as “self-serving buffets” and ob-
serving that nodes can prioritizeVMs’ access to their PRs, lead to the premiss
that it is fair to constrain consumers in proportion to their greediness. There-
fore, instead of fairness, greediness had to be defined. Thiswas done basedon
a survey amongmore than 600 participants. This survey (a) posed questions
by simple real-life scenarios to not constrain the range of participants or dis-
tract themby technical terms, (b) showed thatDRF,which is the state-of-the-
art of data center fairness, does not comply with an intuitive understanding
of fairness, and (c) provided information to formulate the Greediness Met-
ric (GM), which captures an intuitive understanding of greediness without
access to consumers’ utility functions but solely based on the resources they
consume.
The GM was formulated in Section 3.3, which also refined it to define
cloud user greediness. In line with the premiss, cloud fairness was defined
as prioritizing VMs inversely proportional to the greediness of their user. It
was shown that (a) enforcing this definition of cloud fairness provides incen-
tive to users to configure VRs of their VMs correctly, that is, aligned with the
PR requirements of their VMs, and (b) for the purpose of prioritizing VMs
to enforce fairness, the proposed cloud user greediness definition is superior
to any well established metric that quantifies multi-resource consumption.
This superiority will further be confirmed by the use of the simulator de-
veloped inChapter 4. In addition to this simulator, anOpenStack implemen-
tation extension developed practically enables the enforcement of this new
definition of cloud fairness.
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4
Simulation and Implementation
Architecture
The simulative comparison of various policies to allocate cloud re-sources in a fair manner as well as fair cloud resource allocation by
adapting node resources allocation to running VMs were unexplored re-
search fields [39, 97].
A cloud simulator that allocates node resources to VMs is developed in
Python in Section 4.1. The simulator calculates a snapshot resource alloca-
tion that is perfect according to one of ten policies. Policies apply one of five
metrics (cf. Section 4.1.2) to quantify howmuch VMs and users receive and
enforce max-min fairness among those quantifications (cf. Section 2.4.3 and
3.3.3.4) either with a per-user or per-VM scope. Section 4.1.3 elaborates on
how these allocations are calculated. Fairness of allocations is measured by
quantifying bundles with one of these five metrics and feeding the results of
these quantifications to Jain’s index [43, 97] (cf. Section 4.1.4). Accordingly,
there are various allocations andways to evaluate their fairness. To allow for a
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comprehensive discussion of all resulting constellations, the simulator calcu-
lates an allocation snapshot, as an allocation that changes over time compli-
cates the discussion, while not allowing for deeper insights. For the same rea-
son, only perfect allocations are considered, as non-perfectness adds varity
that complicates the discussion but does broaden it in a reasonable manner.
Therefore, the simulator does not evaluate practical but mathematical/theo-
retical aspects and compares different metrics to prioritize VMs.
In order to evaluate practical aspects an OpenStack [73] Fairness Service
(FS) is developed in Section 4.2. The FS adapts VMs’ PPs to enforce fairness
on a per user basis by allocatingCPU,RAM,disk I/O, andnetwork access (cf.
Section 4.2.5). OpenStack is an open-source cloud computing software that
is the de facto standard for private clouds and also serves as foundation for
public clouds. OpenStack consists of several different components with one
of the most important components being Nova (compute) [69]. Nova runs
on every node that hosts VMs and has direct control over these. Therefore,
the FS is implemented by an additional nova service called nova-fairness (cf.
Section 4.2.1).
4.1 Simulator
The cloud simulator (a) calculates a static/snapshot resource allocation that
is max-min fair on a per-user (cf. Theorem 3.9) or per-VM (cf. Corollary
3.10) basis and (b) quantifies the fairness of this allocation [82]. The simu-
lator models different heterogenous resources and deploys different metrics
(cf. Section 4.1.2) to make bundles comparable. Making bundles compara-
ble is necessary to apply max-min fairness (cf. Section 2.4.3) and to quantify
the fairness of allocations. A policy is defined by (a) a per-user (cf. Definition
3.7) or per-VM (cf. Definition 3.8) scope and (b) the metric that is applied
to make bundles comparable. The main entities modeled by the simulator
are users, VMs, and nodes. Setups are constellations of these entities. Sec-
tion 5.2 evaluates different policies by comparing the allocations they result
in for fixed setups.
Formally, a setup is defined analogous the representation of a cloud as
introduced in Section 3.3.2.1. In particular, a setup is a set of users U =
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fu1; u2; : : : ; uug, a set of nodes N = fn1; n2; : : : ; nng, a set of VMs V =
fv1; v2; : : : ; vvg, and a set of resources R = fr1; r2; : : : ; rrg. All functions
defined in Section 3.3.2.1 and illustrated in Figure 3.14 also exist for setups.
Only function util : V ! Rr0 is replaced by function req : V ! Rr0 and
denotes the resources a VM requests (but not necessarily receives). Thus,
req(v) is also referred to as v’s requirement vector and resources have to be
allocated to v in the ratio of this vector. That is, VMs have Leontief utility
functions (cf. Section 2.3.3).
While Leontief utility functions do not apply in practice (cf. Section 3.1),
it is the standard assumption to model data center resource allocation theo-
retically [12, 13, 24, 30, 104, 105] and adopted by the simulator to allow for
a comprehensive and concise comparison of different policies. Nonetheless,
the simulator’s abstraction level is more detailed than the abstraction level
usually applied in literature as the simulator allows users to own different
VMs, each with a different Leontief utility function, while in literature only
one Leontief utility function is assumed per user. Therefore, a setup is de-
fined by setsU,N, V, and R and functions own; host; nbr; phy; quota; virt,
and req.
A VM’s owner is denoted by superscript and a VM’s host is denoted by
subscript. For example, VM vax 2 V is owned by ua 2 U and hosted on
nx 2 N. If a node hosts more than one VM of the same user, the VMs are
distinguished by dots, e.g., _vax andvax.
An allocation for a setup is defined by function alloc : V ! Rr0 that
maps each VM v to the bundle v receives. Accordingly, equation
8n 2 N :
X
v2host(n)
alloc(v)  phy(n)
holds, as the amount of resources allocated to VMs that share a node is lim-
ited by the node’s resources. To ease the discussion, it is assumed that nodes
are not overcommitted, i.e.,
8n 2 N :
X
v2host(n)
virt(v)  phy(n) (4.1)
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As Equation 3.5 is applied to calculate endowments, Equation 4.1 implies
8v 2 V : virt(v) = edwV(v): (4.2)
A VMs resource requests are allowed to exceed the VM’s VRs, as otherwise
overload on nodes would be impossible.
4.1.1 Assumptions and Practice
Section 2.3.3 introduced Leontief utility functions and discussed their suit-
ability tomodel job scheduling. The simulator uses Leontief utility functions
to model node resource allocation and calculates a snapshot resource alloca-
tion, i.e., VM demands are static and for these demands a static allocation is
calculated.
Leontief utility functions model dependencies among time-shared PRs
well. For example, when the bandwidth of a server is reduced, the server’s
disk I/O utilization decreases equivalently, as requests reach the server
slower and accordingly stored data is fetched at a lower rate. In contrast, the
dependency between time-shared PRs and the space shared PRRAM is of-
ten different. For example, assume a program has a fixed number of vari-
ables that are stored in RAM. Allocating more CPU time will execute the
program faster, while the number of variables and, thus, required RAM re-
mains constant. Substitutabilities further complicate dependencies among
PRs: For example, (a) paging reduces RAM requirements by use of CPU
timeor (b) compression saves storageorbandwidthbyuseofCPUtime[23].
Consequently, Leontief utility functions do not cover the whole range of PR
dependencies.
4.1.2 Metrics
The following metrics are evaluated in the simulations C,D, G0,G0:5,G1. C,
D, andG abbreviate cost, DRF, and greediness, respectively. Using these ab-
breviations instead of spelling out those names, allows for a concise and com-
pactnotation in formulas, figures, and tables. Themetrics areusedby the sim-
ulator to generate allocations and also to quantify the fairness of allocations.
All metrics normalize the value of resources according to Section 3.3.1.3 and
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serve to map bundles of VMs or users to a number inR. Let v 2 V, u 2 U,
andMet := fC;D;G0;G0:5;G1g be the set of metrics. MetricM 2 Met
defines theM-value of v and u as follows.
4.1.2.1 Cost-metric (C-metric)
The cost-metric, abbreviated by C-metric, applies the L1 norm (cf. Section
3.2.3.1.1) to define theC-value of users and VMs. Therefore, theC-value of v
is defined by applying the L1 metric to v’s bundle. TheC-value of u is defined
by applying the L1 norm to the sum of bundles of u’s VMs. Equivalently, the
C-value of u can be defined by the sum ofC-values of u’s VMs. TheC-metric
is the onlymetric considered subsequently, for which this equivalence holds.
TheL1 norm is also used todefine asset fairness [30], wherefore asset-fairness
also would have been a viable name for this metric.
4.1.2.2 DRF-metric (D-metric)
TheDRF-metric, abbreviated byD-metric, applies theL1 norm (cf. Section
2.4.3 and 3.2.3.1.4) to define the D-value of users and VMs. In particular,
theD-value of v is the dominant share of v’s bundle. TheD-value of u is the
dominant share of the sum of bundles of u’s VMs. Therefore, the D-value
of u may be smaller than the sum of D-values of u’s VMs. The D-metric is
equivalent to the DoRe metric in Section 3.2.3.1.4.
4.1.2.3 Greediness-metric (Gδ-metric)
The greediness-metric, abbreviated by Gδ-metric, defines the Gδ-value of v
by Definition 3.3 and theGδ-value of u by Definition 3.5 for δ 2 f0; 0:5; 1g.
Therefore, theGδ-value of umay be negative. When the superscript is omit-
ted from G, the statement/equation holds independent of parameter δ. The
Gδ-value of v or u is also referred to as δ-greediness of v or u.
4.1.3 Policies and Allocations
Policies were introduced by Definition 3.7 and 3.8 and Section 3.3.3.4 dis-
cussed how they determinemax-min fair allocations, whenVMdemands are
stable. This section revisits notations and findings to showhow the simulator
applies policies.
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Every policy is determined by a metricM 2 Met and a scope, which is
local or global (cf. Definition 3.7 and 3.8). Accordingly, a policy is denoted
asMs-policy, where s = l, if the policy’s scope is local, and the s = g, if the
policy’s scope is global. TheMs-policy determines theMs-allocation, such
that (a) VMs receive resources in the ratio of their demand vector, (b) no
VM receives more resources than requested, and (c) max-min fairness is en-
forced among theM-values of users or VMs (cf. Theorem 3.9 and Corollary
3.10). When the policy’s scope is local, max-min fairness is enforced on each
node among the VMs’M-values, i.e., the owner of VMs is ignored and alloca-
tions on different nodes are independent. When the policy’s scope is global,
max-min fairness is enforced among the users’M-values, i.e., the allocations
on different nodes are interdependent. Therefore, the Mg-allocation is M-
max-min fair among users and theMl-allocation isM-max-min fair among
VMs. If the subscript is omitted from a policy or allocation, the scope is irrel-
evant, i.e., theMl- andMg-policy result in the same allocation. TheGδg -policy
implements Definition 3.6.
4.1.3.1 Allocation Calculation
TheMg-policy determinesMg-allocation by the algorithm described in List-
ing 4.1. Line 1 and 2 define that the temporary allocation alloct and the the
main allocation allocm allocate every VM an empty bundle. The M-value
of a user or VM a 2 U [ V according to allocation allocm and alloct are
denoted by Mm(a) and Mt(a), respectively. These allocations are adapted
by the while loop in Line 3, which runs until the difference between these
two allocations does not change bymore than 0.001% for 5 iterations. Line 4
merges allocm and alloct, where the weight of allocm in this merge increases
every iteration (cf. Line 5). Line 6 updatesMm(u) for all users and Line 7
“resets” allocation alloct. Line 8 iterates over all nodes. The while loop in
Line 9 changes allocation alloct and iterates as long as alloct has not allo-
cated all resources of a node and VMs request more resources. In order to
align theM-values, Line 10 selects a VM that requests more resources and
most “deserves” them. For v 2 V, this deserving is determined by
M(v) := Mt(v) Mm(v) +Mm(own(v)): (4.3)
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1 8v 2 V : alloct(v) := f0gr
2 8v 2 V : allocm(v) := f0gr
3 while(9v 2 V;91  i  r : jalloct(v)i   alloc(v)ij > 10 5 in last five
iterations)
4 allocm := (1  x)  allocm + x  alloct
5 x := x  0:995
6 u 2 U : updateMm(u)
7 8v 2 V : alloct(v) := f0gr
8 8n 2 N do:
9 while( 8ri 2 R :
P
v2host(n) alloc
t(v)i < phy(n)i and
v 2 host(n) : alloct(v) < req(v)):
10 v := argminv2fv2host(n)jalloct(v)<req(v)gM
(v)
11 alloct(v) := alloct(v) + ε  req(v)/Pri=1 req(v)i
12 8v 2 host(n) : updateMt(v)
Listing 4.1: Determining the Ms-allocation
Mt(v)has to be contained inM(v), asalloct is the allocation beingmodified
and a VM that deserves more resources most, i.e., currently receives the low-
estM-value, has to be selected.Mm(v) contributed in Line 6 toMm(own(v))
and this value influences the resource allocation on all nodes that host VMs
of own(v). To stabilize v’s contribution toMm(own(v)) over different iter-
ations of the loop in Line 3, the loop in Line 9 must ensure that v is allo-
cated roughly the same resources as in the last iteration of Line 3. Subtract-
ingMm(v) in Equation 4.3 ensures exactly that, as v is likelier to be selected,
whenM(v) is lower. As allocm shall align theMm-value of all users, VMs
of users’ that already have a highMm-value must be less likely to be selected.
Therefore,Mm(own(v))’sM-value is added in Equation 4.3.
After the VM v that desrves more resources most is determined, Line 11
increases alloct(v) by a fraction of req(v), which ensures, that v receives re-
sources in the same ration as req(v). The division by
Pr
i=1 req(v)i ensures
that the amount by which a VM’s bundle is increased, is normalized among
VMs. Lastly, Line 12 updates theMt-value of all VMs hosted by the node.
Updating allVMs is important, as changing thebundleof oneVMcanchange
theMt-value of other VMs, ifM = G.
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4.1.3.1.1 Implementation Details
An implementation detail that is not shown in the pseudo code, is how the
approximation of an allocation depicted in Line 11 by ε is implemented.
In particular, the loop in Line 9 actually runs until (a) some resource rs is
“highly” saturated, i.e.,
9rs 2 R :
X
v2host(n)
alloct(v)s > phy(n)s   ε0; (4.4)
(b) no resource is over-saturated, i.e.,
8ra 2 R :
X
v2host(n)
alloct(v)a  phy(n)a; (4.5)
and (c) the difference among theM-values of all VMs requesting more re-
sources is at most ε0, i.e.,
max
va;vc2fv2host(n) j alloct(v)<req(v)g
jM(va) M(vc)j < ε0; (4.6)
where ε0 = 10 9. This value of ε0 ensures that the determined allocation is
equal to a perfect allocation, i.e., an allocation where equality holds in Equa-
tion 4.4 and 4.6 for ε0 = 0, in the first four decimal digits; an accuracy
that is more than sufficient for all discussion based on the simulator’s results
(cf. Section 5.2). To determine such allocations, resources are allocated to
the VM v with smallestM(v) (cf. Line 10 and 11), if no resource is over-
saturated, and resources are removed from the VM v with largestM(v), if a
resource is over-saturated. This is implementedby initializing ε (cf. Line11)
with 0:05 and multiplying it at beginning of the loop in Line 9 with 0:9, if
(a) a resource is over-saturated and ε > 0 or (b) no resource is saturated and
ε < 0. Therefore, jεj decreases and alloct oscillate around and converges to-
wards an optimal allocation. Another implementation detail not shown here
is the handling of VMs that request zero of some resource: VMs that request
zero of rs (cf. Equation 4.4) have to be allocated more resources to make the
allocation efficient, while Equation 4.6 has to be verified only for those VMs
that still can be allocated resources.
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4.1.3.1.2 Local Policies
As for local policies allocations on different nodes are independent and since
theM-values of users are not considered, local allocations are generated by
running only Lines 8 to 12 of Listing 4.1 where
M(v) := Mt(v): (4.7)
4.1.4 Fairness Score and Fairness Quantification
While the quantification of single-resource allocations is well researched (cf.
[43, 51, 90] and Section 2.6.10.1), there is no best practice to quantify the
fairness of multi-resource allocations. In particular, single-resource fairness
returns a real number that quantifies the fairness of an allocation, which is
specified by vector v 2 Rc0, where vi is what user ui receives. Therefore, to
apply a single-resource fairness measure to a multi-resource allocation, the
bundle of eachuser has to bemapped to a scalar, such that the resulting vector
of scalars can be input to the single-resource fairness measure.
[44] suggests the dominant share or the number of jobs a user is able to
schedule, to map a multi-resource allocation to a scalar. As a single-resource
fairness measure, [44] suggests a function of [51] that is parameterized by
β; λ 2 R.
This thesis quantifies the fairness of multi-resource allocations by
Rru M2Met     ! Ru Jain’s Index     ! [0; 1]: (4.8)
In particular, the metrics discussed in Section 4.1.2, i.e., the metrics inMet,
are used to map a multi-resource allocation to a scalar. As single-resource
fairness measure, this thesis uses Jain’s Index [43], as it is the traditional fair-
ness measure and a special case of the function suggested in [44, 51]. As
jMetj = 5 this results in five fairness measures (one for each metric inMet)
applied to the allocations.
Jain’s Index takes a vector of non-negative numbers as input, while the sub-
traction of the quota credit may lead to negativeG-values. To avoid negative
values as input for Jain’s index, the largest quota credit among users is de-
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termined and added to the G-value of every user before being input to Jain’s
index.
Using theD-metric in the leftmapping of Equation 4.8, quantifies bundles
according to the dominant share as suggested in [44]. [44] alternatively sug-
gests to quantify bundles, by the number of jobs users are able to schedule.
This quantification is not used here, as (a) two users may be able to schedule
different numbers of jobs with the same amount of resources, and therefore,
the samebundle is quantifieddifferently for them, and (b) the simulator does
not model jobs.
For metricM 2 Met, theM-score of allocation A is defined as the result
of applying Equation 4.8 to A, where M is used in the left mapping of the
equation.
4.2 OpenStack Extension
OpenStack [42] is the de facto standard for private cloud software stacks and
also serves as a foundation for public clouds. OpenStack is open source and
has a large, supportive community that organizes regular meetings and sum-
mits all over the world. Out of the box, OpenStack does not control cloud
resources by adapting PR allocations, but the idea was well received, when
discussedat the13thSwissOpenStackUserGroupMeetupon July7th, 2016,
inWinterthur.
This section describes the extension of OpenStack to leverage PR alloca-
tion in order to enforce fairness among cloud users [64, 79, 80]. Fairness is
enforced as discussed in Section 3.3.3.
4.2.1 High-level Design and Steps
Two essential node types in the OpenStack architecture are the controller
node and the compute nodes. The controller node coordinates the cloud, e.g.,
by scheduling VMs, and stores essential information to be accessed by other
nodes or administrators. Compute nodes perform the actual processing of
workloads, i.e., hostingVMs. For this purpose, computenodes run theOpen-
Stack servicenova-compute that is part of theOpenStack compute project
nova. OpenStack nova knows three types of managing components: Ser-
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1 whileNRI of some node inNf is missing:
2 send own NRI to nodes of which NRI is missing
3 use NRIs to calculate CRS and normalization vector
4 every μ seconds:
5 collect RUI of all VMs hosted by ni
6 applyGδV to collected RUI in order to calculate greediness of all VMs
hosted by ni
7 send this greediness set to all n 2 Nf   fnig
8 wait to receive greediness set from all n 2 Nf   fnig
9 applyGδU to calculate the greediness of all u 2 U
10 for every VM v hosted by ni:
11 set priorities of v according toGδV(v) andGδU(host(v))
Listing 4.2: Steps of the FS running on node ni
vices, managers and drivers [72]. Services are generic containers that group
compute node functionalities. Each service has its own managers to control
a specific aspect of the node and execute tasks. Managers encapsulate func-
tionalities of the service by providing methods and periodic tasks to deploy
the functionality.
A compute node canmonitor the RUI of the VMs it hosts and adapt their
priorities. Thus, PR allocations are adapted by an additional nova service
called nova-fairness. This Fairness Service (FS) enforces fairness in the
cloud as discussed in Section 3.3.3 (accordingly, it collects all information
discussed in Section 3.3.2.1). The message exchange between FS instances
on different nodes is decentralized.
LetNf  N be the set of compute nodes that run the FS and ni 2 Nf. The
pseudocode inListing 4.2 describes how theFS runningonnodeni calculates
the greediness of users and adapts the priorities of hosted VMs.
Lines 1 to 3 ensure that the CRS, which is essential to calculate the greed-
iness, is available before the FS conducts any further steps. In order to allow
adding nova-fairness nodes subsequently, the FS respondswith itsNRI upon
receiving the NRI of a new node (this is not reflected in the pseudo code). μ
in Line 4 defines the interval with which the greediness of users and PPs of
VMs are updated and is referred to as the update interval. Every μ seconds the
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FS calculates the greediness of VMs hosted by ni (Line 5 and 6). This greedi-
ness set is announced to all nodes (Line 7). When greediness sets have been
received from all other nodes (Line 8), the node calculates the greediness of
users (Line 9) from this information. Lastly, priorities of VMs on ni are set
according to the calculated greediness (Line 10 and 11).
4.2.2 ResourceMeasurement
The FS takes the following six PRs into account: (a) CPU time in sec-
onds, (b) memory used in kilobyte, number of bytes (c) read from disk and
(d) written to disk, and number of bytes (e) received and (f) transmitted
through the network interface. Disk space andRAMbandwidth are not con-
sidered by this prototypical implementation, as disk usage is accounted for
by (c) and (d) andRAM usage is accounted for by (b). Resources such as
GPUs and software licenses are not taken into account as they are relevant
only in specific scenarios. Therefore, the FS takes all PRs that are relevant
for generic computing tasks and most relevant in the context of clouds into
account (cf. Section 2.2.1).
4.2.2.1 CPU Time Normalization
CPU time, i.e., the amount of time used for a specific CPU task to complete
[99], measures CPU usage. CPU time provided by different nodes is not
directly comparable. The reason is that cloud nodes are rarely homogeneous
[36] and, therefore, are equippedwith different CPUs. Accordingly, one sec-
ond of CPU time on a powerful node is more valuable than one second of
CPU time on a less powerful node. To compare CPU time across nodes, the
FS normalizes CPU time by the nodes’ BogoMIPS [110]. BogoMIPS is a
metric provided by the Linux operating system to capture the performance
of differentCPUs. However, BogoMIPS do not define a scientifically reliable
measure to compare CPUs, wherefore other normalization references, such
as the SPEC value [96], are considered for future improvements.
4.2.2.2 Resource Utilization Information
The FS requests a list of VMs that are running on its node by an Remote
Procedure Call (RPC) to the nova-conductor service. This list contains
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only VMs that have been successfully scheduled by OpenStack on the node.
Therefore, the list indicates for whichVMsRUI have to be collected (cf. Line
5 of Listing 4.2). The RUI is collected by deploying an OpenStack driver to
access the libvirt virtualization API [5]. This API allows monitoring the
detailed VM RUI in a unified manner and supports most of the hypervisors
known [87]. Accordingly, the libvirt API provides access to the RUI for each
VMandensures theFS’s compatibilitywithnumeroushypervisors. For time-
shared PRs (CPU time, disk I/O, network access), the libvirt API provides
the accumulated PR utilization since boot time. Therefore, the FS calculates
the RUI for the current update interval by subtracting the accumulated uti-
lization at the beginning of the interval from the accumulated utilization at
the endof the interval. For space-sharedPRs (RAM) the libvirt API provides
the current utilization, which the FS uses to representRAMutilization in the
RUI vector.
VMs’ PR utilization may follow well defined but bursty patterns. For ex-
ample, databases usually write in periodic large bursts to disk. However,
users cannot specify this burstiness, as they only configureVRs of their VMs.
Nonetheless, the FS does not penalize bursty PR utilization, when enforcing
fairness. The reason is that the FSmeasures the PR utilization of time-shared
PRs accumulated over period μ. Therefore, it does not matter, if within this
periodPRs are utilized smoothly or in bursts. Onlywhen the inter-burst time
is greater than μ, bursts are penalized.
4.2.2.3 Node Resource Information
The NRI of a node specifies its PR capacities. Therefore, the NRI per node
is stable, which allows to capture NRI without a temporal component (Line
1-3 of Listing 4.2). The different NRI data points considered by the FS are
(a) number of CPU cores, normalized by the node’s BogoMIPS, (b) com-
bined disk read speeds of all disks in bytes/s, (c) network throughput in
Byte/s, and (d) total amount of installed memory in kBytes.
4.2.3 Metric Customization
TheFS enforces fairness according toDefinition 3.6. However, the FS allows
to overwrite the GδU and GδV used by this definition. The definitions to be
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used instead are specified in the nova configuration by the class path of these
definitions. This class path is checked by the FS for correctness, i.e., whether
a correct class with required definitions exists under that path. Therefore,
the FS allows to enforce fairness according Definitions 3.7 and 3.8, which
includes fairness definitions such as asset fairness or DRF.
Flavors in OpenStack do not contain a virtual counterpart for every PR.
For example, OpenStack flavors contain VCPU and VRAM but not virtual
disk I/O or virtual network access. However, the definitions for function
edwV in Section 3.3.2.3 assume that every PR has a virtual counterpart.
Therefore, in case a PR has none, the FS divides its node’s supply of that PR
by the number of hosted VMs. In turn, this result determines the amount of
the virtual counterpart of this PR every VM on that node owns. For exam-
ple, when a node with a bandwidth of 10 Gbit/s hosts four VMs, each VM’s
virtual network access is set to 2.5 Gbit/s.
4.2.4 Message Exchange
The FS’s information exchange between compute nodes (cf. Lines 2, 7, and
8 of Listing 4.2) is implemented in a decentralized and asynchronous man-
ner. Section 5.4 compares two alternative types of message flow topologies,
discusses and compares their details and complexity, and provides according
illustrations.
4.2.4.1 Decentralization
OpenStack enables message exchanges between nodes by message queues.
OpenStack’s default message queuing protocol is RabbitMQ [20], which is
an implementation of the AMQP specification. AMQP is centralized, where-
fore using RabbitMQ implies that all inter-node communication traverses
the RabbitMQ broker on the controller node that relays messages. To al-
low for a decentralized information exchange between compute nodes, the
ZeroMQ [70] message queuing system is deployed. ZeroMQ can be set up
with minimal effort and allows compute nodes to exchange information di-
rectly by running a decentralized ZeroMQmessage broker on each node.
The only mechanism of ZeroMQ that works centralized is the discovery
of nodes to communicate with. For this purpose, a redis data structure
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store [88] hosting identification information for all ZeroMQ brokers has to
be installed on the controller node. Because redis is an in-memory data store,
it is highly performant and sufficiently scalable.
4.2.4.2 IsochronousMessage Exchange
To achieve independence of compute nodes, FS instances on different nodes
operate isochronously, i.e., nodes adhere to the same update interval μ, but
send messages within this interval at different times. Moreover, messages
between nodes are sent by RPC casts, as these, in contrast to calls, do not
invoke a response. Accordingly, messages that contain NRI and greediness
sets from other nodes reach a node at different times. To ensure that mes-
sages are only sent to nodes, which are currently reachable and running the
FS, an according list is requested first from the nova-conductor service.
The nova-conductor queries a SQL database located on the controller, which
contains all status information about services currently running.
The NRI is static, wherefore a compute node only needs to receive this
information once from every other node. Therefore, the FS waits to conduct
any other operations, until theNRI of all other nodes have been received (cf.
Lines 1-3 in Listing 4.2). In contrast to the NRI, VM greediness constantly
changes and, therefore, each greediness set that a compute node sends is as-
sociated with a certain period of time. Thus, this information needs to be
synchronized, when it reaches a compute node. To do so, every compute
node nxmaintains a FIFOqueue for every other compute node nz that stores
greediness sets received from nz. When all of these queues contain at least
one element, nx dequeues the first element from every queue to recalculate
the user greediness and update VM priorities.
4.2.5 Calculating and Applying Priorities
The FS allocates PRs to VMs by PPs (cf. Section 2.2.1.1, Lines 10 and 11 of
Listing 4.2, and [35]). All PRs except network access are controlled by lib-
virt, wherefore the FS supports most of the known hypervisors [87]. The
FS calculates PPs of a VM vi based on the number Gδp(vi) := GδV(vi) +
GδU(own(vi)). Number GδU(own(vi)) already includes GδV(vi) (cf. Equation
3.9). However, by addingGδV(vi) again, the individual greediness of the VM
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is emphasized, when setting theVM’s PPs (otherwise all VMsof a userwould
have the same PPs). Generally, the ranges of PPs differ among PRs:
CPU time is controlled by setting PPs, alias CPU shares, in the range
[1,100].
RAM is space-shared and not time-shared. Thus, it is not allocated by PPs.
In turn, the FS uses soft limits, which are a minimum guarantee. The
FS assigns soft-limits from 10 MiB to the VMs’ maximum amount of
RAM.
Disk I/O is controlled by setting PPs, alias disk weights, in the range
[100,1000]. This is the maximal range allowed by libvirt.
Network access is the only PR that is not controlled by libvirt, as libvirt
only allows setting hard limits for network access, i.e., a maximum
bandwidth that cannotbeexceededeven if nootherVMproduces traf-
fic. To avoid the corresponding potential waste of bandwidth, the FS
currently deploys the more sophisticated Hierarchical Token Bucket
(HTB) queuing discipline of tc by calling tc’s corresponding Com-
mand Line Interfaces (CLI). This allows for setting PPs in the range
[1, 98]. Section 5.3.2 integrates the Hierarchical Fair Service Curve
(HFSC) queuing discipline into libvirt, such that the FS can set PPs
for network access via libvirt.
Function
p(g) 7!
8>><>>:
outmax if g  inmax,
outmin if g  inmin,
(g inmin)(outmax outmin)
inmax inmin + outmin else,
(4.9)
translates g := Gδp(vi) to PPs. In particular, greediness g is expected to
be in interval [inmin; inmax] and [outmin; outmax] is the interval of the gener-
ated output values. If g =2 [inmin; inmax], the according maximum/minimum
value is returned. Otherwise, it is calculated where g lies relatively in interval
[inmin; inmax]. The value in interval [outmin; outmax] that lies relatively at the
same position is returned. For example, when g lies right in the middle of
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inmin and inmax, the value that lies right in the middle of outmin and outmax is
returned.
Values inmin and inmax have to be defined depending on the metric that is
used by the FS. By default the Gδ-metric is used for which g < 0 is possi-
ble and, thus, a inmin < 0 should be chosen. However, if the Gδ-metric is
overwritten (cf. Section 4.2.3) by, e.g., the C- or D-metric, g  0, where-
fore inmin = 0 is a good choice. Because all metrics normalize resources,
reasonable values of inmin and inmax are easily determined. For the experi-
mental evaluation in Section 5.3, inmin =  1 and inmax = 1 was chosen,
as Section 5.2 will show that the greediness values usually fall within that
range (although it is possible to construct extreme cases where input values
=2 [inmin; inmax] occur).
The priority values that can be assigned to a VM to access a PR differ de-
pending on the PR.Therefore, interval [outmin; outmax] has to be defined de-
pending on thePR to be controlled. As discussed above, the FSuses intervals
[1; 100], [100; 1000], and [1; 98] for CPU time, disk I/O, and network access,
respectively. In particular, these intervals are dictated by priority ranges that
the libvirt API allows to assign to these PRs.
When the FS updates the PPs of VMs, an exponential decay is used, to
avoid fast changing of PPs. In particular
updated PP := (1  E )  current PP+ E  p(h); (4.10)
for 0  E  1, where for the experimental evaluation inSection5.3E = 0:2
is chosen. This value was determined to provide a good tradeoff between
smoothness and promptness of the adaption of priorities.
4.3 Discussion
This chapter developed a cloud simulator that calculates max-min-fair multi-
resource allocations while using different bundle measures (cf. Section
2.4.3). The simulator models every VM by a Leontief utility function, which
is generally too simplistic to capture resource requirements in clouds. The
decision to use Leontief utility functionswasmade, because they are the best
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option currently available to model data center multi-resource allocation. In
particular, Leontief utility functions are most prominently used in literature
(cf. Section 2.6) and capture dependencies between resources in a mathe-
matically simple manner, as dependencies between resources are linear. An
advantage of the simulator overmanymulti-resource allocationmodels in lit-
erature is that the simulator models (a) multiple VMs per user and (b) that
VMs are located on different nodes. In contrast, the work introducing DRF
[30], which defines today’s state-of-the-art of fair data center multi-resource
allocations, assumes a sinlge Leontief utility function per user (notmodeling
different VMs per user) and their competition for resources in a monolithic
resource pool (not modeling that these resources are partitioned to nodes).
Also OpenStack was extended by a fairness service that enforces cloud
fairness as proposed in this thesis by conducting three steps: (a) monitor-
ing the PR utilization of VMs, (b) periodically exchanging this information
across nodes to calculate the greediness of cloud users, and (c) periodically
assigning priorities to VMs inversely proportional to the greediness of their
owner. PRs that aremonitored in Step a and for which priorities are assigned
inStep c areCPU,disk I/O, network access, andRAM.The libvirtAPI is used
for both of these steps, making the fairness service compatible to amultitude
of hypervisors. For the message exchange in Step b OpenStack’s standard
message queues are used.
Thus,Chapter 5does not only evaluate the solutiondeveloped, but (a) im-
proves the messaging scheme used in Step b, (b) evaluates the overhead
caused by the fairness service, and (c) shows that it effectively enforces fair-
ness among cloud users. Furthermore, the simulator is applied to compare
different bundle measures in terms of their suitability to extend max-min-
fairness to cloud multi-resource allocations.
122
5
Evaluation
This thesis’ proposal to establish cloud fairness is evaluated as follows.A theoretical evaluation compares theGδ-,D-, andC-policies, with re-
spect to their suitability to define cloud fairness. This theoretical evaluation
is constituted by an analytical investigation in Section 5.1 and a simulative
investigation in Section 5.2. The analytical investigation begins by investi-
gating the effect of theGδ-policy’s δ-parameter and points out frequent cases
in which it has no effect on the allocation. Subsequently, it is shown that
under simplifying assumptions theGδ-policy is (a) strategy-prove, (b) envy-
free, (c) Pareto-efficient, and (d) provides sharing incentives. Under the as-
sumptionsmadealso theD- andC-policies exhibit theseproperties and, thus,
the analytical investigation results in a tie between the policies in terms of
their suitability for clouds. This tie is broken by the simulative investigation
that follows. The first simulations show effects of different values for theGδ-
policy’s δ-parameter and, thereby, complement the analytical results. Next,
it is shown how the Gδ-policy provides the configuration incentive. This in-
centive is neither provided by the D- nor the C-policy. Subsequent simula-
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tions show how the three policies compare to one another in case ofmultiple
nodes. The section closes by summarizing all theoretical results. As these re-
sults show the Gδ-policy’s, i.e., Definition 3.6’s, superiority, the Gδ-policy is
integrated into the Fairness Service (FS).
This FS is investigated by the practical evaluation, which shows the FS’s
functionality and, thereby, proves that the approach put forward in this thesis
is technically feasible. Just as the theoretical evaluation, the practical evalua-
tion consists of two parts: an experimental investigation in Section 5.3 and a
structural investigation in Section 5.4. The experimental investigation shows
how the FS changes the priorities of running Virtual Machines (VM) to en-
force fairness. Thismakes theFSmore potent to control cloud resources than
VM scheduling. The structural investigation shows how themessage volume
produced by the FS can be reduced to an amount that for an individual node
only increases with the number of users. This proves the FS’s high scalability.
5.1 Analytical Investigations
Section 5.1.1 investigates the effect of the Gδ-policy’s δ-parameter to point
out frequent cases in which δ has no effect on the allocation. Section 5.1.2
shows that under simplifying assumptions the Gδ-policy is (a) strategy-
prove, (b) envy-free, (c)Pareto-efficient, and (d)provides sharing incentives.
Section 5.1.3 summarizes the results of the analytical investigation.
5.1.1 Effect of δ
When fairness is investigated, it often makes sense to assume that all users
are equal, i.e., have the same quota. Furthermore, it often makes sense to as-
sume that all users deploy an equal amount of their quota to instantiate VMs,
as otherwise the configuration and uncertainty incentives would demand to
allocate users different amounts of resources, which complicates the discus-
sion of fairness. To simplify the discussion, simulation setups are designed
such that Equation 4.2 holds, which is the case, when nodes are not over-
committed (cf. Definition 3.2). Notably, when these assumptions hold, the
Gδg -allocation is independent of parameter δ, as proven next.
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Theorem 5.1. When (a) all users have the same quota, i.e., 8ua 2
U : quota(ua) = q for some q 2 Rr, (b) all users deploy the same percent-
age of their quota, i.e., 8ua 2 U :
P
va2own(ua)
Pr
j=0 edwV(va)j = s for some
s 2 R, and (c) Equation 4.2 holds, then theGδg -allocation is independent of δ.
Proof. FromDefinition 3.5 and 3.3 follows that for user ua 2 U
GδU(ua) =
X
va2own(ua)
rX
j=1
edwV(va)j+
X
va2own(ua)
rX
j=1
(alloc(va)j edwV(va)j) 2δ + 2 
(
2 or
DCFj
  qtc(ua)
(5.1)
holds. Due to (a), 8ua 2 U : qtc(ua) = q0 for some q0 2 R holds. Define
w(ua) :=
X
va2own(ua)
rX
j=1
(alloc(va)j edwV(va)j)
(
2 or
DCFj:
Then Equation 5.1 can be rewritten as
GδU(ua) =  q0 + s+
2
δ + 2
 w(ua) (5.2)
Let Aδ0g be a Gδ
0
g -allocation for some 0  δ0  1. Aδ
0
g is generated such
that any two users ua; uc 2 U have the same Gδ0 -value. However, due to
the partitioning of VMs to nodes and the request vector of VMs, users may
also have a different greediness (cf. the proof Theorem 3.9). Therefore,
Gδ
0
U (ua) = Gδ
0
U (uc) + x, for some x 2 R holds and, thus,
 q0 + s+ 2
δ + 2
 w(ua) =  q0 + s+ 2δ + 2  w(uc) + x: (5.3)
Equation 5.3 can be simplified to
w(ua) = w(uc) + x: (5.4)
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Since function w does not contain δ, the ratio of ua’s and uc’s Gδ
0 -value is
independent of δ. Therefore, Aδ0g is Gδ-max-min fair, for any δ, and thus, Aδ
0
g
is theGδg -allocation for any δ.
Section 5.2.1 investigates a setup that demonstrates how δ influences the
Gδg allocations, when (b) does not hold. FromTheorem 5.1 follows the sub-
sequent corollary.
Corollary 5.2. When all VMs have the same static greediness and Equation
4.2 holds, then theGδl -allocation is independent of δ.
5.1.2 Characteristics
DRF is the most prominent approach to MRA fairness in data centers. [30]
shows that under the assumptions that (a) all resources are provided by one
monolithicnode and(b) everyuser is characterizedby aLeontief utility func-
tion (the abstraction of users to VMs does not exist) with strictly positive
demands for every resource, DRF, i.e., the D-policy, is strategy-prove and
the resulting D-allocation is envy-free, Pareto-efficient, and provides shar-
ing incentives (cf. Section 2.5). Under these assumptions the C-policy also
achieves these characteristics [38] andTheorem 5.3 shows that under these
assumptions also theGδ-policy achieves these characteristics [84].
To emulate the assumptions made by DRF, which does not consider in-
dividual VMs or user quotas, Theorem 5.3 assumes that every user ua 2 U
has the same quota q 2 Rr and starts one VM va with virt(va) = q, i.e.,
va is configured with ua’s entire quota. Therefore, ua’s greediness is equal to
va’s dynamic greediness, as ua’s quota credit and va’s static greediness cancel
each other out (thus, the Gδ-policy’s scope is irrelevant in the subsequent
discussion). To ease the discussion but without loss of generality, Theo-
rem 5.3 assumes that the monolithic node is not overcommitted, wherefore
virt(va) = edwV(va) holds (cf. Section 4.1).
Theorem5.3. When (a) a cloud contains only one node n, (b) n is not overcom-
mited, (c) every user ua 2 U has the same quota q 2 Rr, (d) starts one VM
va with virt(va) = q, (e) and each user/VM is characterized by a Leontief util-
ity function with strictly positive demands for every resource, then theGδ-policy is
strategy-prove and provides envy freeness, Pareto efficiency, and sharing incentives.
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Proof. The four characteristics are proven separately.
Sharing incentive: An allocation A provides sharing incentives, when A
gives each user ua 2 U a utility that is at least as high aswhen ua had exclusive
access to the resources that correspond to ua’s quota. Assume aGδg -allocation
A, for some 0  δ  1, does not provide sharing incentives. As every VM
receives resources in the ratio of its request vector, a VM vc must exist that
receives strictly less of every resource than vc’s VRs, i.e., alloc(vc) < virt(vc).
Because (a) alloc(vc) < virt(vc) = edwV(vc), (b) 22+δ > 0, and (c) at least
one resource is saturated, vc’s dynamic greediness is negative. Due to the fac-
tors 2  22+δ and 42+δ , which are applied when ceding or exceeding resources,
and since vc cedes resources, another VM must exist, that has a positive dy-
namic greediness. Accordingly, the dynamic greediness of VMs is not equal
and, thus, theGδ-values of users not aligned. Then A is not aGδg -allocation.
Pareto-efficiency: DRF makes the assumption that every user is character-
ized by a Leontief utility function, wherefore, this assumption is also made
here. This assumption combined with the fact that the Gδg -allocation satu-
rates at least one resource (cf. Listing 4.1), implies that Pareto-efficiency is
trivially achieved (cf. [38] and Section 2.5.3).
Strategy proofness: Assume that lying about vc’s requirement vector, i.e.,
the vector that specifies the ratio in which resources are allocated to vc, can
increase uc’s utility. Because strictly positive Leontief utility functions are
assumed, vc has to receive more of every resource, in order to increase uc’s
utility. Because theGg-policy provides sharing incentives, vc receives at least
its endowment of at least one resource r, when the true requirement vector is
reported. Receiving more of r increases vc’s G-value. Since the G-values are
aligned, theG-value increase caused by receivingmore of rhas to be compen-
sated by receiving less of another resource r0. Thus, in order to receive more
of r, uc has to request/receive less of r0. Then uc’s utility decreases.
Envy-freeness: Assume two VMs va; vc 2 V have the same VRs. Further-
more, assume ua envies vc’s bundle. Then vc receives strictly more than va of
at least one resource. Since bothVMshave the sameG-value, vc has to receive
strictly less than va of another resource. However, because the Gg-policy is
strategy-prove, ua has stated the true requirement vector of va. Therefore,
when vc receives less of a resource than va, ua cannot envy vc’s bundle.
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5.1.3 Analytical Results
Whennodes are not overcommitted and all users are equal, i.e., have the same
quota, and deploy an equal amount of that quota (to instantiate VMs), the
allocation that results from applying theGδg -policy is independent of δ. Simi-
larly, theGδl -allocation is independent of δ, when nodes are not overcommit-
ted and all VMs have the same static greediness.
Under the assumption of Leontief utility functions, the Gδ-policy is
(a) strategy-prove, (b) envy-free, (c) Pareto-efficient, and (d) provides shar-
ing incentives. However, also theD- andC-policy have these characteristics.
The simulative investigation in the next section shows that despite this initial
tie between the policies in terms of desirable characteristics the Gδ-policy is
superior.
5.2 Simulative Investigation
DifferentM-policies are applied to different simulation setups and the result-
ing fairness is compared. Section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 investigates traits unique to
the Gδ-policy. In particular, effects of different δ and the configuration in-
centive are highlighted by simulations. Subsequently, Section 5.2.3, 5.2.4,
and 5.2.5 compare theGδ-,D-, and C- policy on different simulation setups.
Section 5.2.6 discusses starvation limits and their effects and Section 5.2.7
finally summarizes the results of the theoretical investigations.
5.2.1 Setup 1: Configuration Strategies and δ
This setup compares two strategies to configure VMs and demonstrates the
effects of different values of δ and is illustrated in Figure 5.1a. One node n
provides one resource r in quantity 2, i.e., phy(n) = 2. Node n is shared by
two users ua and uc;who have a quota of 1, i.e., quota(ua) = quota(uc) = 1.
Both users want to execute a workload that requires four VMs. Three of
these VMs will each require 0.05 of r and one VM will require as much of
r as is available. When configuring the VMs, the users know that three VMs
will require 0.05 but they do not know, which VM will require infinite re-
sources. Therefore, both users instantiate four VMs and choose different
strategies to configure these VMs. Because one VM will require infinite re-
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(b) Setup 2 for q = 6. Every VM belongs to a differ-
ent user and requests an infinite amount of resources
in the ratio as v4’s VRs
Figure 5.1: Illustrations of Setup 1 and Setup 2
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(c) δ = 1
Figure 5.2: Gδg -allocations for Setup 1. VMs are on the x-axis and re-
source amounts are on the y-axis
sources, ua chooses the strategy to partition the entire quota to the four VMs
va1 ; va2; va3 ; va4, i.e., virt(vax) = 0:25 for 1  x  4. As three of the fourVMswill
only require an amount of 0.05 of r, uc chooses the strategy to configure each
VM vc1; vc2; vc3; vc4with that amount ofVRs, i.e., virt(vcx) = 0:05 for 1  x  4.
During runtime, the first VM of both users happens to be the busy VM,
i.e., attempts to utilize an infinite amount of r, while the six other VMs are
idle, i.e., attempt to utilize an amount of 0:05 of r. Figure 5.2 (backed by full
numerical details as ofTable 5.1) illustrates theG0g -,G0:5g -, andG1g-allocations.
The figure shows that all idle VMs receive all requested resources. However,
bundles of the two busy VMs differ depending on δ.
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Figure 5.2a depicts that for δ = 0, va1 receives more resources than vc1 . The
reason is that DCF = 1 = 22+δ and, thus, the over-configuration of v
a
2; va3 ; va4
is not penalized (cf. Equation 3.6). Accordingly, Table 5.1 shows that the
idle VMs of both users have the same G0-values. However, virt(va1 ) = 5 
virt(vc1), wherefore, va1 receives more resources than vc1 . When δ increases,
the over-configuration of ua’s idle VMs is penalized stronger and the under-
configuration of uc’s busy VM is penalized less. Accordingly, Figure 5.2b and
Table 5.1 display that δ = 0:5 is the tipping point, at which VMs of both
users receive the same amount of resources. Table 5.1 depitcs that the Gδ-
values of ua’s idle VMs are maximized for δ = 1. Accordingly, va1 receives
least resources for δ = 1 and vc1 most, in order to align both users’G1-values.
5.2.1.1 Generalization
Setup 1 can be altered in two dimension: the number of idle VMs and the
amount of resources idle VMs request (while adapting the VRs of uc’s VMs
accordingly). Let s 2 N1 be the number of VMs that each user owns and
0  t  1, such that t=s is the resource utilization of all idle VMs and the
VRs of uc’s VMs. For example, in the scenario discussed above s = 4 and
t = 0:2. Under these assumptions
GδU(ua) =
4
δ + 2

alloc(va1 ) 
1
s

  (s  1)  2
δ + 2

1
s
  t
s

; (5.5)
where the minuend is GδV(va1 ) and the subtrahend is the δ-greediness of the
s  1 idle VMs of ua. Similarly
GδU(ub) =
4
δ + 2

alloc(vb1 ) 
t
s

+ t  1; (5.6)
where the first summand isGδV(vb1 ). Since the greediness of ub’s idle VMs is 0,
this greediness doesnot appear inEquation5.6. Summand t 1 is the remain-
der of ub’s quota credit. The Gδg -policy determines alloc(va1 ) and alloc(vb1 ),
such that ua and ub have the sameGδ-value, i.e.,
GδU(ua) = GδU(ub): (5.7)
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A second constraint is that all resources have to be allocated, i.e.,
2  2  (s  1)  t
s
  alloc(va1 )  alloc(vb1 ) = 0 (5.8)
must hold, where 2 is the overall resource supply and 2  (s   1)  ts are the
resources allocated to the 2  (s  1) idle VMs. Resolving Equations 5.7 and
5.8 results in
alloc(va1 ) = 1  t+
(t  1)  δ + 6t+2s
8
(5.9)
and
alloc(vc1) = 1  t+
(1  t)  δ + 10t 2s
8
: (5.10)
Calculating the difference
alloc(va1 )  alloc(vc1) =
(2  s  δ)  (1  t)
4  s ; (5.11)
reveals that wether ua’s or uc’s strategy is superior depends on a combination
of δ and s, whereat increasing s and δ make uc’s strategy preferable. Notably,
t only changes the difference in the Gδg -allocations but does not influence,
which strategy is superior. Furthermore, for δ = 0 the first factor of the
dividend is always positive, which reflects that ua’s strategy is always superior,
as over-configuring VMs is not penalized.
5.2.2 Setup 2: Incentives
This setup shows how the G-policy provides incentives to users to config-
ure VMs correctly and is illustrated in Figure 5.1b. Let q 2 N>0. There
is only one node n. n hosts q + 1 VMs v0; v1; v2; : : : ; vq and provides two
resources r1 and r2. Every VM requests an infinite amount of resources
in ratio 2:1, i.e., every VM requests twice as much of r1 than of r2. The
VRs of VM vj are virt(vi) = (i; q   i) and phy(n) = ( q2 q2 ; q
2 q
2 ) =Pq
i=0 virt(vi) =
Pq
i=0 edwV(vi), i.e., the VMs’ endowments completely
partition n’s resources. Each VM belongs to a different user. All users have
the samequota, wherefore the results presentedbeloware independentof the
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amount of this quota. Section 5.1.1 shows why the results are independent
of δ and the scope (local/global).
Figure 5.3 illustrates the G-allocation for q 2 f3; 6; 9g, as these are the
smallest values for q for which a VM exists that is perfectly configured, i.e.,
whose VRs have ratio 2:1 (just as the request ratio). While δ influences the
Gδ-values of VMs, it does not influence the Gδ-allocation. For example, for
q = 6, G0V(vi) = 0:920, G
0:25
V (vi) = 0:818, G
0:5
V (vi) = 0:736, G
0:75
V (vi) =
0:669, G1V(vi) = 0:614 for all vi 2 V holds. This reflects that for smaller δ,
deviating from the endowment increases the greediness stronger.
Although all VMs have the same sum of VRs, Figure 5.3 shows that VMs
receive different amounts of resources, because the ratios of their VRs are
different. In particular, the better a VM’s VR ratio is aligned with the ac-
tual resource requirement, themore resources theVM receives. Accordingly,
virt(v0) = (0; q) is the worst configuration to request resources in ratio
(2; 1) and, thus, v0 receives the smallest bundle for all q. In contrast, VM
v2q=3’s VRs have the perfect ratio, wherefore v2; v4 and v6 receive the most
resources for q = 3, q = 6, and q = 9, respectively. Although v0 and vq have
one VR configured with 0, vq receives significantly more resources than v0,
because it has a high endowment to the stronger requested resource.
5.2.3 Setup 3: VM andUser-based Fairness
This setup demonstrates the importance of enforcing fairness on a per-user
and not per-VM basis and is illustrated in Figure 5.4a. A single node nx 2 N
hosts different numbers of VMs of two users ua; uc 2 U that compete for
one resource r. In particular, let ua own two VMs _vax;vax and uc own one VM
vcx. Six infinitely devisable units are available of r. Both users have a quota
of three units to r and all VMs have an endowment of 1. Normalization as
described in Section 3.3.1.3 is applied, wherefore one unit of r has a value of
2=6 = 0:3.
5.2.3.1 Local Policies
AllMl-policies treat all VMs equally, as they, by definition, do not consider
the owner of VMs. Therefore, allMl-policies allocate all VMs two units of r,
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Figure 5.4: Illustrations of Setup 3, Setup 4, and Setup 5
i.e., allMl-allocations are the same. Consequently, ua receives twice as much
resources as uc.
Table 5.2 shows theM-values andM-scores for this allocation row-wise
for different M. Since there is only one resource, the dominant share of a
bundle is equal to the amount of the only resource in the bundle. Therefore,
the C- andD-value of all bundles is equal. The Gδ-values depend on δ. The
reason is that VMs receive two units of r, while their endowment is 1. This
exceeding of the endowment is accounted for differently depending on δ. As
the Gδ-value of users contains the sum of Gδ-values of their VMs, also the
Gδ-values of users are different.
Table 5.2 depicts that allM-scores are 0.9. The reason is that for anymetric
M theM-value of ua is twice theM-value of uc, when input into Jain’s index
to calculate the M-score (cf. Equation 4.8). For the C- and D-metric, this
follows directly from the C- andD-values in the table. TheGδ-values shown
134
Table 5.2: M-values and M-scores for the local allocation of Setup 3
M-value M-score
_vax vax vcx ua uc
C/D 0:6 0:6 0:6 1:3 0:6 0:9
G0 1 1 1 1 0 0:9
G0:5 0:86 0:86 0:86 0:73  0:13 0:9
G1 0:7 0:7 0:7 0:5  0:2 0:9
in the table for ua and uc do not have this 2:1 ratio. However, as explained in
Section 4.1.4, theseGδ-values are increased by 1 before input to Jain’s index.
5.2.3.2 Global Policies
Table 5.3 lists the Mg-allocations on a per-user basis and the correspond-
ing M-scores. Contrary to Table 5.2, the M-values are not shown. Also it
is not listed, what individual VMs receive: as ua’s VMs are identical, they
receive the same amount of r, i.e., 50% of what ua receives, while uc’s en-
tire amount is allocated to uc’s only VM vcx. DifferentMg-allocations are de-
picted row-wise, while the correspondingM-scores are presented in the four
rightmost columns. For example, the G0-score of the Dg- or Cg-allocation
is 0:987. The table indicates that the smaller δ is, the less the Gδg -policy al-
locates uc. The reason is that a smaller δ penalizes under-configuring VMs
more strongly. As uc runs two VMs, ua has configured more resources and,
therefore, under-configured less than uc, who only has configured one VM.
Also the G0-scores reflect that G0 disfavors uc, as, the larger uc’s bundle, the
lower the corresponding G0-score. However, in general, all Mg-allocations
are similar, wherefore, allM-scores are high. The diagonal of 1s in the right
half of the table shows that, for a given metricM, theMg-allocation also has
the highest possibleM-score. TheMl-allocation described in Table 5.2 does
not achieve the maximalM-score for any metricM, as this allocation is lo-
cal and, therefore, achieves fairness on a per-VM basis, while the M-scores
evaluate fairness on a per-user basis.
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Table 5.3: Global M-allocations and corresponding M-scores for Setup
3. Values beginning with 0.9 are rounded
M-Allocation M-Score
ua uc C/D G0 G0:5 G1
C/D 3 3 1 0:987 0:994 0:997
G0 3.25 2.75 0:993 1 0:999 0:997
G0:5 3.1875 2.8125 0:996 0:999 1 0:999
G1 3.125 2.875 0:998 0:997 0:999 1
5.2.4 Setup 4: Exchange of Resources on the Same Node
In this setup (cf. Figure 5.4b) there are two resources r1 and r2, one node
nx, with phy(nx) = (30; 30), and three users ua; uc; ue, which all have quota
(20; 20) and own VM vax; vcx; vex, respectively. All VMs are scheduled on nx
and have an endowment of (10; 10). The VMs’ demands are req(vax) =
(30; 0), req(vcx) = (0; 30), and req(vex) = (30; 30), i.e., the VM of customer
ua attempts to fully utilize r1, the VM of customer uc attempts to fully utilize
r2, and the VM of ue attempts to fully utilize both resources.
Since all users have the same quota and only operate one VM, allocations
are independent of the scope, which is therefore omitted in the discussion.
Section 5.1.1 explains, why theGδ-allocations are the same for all δ. Accord-
ingly, also parameter δ is omitted in the discussion of this section. Figures
5.5a, 5.5d, and 5.5g illustrate the local and global C-allocation,D-allocation,
andG-allocation (as just discussed, δ is omitted), respectively.
These figures show that the C-policy allocates all VMs the same sum of
resources, while the D-policy allocates vex twice the amount of resources, as
it only considers one dominant share (cf. Section 2.6.1.4.2). The G-policy
takes the middle way, as it slightly favours vex. The reason is that all VMs have
the same symmetric configuration of VRs, while only vex’s resource demand
is symmetric and vax and vcx request only one resource. Therefore, vex is better
configured and gets an accordingly larger share of nx’s resources.
Table 5.4 describes the allocations in Figure 5.5a, 5.5d, and 5.5g numeri-
cally and lists the respectiveM-scores. Notably, the Gδ-scores of the C- and
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Figure 5.5: Illustration of the various M-allocations for Setup 4 and
Setup 5. VMs are on the x-axis and resource amounts are on the y-axis
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Table 5.4: M-allocations and corresponding M-scores of Setup 4. Values
beginning with 0.9 are rounded
M-allocation M-Score
ua uc ue C D G0 G0:5 G1
C 20,0 0,20 10,10 1 9.926 0.969 0.978 0.984
D 15,0 0,15 15,15 0:8 1 0:8 0.919 0.937
G 18:3; 0 0; 18:3 11:6; 11:6 0.986 0.963 1 1 1
Table 5.5: M-values of the three different M-allocations of Setup 4
C-allocation D-allocation G-allocation
ua uc ue ua uc ue ua uc ue
C 1 1 1 0.75 0.75 1.5 0:916 0:916 1:16
D 1 1 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0:916 0:916 0:583
G0  0:5  0:5  1  1  1 0  0:6  0:6  0:6
G0:5  0:6  0:6  1  1  1  0:2  0:73  0:73  0:73
G1  0:6  0:6  1  1  1 0:3  0:7  0:7  0:7
D-allocation differ slightly depending on δ. The reason for this can be found
in Table 5.5, which depicts the users’M-values. The table shows that for the
C- and D-allocation some users’ Gδ-values slightly increase with decreasing
δ, wherefore, also theGδ-scores in Table 5.4 change depending on δ. For ex-
ample, theG0-values for theC-allocation are 0:5, 0:5, and 1, for user ua,
uc, and ue, respectively, while the theG1-values are 0:6, 0:6, and 1. This
leads toGδ-scores that change depending on δ.
5.2.5 Setup 5: Cross Host Alignment
Setup 5 extends Setup 4 by adding node nz that has the same capacities as
nx and that hosts two additional VMs (cf. Figure 5.4c). The additional VMs,
vaz and vez, are owned by customer ua and ue, respectively. vaz and vez have an
endowment of (10; 10) and attempt to fully utilize the node, i.e., req(vaz) =
req(vez) = (30; 30).
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Contrary to Setup 4, in Setup 5 the scopemakes a difference, as users now
run different numbers of VMs. Just as in Setup 4, the Gδg -allocations are in-
dependent of δ, for the following reason: uc only runs one VM, wherefore
the share of this VM vcx has to bemaximised, in order to align theGδ-value of
users as much as possible for any δ. Accordingly, vcx receives all of nx’s supply
of r2, which implies that no resources can be allocated to vex, as vex also runs on
nx and requires r2. vax, which is the third VMon nx, only requires r1 and there-
fore receives all of r1, since the allocation has to be PE. Thus, the allocation
on nx is “fixed” and only the allocation on nz can potentially vary for differ-
ent δ. However, nz hosts VMs of users, who deploy the same percentage of
their quota. Also these users have the same quota and Equation 4.2 holds.
Therefore, an argumentation analogous to the proof of Theorem 5.1 proves
that δ does not change the Gδg -allocation on nz and, thus, all Gδg -allocations
are equal. A simpler argumentation shows that also the Gδl -allocations are
independent of δ as well.
Figure 5.5b and 5.5c show the Cl- and Cg-allocation, respectively, Figure
5.5e and5.5f illustrate theDl- andDg-allocation, respectively, andFigure5.5h
and 5.5i depict theGl- andGg-allocation, respectively.
The local allocations for Setup 5 are unspectacular: On node nz all allo-
cations are the same and the allocations on nx are the same as for Setup 4.
As every Mg-policy attempts to equalize the M-values users receive, all
Mg-policies maximize the share of vcx and, therefore, starve vex. Accordingly,
the allocation on nx is equal for allMg-allocations. On nz the global alloca-
tions differ. In particular, everyMg-policy distributes nx’s resources such that
ua and ue receive the sameM-value. Notably, the D-policy is able to equal-
ize the D-value of all three users. Just as the G-allocation lies between the
D- andC-allocation for Setup 4, theGg-allocation on nz lies between theDg-
and Cg-allocation for Setup 5, as the Gg-policy on nz allocates vaz more than
theCg-policy but less than theDg-policy.
Table 5.6 describes all allocations of Setup 5 numerically and gives the
respective M-scores. The table displays that only the Dg-policy is able to
achieve perfect fairness by its own definition (the D-score). All other M-
policies achieve a lowerM-score, as uc only has one VM and, therefore, can
only receive limited resources. EveryMg-policy outperforms its local coun-
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terpart in terms ofM-score. The reason is that the local policies achieve fair-
ness on a per-VM basis, while global policies achieve fairness on a per-user
basis and also theM-score is determined on a per-user basis. While the D-
score of theDg-allocation is 1, theM-score score forM2 fC;G0;G0:5;G1; g
is rather low. In contrast, G-scores of the Cg-allocation are high and the C-
score of theGg-allocation is high as well.
5.2.6 Starvation Limits
Setup 5 demonstrated that global policies may starve VMs, i.e., allocate the
VMs zero resources. This is not desirable in reality, as it makes VMs useless.
Therefore, the simulations were extended by starvation limits, i.e., minimum
guaranteed amounts of resources that VMs receive, even though they would
have to receive less in order to enforcemax-min fairness among theM-values
of users. Two different types of starvation limits were implemented and are
discussed in Section 5.2.6.1 and 5.2.6.2.
5.2.6.1 Static
Static starvation limits are defined by a simulationwide starvation factor 0 
S  1 that specifies the fraction VMs are guaranteed to receive of their
endowment. In particular, as resources are allocated in the same ratio as VMs
request them, v 2 V is guaranteed bundle
S  req(v) min
ri2R
(
edwV(v)i
req(v)i if req(v)i > 0
1 else.
(5.12)
5.2.6.2 Dynamic
Dynamic starvation limits define a starvation factor for every user based on
the users’M-value. In particular, the higher theM-value of a user, the lower
the starvation factor of the user’s VMs.
The starvation factor has to be 1, as the endowment specifies howmany
resources are budgeted for a VM, and a starvation factor greater 1means that
more resources are guaranteed to a VM than are budgeted for the VM. Fur-
thermore, the starvation factor has to be 0, as 0 means that no guarantees
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Figure 5.6: Exemplary starvation function sσ plotted for different σ
are made and there cannot be less than no guarantees. Thus, the starvation
factor for a user has to be defined by a function s : R! [0; 1] that monoton-
ically decreases. Also the function should be continuous such that starvation
factors gradually change.
Function
sσ(x) 7! 0:5+ 0:5 
(
 hσ( x) if x < 0
hσ( x) else,
(5.13)
where
hσ(x) 7!
r
x2 + σ
σ
  xp
σ
(5.14)
is (a) parameterized by σ > 0, which controls how fast sσ(x) converges,
(b) plotted in Figure 5.6 for different σ, and (c) an exemplary starvation func-
tion that meets these demands.
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5.2.6.3 Starvation Limit Effects
Simulations that incorporate starvation limits did not yield additional in-
sights about the different metrics. Therefore, those simulations are not dis-
cussed in detail. However, two important findings about starvation limits are
the following.
Firstly, when starvation limits are static,M-scores generally decrease with
increasingS . The reason is that, the higherS is the less flexibility policies
have to allocate resources, as they have to adhere to higher and, therefore,
more constraining starvation limits.
Secondly, by designdynamic starvation limits givemore incentive to users
to behave economically. The reason is that the higher a user u’s M-value,
the lower u’s VMs’ dynamic starvation limits. Therefore, if u utilizes a large
amount of resources with some VMs (or, in case of the greediness metric,
configures VMs poorly) the resources guaranteed to any of u’s VMs decrease.
This dependency increases the smaller σ is, wherefore, also the incentive to
behave economically increases with decreasing σ. In contrast, static starva-
tion limits always guarantee the same amount of resources to u’s VMs, even
if some of the user’s VMs already utilize large amounts of resources.
5.2.6.4 Using sσ for Asymptotic PPMappings
Section 4.2.5 discussed mapping greediness to priorities. Function p is pre-
sented inEquation4.9 andmaps an input value g into anoutput interval based
on an input interval. The target value is determined, such that its position in
the output interval is relatively the same, as g’s position in the input inter-
val. Therefore, a linear dependency between input and output values exists,
while it was not proven that such dependency is optimal in practice. In fact, it
might be advantageous to use an asymptotic function that converges towards
the borders of the output interval. One function to implement such asymp-
totic behavior is p(sσ(g)), where inmin = 0 and inmax = 1. An advantage of
this nested formula is that increasing g always decreases the priority. In con-
trast, when g is input to p directly, i.e., without applying sσ first, the priority
does not decrease, when g  inmax. Therefore, all users with g  inmax are
assigned the same priorities, although their greediness may differ.
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5.2.7 Simulative and Theoretical Results
The simulations above complete the theoretical investigations and allow for
comparing the three metrics in terms of different aspects. Table 5.7 summa-
rizes these findings.
Setup 3 and Setup 5 prove that it is insufficient to consider each VM sep-
arately, when aiming for fairness among users. In particular, Setup 3 is very
simple as it only contains one node, two users, and three VMs, but already
demonstrates, how local policies may fail to achieve fairness.
Fairness was measured by the M-score for different metrics M2
fC;D;G0;G0:5;G1; g. TheC-score compares bundles of users by theL1met-
ric, which is the most straight-forward bundle measure. The D-score com-
pares bundles of users by the L1 metric and is supported by DRF’s wide
application in data centers. TheGδ-score is backed by the questionnaire pre-
sented in Section 3.2. The questionnaire also identified theL1 andL1 norms
as insufficient, wherefore theGδ-score is the best choice. Furthermore, Setup
4 and Setup 5 show that an allocation that maximizes theGδ-score lies in be-
tween allocations that maximize theC- andD-score.
Setup 3 and Setup 5 indicate that theM-score of theMg-allocation is al-
ways at least as high as the M-score of the Ml-allocation. As the Gδ-score
best measures the intuitive fairness of an allocation and is maximized by the
Gδg -allocation, it is concluded that theGδg -policy achieves the highest overall
intuitive fairness. While all three policies (Gδ , C, and D) are SI, PE, SP, EF
(cf. Section 5.1.2 and [30, 38]) only the Gδ-policy gives incentive to users
to configure their VMs correctly (cf. Section 3.3.4.2 and Setup 2). While
0  δ  1 has to be fixed, several setups show that the Gδ-score is similar
or even equal, even when δ lies at different ends of the spectrum. Further-
more,Gδ-allocations are often independent of δ (cf. Section 5.1.1 and Setup
2, Setup 4, and Setup 5). This makes theGδg -policy the best choice for any δ.
5.3 Experimental Investigations
Controlling cloud resources through PR allocation was a relatively unex-
plored research field before this thesis. OpenStack [73] is the de facto stan-
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Table 5.7: Comparison of the different metrics
Aspect Finding Shown in
Scope per-user always better
than per-VM
Setup 3, Setup 5
Intuitiveness Gδ-score superior toC-
andD-score
Section 3.3.4.5
Allocations Gδ-allocation lies often
betweenC- and
D-allocation
Setup 4, Setup 5
SI, PE, SP, EF Provided byGδ-,C-, and
D-policy
Section 5.1.2, [30, 38]
Incentives only provided by
Gδ-policy
Section 3.3.4.2,
Setup 2
Gδ-policy’s δ
parameter
irrelevant in several
cases
Section 5.1.1, Setup 2,
Setup 4, Setup 5
dard for private clouds but out-of-the-box does not control cloud resources
by these means. Therefore, Section 4.2 developed an OpenStack extension
termed the Fairness Service (FS) that adapts VMs’ Proportional Priorities
(PP) to enforce fairness according to the definitions established in Section
3.3.3. The FS is evaluated in this section to prove that this novel way to en-
force cloud fairness is technically feasible. In particular, Section 5.3.1 evalu-
ates the FS’s performance overhead by the CPU time the FS consumes and
Section 5.3.2 shows hows this overhead can be decreased. Section 5.3.3
proves that the FS successfully changes the allocation to running VMs by
changing their PPs to access PRs based on the PRs their owners overall uti-
lize.
Theevaluation environmentwas set up according to theOpenStack instal-
lation guide forUbuntu 14.04 [71]. All compute nodes are equippedwith a 3
GHz dual-core Intel Xeon E3113 CPU, 4 GBRAM, a 150MiB/s hard-drive,
and a 1 Gbit/s network connection.
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The efficiency/utilization of the FS is not evaluated, because the FS de-
ploys PPs. These PPs ensure that no PR is idle, if desired by a consumer (cf.
Section 2.2.1.1), and, therefore, guarantee high utilization. Furthermore, the
FS either increases or decreases the PPs of a VMon all PRs. Thus, no adverse
ratios of PPs on different PRs occur.
5.3.1 CPUOverhead
The CPU overhead is evaluated depending on (a) the number of VMs,
(b) whether or not VMs are loaded, and (c) the length of the update inter-
val. The evaluationwas performed for a single node, as themessage exchange
among nodes can be implemented, such that the number of messages a node
receives and sends is a small constant independent of the overall number of
nodes (cf. Section 5.4). Therefore, the number of nodes does not influence
the CPU overhead.
Accordingly, a performance experiment is defined by the triple (β; λ; μ) 2
N1fT; FgN[f1g. β defines the number of VMs that are hosted by
the node in the experiment. The Boolean variable λ specifies whether these
VMs are loaded, whereat load is simulated by stress [4]. μ determines the
length of the update interval. If μ = 1, the FS is deactivated. Each per-
formance experiment runs for four minutes. The FS’s CPU overhead is mea-
sured by the CPU time that is utilized by OpenStack processes, when the FS
is running (μ < 1) or not running (μ = 1). In particular, the Open-
Stack processes to be monitored are the nova-compute, nova-network,
nova-api-metadata, and nova-fairness services.
Figure 5.7a and 5.8a show the sum of the CPU time consumed by these
processes for different numbers of VMs and update intervals. The figures
demonstrate that the FS significantly increases the CPU time that is utilized
by these processes.
Controlling network accesswas identified asmain cause for the significant
CPU overhead. In particular, as outlined in Section 4.2.5, the Unix applica-
tion tc is used to apply network priorities, which impliesmultipleCLI calls to
set priorities. Therefore, Section 5.3.2 shows how the CPU overhead caused
by controlling network access can be reduced and Figure 5.7b and 5.8b il-
lustrate how much CPU time is utilized by OpenStack processes, when the
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FS does not control the network access. These figures depict that disabling
network control reduces the CPU overhead by more than 50% on average.
All figures demonstrate that the CPU overhead increases linearly with the
number of VMs and shorter update intervals. Therefore, the FS’s CPU over-
head can be reduced by selecting longer update intervals. In particular, the
CPU overhead caused by higher numbers of VMs can be contained by in-
creasing μ.
5.3.2 Controlling Network Access
The FS does not use libvirt to control network access, as libvirt only offers
hard limits for this purpose. Instead the evaluated prototype of the FS uses tc
and the Hierarchical Token Bucket (HTB) queuing discipline to control the
network access, as it allows controllingnetwork accessbyPPs [35]. However,
as shown above, this significantly increases the CPU overhead. This section
(a) identifies a queuing discipline that is better suited than HTB to control
network access by PPs and (b) shows how it can be deployed efficiently by
the FS. Circles in the subsequent graphs depict outliers.
5.3.2.1 Comparison of HTB andHFSC
Literature searches [66, 67] investigated which queuing disciplines allow
sharing thenetworkbyPPs and identified theHierarchical Fair ServiceCurve
(HFSC)queuing discipline as potential candidate to replace theHierarchical
Token Bucket (HTB) queuing discipline in the FS. Both queuing disciplines
are, thus, compared with respect to (a) how precisely they allocate the net-
work, i.e., the deviation of the actual network allocation from the allocation
that is perfect according to the assigned PPs (cf. Section 5.3.2.1.1), (b) how
efficiently they utilize the network, i.e., howmuch percent of the network ca-
pacity is utilized in case of congestion (cf. Section 5.3.2.1.2), and (c) how
long packets are delayed (cf. Section 5.3.2.1.3).
Subsequently, the term flow is used, as queuing disciplines allocate the
network amongflows. In the context of theFS, a flow, therefore, is all network
traffic produced or received by a VM. The data illustrated in all tables was
gathered by 10 iterations of an according experiment.
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Figure 5.7: CPU time consumed by OpenStack services dependent on
the number of VMs (β) and the update interval (μ) for λ = F
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Figure 5.8: CPU time consumed by OpenStack services dependent on
the number of VMs (β) and the update interval (μ) for λ = T
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of the allocation accuracy of HTB and HFSC
based on two scenarios [67]
5.3.2.1.1 Allocation Accuracy
The allocation accuracy of both queuing disciplines is investigated by two
scenarios. In Scenario S1 two flows with different PPs overload the network.
In Scenario S2 there are three additional flows and one of them is idle. There-
fore, the bandwidth “belonging” to the idle flow has to be distributed among
the other flows according to their PPs. Figure 5.9 shows the allocation accu-
racy by the percentage with which the resulting allocations deviate from the
allocation that is perfect according to the PPs. The figure shows that HFSC
performsbetter in both scenarios andHTBhas a significantly lower accuracy,
when bandwidth of idle flows has to be allocated to other flows.
Figure 5.10 shows that the accuracy of both queuing disciplines does not
scalewith the number of flows, whereat the scalability ofHTB is significantly
better.
5.3.2.1.2 Network Utilization
While Figure 5.10 seems to imply that HTB scales better, Figure 5.11 shows
that HTB achieves the higher scalability in terms of accuracy at the cost of
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utilization. In particular, the figure shows that the utilization of HFSC is sig-
nificantly higher and stable, while the utilization of HTB varies strongly.
5.3.2.1.3 PacketWaiting Times
HTB results in a mean packet waiting time of 57.5 ms, while HFSC results
in a mean packet waiting time of 47 ms. Also the variance of packet waiting
times is smaller for HFSC.
5.3.2.2 HFSC Integration into libvirt
Due to the higher efficiency, lower packet waiting times, and generally more
predictable behavior, HFSC is regarded superior toHTB to control network
access by PPs. Therefore, libvirt is extended to deploy HFSC to allocate the
network by PPs. Integrating the HFSC into libvirt and not the FS directly,
makes the resulting implementation useable by all libvirt users independent
of the FS. Since the FS uses libvirt to control PRs, the FS is able to deploy
HFSC via this extension, without implementation overhead.
The libvirt extension integrates HFSC via hooks, hides most of HFSC’s
complex parameters, and simply allows controlling the network access by
PPs. The PP information required by the extension is conveniently stored
in the XML file that libvirt uses to describe a VM.The extension adds a VM
that is started to the HFSC hierarchy via a hook (since VMs are only differ-
entiated by their PPs, this hierarchy is flat). Similarly, a VM is removed from
the hierarchy by a hook, when the VM is shut down.
In order to show that this extension allows the FS to efficiently control
network access by PPs, the CPU overhead of the extension has to be deter-
mined. In particular, the CPU overhead with and without the extension has
to be compared, when a VM is started and stopped. Figure 5.12 shows the
according results. The negligible CPU overhead of the extension shows that
it is possible for the FS to control network access with a low CPU overhead.
5.3.3 Fairness Promotion AmongUsers
Thetwo fairness experiments following show if andhow theFSaltersVMs’PPs
to promote fairness among users. In these fairness experiments the update
interval (μ) of the FS is 10 seconds and the FS enforces fairness according
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Figure 5.10: Allocation accuracy of HTB and HFSC depending on the
number of flows [67]
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Figure 5.11: Efficiency of HTB and HFSC measured by the utilization
of the available bandwidth depending on the number of flows [67]
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Figure 5.12: CPU time utilized, when starting and stoping a VM with
and without the libvirt extension [67]
to Definition 3.6. All evaluations have been conducted over a timespan of 15
minutes. Although the FS is able to monitor and control CPU time, RAM,
disk I/O, and network access, only CPU time and disk I/O are considered
in these fairness experiments to simplify the discussion. All users in those
experiments have the same quota, wherefore the quota credit is the same for
all users, and, thus, the size of this quota does not influence results of the
experiments.
When the FS is not running, allocations are determined by the Com-
pletely Fair Scheduler (CFS) [63], which is the Linux default scheduler and
achieves virtually perfect CPU fairness between (VM) processes sharing a
node. However, theCFS is oblivious towhich clouduser owns aVMprocess.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the FS is the first implementation that
establishes cloud fairness solely by adapting PR allocation to VM processes.
5.3.3.1 Single node, single resource
The constellation of the first fairness experiment (a) is equivalent to Setup
3 that is discussed in Section 5.2.3, (b) illustrated in Figure 5.13a, and (c) in-
154
rv¨ax
ua uc
nx
v˙ax
r
rvcx
(a) One node nx
hosts three VMs
_vax;vax, and vcx, whereat
_vax;vax belong to user
ua and vcx belongs to
user uc
D
is
k
C
P
U
D
is
k
C
P
U
D
is
k
C
P
U
D
is
k
C
P
U
ua uc ue
vcxv
a
x
vezv
c
znz
nx
(b) Two nodes host four VMs that be-
long to three users that compete for
CPU and disk I/O
Figure 5.13: Illustration of the two fairness experiments
vestigates how the FS promotes fairness on one node nx, when two users ua
and uc contend for the samePR.User ua operates twoVMs _vax andvax and user
uc operates oneVM vcx. All VMs attempt to utilize amaximal amount of CPU
time, while not imposing significant load on any other PR.
Without the FS all VMs receives 1=3 of nx’s CPU time, which is arguably
not fair, as both users have the same quota but ua receives twice the amount
of CPU time as uc. Figure 5.14 shows, how the FS mitigates this unfairness
by giving more CPU shares and, thus, more CPU time to the only VM of uc.
The first three minutes of the experiment’s real time demonstrate the FS’s
flexibility: Within this timeframe only _vax attempts to utilizes theCPU,which
increases ua’s greediness and accordingly decreases the CPU shares of ua’s
VMs. Nonetheless, _vax is able to fully utilize the CPU, because no other VM
attempts to utilize it. Only after threeminutes, when the other VMs also start
utilizing the CPU, the shares take effect and ua’s VMs are throttled in favor of
uc’s VM.
These results show that the FS successfully enforces fairness, if necessary,
while not decreasing PRutilization/efficiency. In the first threeminutes only
VM _vax is active and gets full access to the requested CPU time. In particular,
as no otherVM is active, constraining _vax’s CPUaccesswould not increase the
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Figure 5.14: CPU shares and resulting CPU time allocated by the FS in
the fairness experiment as illustrated in Figure 5.13a
performance of any VM but only decrease the performance of _vax. Therefore,
constraining _vax within the first three minutes would be inefficient. However,
after threeminutes two other VMs attempt to utilize theCPU and, thus, con-
tention arises. As two of the three VMs contending for CPU time belong to
user ua, it becomes necessary to throttle those two VMs in favor of the third
VM, which belongs to user uc. Otherwise ua would receive more CPU time
than user uc, which is unfair. Thus, the FS ensures fairness according to Def-
inition 3.6 by prioritizing uc’s only VM.
5.3.3.2 Multiple Nodes, Multiple Resources
The second fairness experiment investigates how the FS promotes fairness
across nodes, when users contend for multiple PRs. Figure 5.13b shows this
setup, where three users ua; uc, and ue utilize PRs on two nodes nx and nz.
User ua heavily utilizes the CPU and disk on nx by VM vax. User uc attempts
the same PR utilization by VM vcx. However, uc additionally utilizes the CPU
of node nz byVM vcz. VM vcz shares this nodewith ue’s onlyVM vez that heavily
utilizes disk. Therefore, the utilization of vcz and vez on nz does not interfere,
while vax and vcx contend for CPU and disk I/O on nx.
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Figures 5.15 and5.16 compareCPUanddisk allocationswith andwithout
the FS on both nodes. The PRs user uc’s VMs receive are illustrated by blue
lines in all figures. PRs allocated touserua andueVMsare illustratedby green
and yellow lines, respectively.
Figure 5.15 compares the allocation on nx. Figure 5.15a demonstrates that
without the FS both VMs on nx receive the same amount of CPU and disk
I/O. Figure 5.15b shows that the FS decreases vcx’s CPU and disk I/O access
in order to allocate more of these PRs to vax. The reason is that the owner
of vcx also consumes PRs on nz. The allocation on nz is compared by Figure
5.16 (vcz does not utilize the disk, wherefore the according line is not visible
in these figures) and shows that the FS increases vez’s disk access by almost
40%. The reason is that vcz’s owner also utilizes PRs on nx and, therefore, vez is
prioritized. Interestingly, although the FS increases vez’s disk access by 40%,
this does not hurt vcz.
5.3.4 Experimental Results
TheFS’sCPUoverhead ismainly causedby an inefficient implementation for
controllingnetwork access. Itwas investigates indetail how this overhead can
be reduced and an according solution was implemented.
Without the FS, OpenStack does not leverage PR allocation to promote
fairness among cloud users. The simple scenario where two users compete
for one PR on the same node, most clearly shows this shortcoming (cf. Sec-
tion 5.3.3.1). Notably, in this scenario fairness can be established without
global monitoring information or a multi-resource fairness definition. The
FS not only achieves fairness in this scenario, but also in complex settings,
where VMs running on different nodes and utilizing different PRs have to be
managed (cf. Section 5.3.3.2).
5.4 Structural Investigations
The definitions in Section 3.3.3 and implementation in Section 4.2.4.1 allow
to calculate the greediness in a decentralized manner [6, 100]. The resulting
message volume for this calculation equals the sum of the size of messages
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Figure 5.15: CPU and disk allocation on node nx of the fairness experi-
ment as illustrated in Figure 5.13b
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Figure 5.16: CPU and disk allocation on node nz of the fairness experi-
ment as illustrated in Figure 5.13b
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exchanged. It is assumed that (a) r is small and constant, (b) that
v n and v u; (5.15)
because users usually own several VMs and nodes usually host several VMs,
and (c) 8n 2 N : jhost(n)j > 0, i.e., every node hosts at least one VM.
Subsequently, twomessaging schemes to calculate the greediness are pre-
sented. Themessaging scheme presented in Section 5.4.1 is straight-forward
but less optimal in terms ofmessage volume then themessaging scheme pre-
sented in Section 5.4.2.
5.4.1 SimpleMessaging Scheme
The simple messaging scheme works as follows. Each node applies function
GV to calculate the greediness of the hosted VMs, announces this greediness
set to all other nodes and accordingly receives the greediness sets of other
nodes. Each node then applies function GU to the calculated and received
VM greediness sets to calculate the greediness of users (cf. Listing 4.2).
The CRS is essential to calculate the greediness of VMs and users. As the
CRS is the sumofnodes’ PRs, everynodeneeds to send itsPRs to everyother
node, such that every node can calculate the CRS.This messaging scheme is
illustrated in Figure 5.17a. It is sufficient, to perform this PR announcement
once, as the PRs of a node are static (cf. Line 1 and 2 of Listing 4.2). In case a
node is added to the cloud, it announces its PRs to everynode, towhich every
node respondswith its PRs. Accordingly, eachnodeoncehas to send a vector
v 2 Rr0 to every other node. This results in n  (n  1)messages with a size
of r being send. TheCRSmessage volume, therefore, isn (n  1) r 2 O(n2):
When anode knows theCRS it can locally calculate the greediness of each
hosted VM.The resulting greediness set has to be send to every other node,
such that every node can calculate the greediness of each user (cf. Line 7 and
8 of Listing 4.2). This results in n  (n  1)messages, as illustrated in Figure
5.18a. . In particular, each node ni has to send amessagem to the n  1 other
nodes. Message m contains jhost(ni)gj scalars, wherefore, the size of m is
only bounded by v. This gives bound n  (n  1)  v 2 O(n2  v). However,
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simple and improved messaging scheme. All message are of size O(r)
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(b) The improved messaging scheme cycles a message of size O(u)
through the nodes
Figure 5.18: An example of the greediness message volume produced by
the simple and improved messaging scheme. GV(v1; v2; : : : ; vx) abbreviates
GV(v1);GV(v2); : : : ;GV(vx)
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(a) The simple messaging scheme sends the quota credit to every node
individually
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(b) The improved messaging scheme sends the quota credit to one
node, which implicitly communicates it to all other nodes (cf. Figure
5.18b)
Figure 5.19: An example of the quota message volume produced by the
simple and improved messaging scheme. qtc(u1; u2; : : : ; ux) abbreviates
qtc(u1); qtc(u2); : : : ; qtc(ux)
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since the greediness of every VMhas to be send to n  1 nodes, the greediness
message volume actually is (n  1)  v 2 O(n  v).
In order to calculate the greediness of any user, nodes also need to know
the quota credit of every user (cf. Definition 3.4), which is a static scalar for
each user. Accordingly, the quota credits must be announced initially to ev-
ery node by the central entity that holds this information, in the context of
OpenStack this node is the controller (cf. Figure 5.19a). Thus, the quota
message volume is n  u 2 O(n  u).
As the CRS and quota message volume have to be exchanged once, while
the greedinessmessage volume has to be exchanged continually, and because
of Equation 5.15, the message volume that needs to be exchanged to calcu-
late and update the greediness of users isO(n  v). As every node has to be
involved in the communication, the first factor (n) cannot be reduced. The
second factor (v) is possibly large and reflects the amount of data that every
node receives periodically. The improved messaging scheme presented next
reduces this factor.
5.4.2 ImprovedMessaging Scheme
The following messaging scheme to calculate the greediness in a decentral-
izedmanner has a lowermessage volume compared to themessaging scheme
presented in Section 5.4.1. The message volume is reduced by a vectorm 2
Ru that (a) contains the greediness of all users, (b) cycles through the nodes
according to some node order, and (c) is updated by the node that it cur-
rently traverses. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that this node order
is given by the nodes’ indices, i.e., for 1  i < n, node ni sendsm to ni+1 and
node nn sends m to node n1. Node ni+1 and n1 are called the successor of ni
and nn, respectively.
m has one entry for every user ui 2 U and this entry is initalized with
 1  qtc(ui). Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the ith entry of
m corresponds to user ui. After m has completed the first cycle, this ith en-
try contains the greediness of user ui, as every node that hosts VMs of ui has
added the VMs’ greediness to the ith entry. From then on,m, which contin-
ues to cycle through the nodes, will inform the node it traverses about the
greediness of users, while also being updated by that node. To update m, a
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node subtracts from m what it added, when it last received m, and adds the
current greediness of VMs it hosts to the entries that correspond to the VMs’
owners.
More specifically, every node nj maintains a vector mlocal 2 Ru, which
stores what nj added to m in the last round. Therefore, mlocal is initialized
with zeros. When nj receivesm from its predecessor,m is redefined asm :=
m   mlocal. Every entry in mlocal is then overwritten by zero and for each
VM vk 2 host(nj), GV(vk) is added to the ith entry of mlocal, whereat i is
determined by own(vk) = ui. Finally, by again redefiningm := m + mlocal,
m contains the greediness of userui at the ith entry, for every userui 2 U. m is
then send to the successor of nj. The first iteration of this process is illustrated
in Figure 5.18b. As it is the first iteration, nodes do not deduct values.
The cycling ofm is initiated by a node, which holds the information about
edwU(ui) of every user ui 2 U (in case ofOpenStack, this is theController).
This entity initializesm as
m :=  1  (qtc(u1); qtc(u2); : : : ; qtc(uu))
and sends it to an arbitrary node (cf. Figure 5.19b). This node proceeds as
if m were received from its predecessor (as mlocal is initialized with zeros,
the initiating node will not subtract anything from the vector but only add
the greediness of hosted VMs). This procedure makes it unnecessary to an-
nounce qtc(ui) of every user ui to every node individually (cf. Figure 5.18b
and 5.19b). Therefore, the quota message volume becomes 1  u 2 O(u).
Afterm has traversed the circle twice, every node knows the greediness of
all users. Therefore, the greediness message volume is reduced to 2  n  u 2
O(n  u). As v u, this is a much better bound.
TheCRSmessage volume can be reduced by the same technique toO(n 
r). In particular, a node ni starts by sending vectorm0 := phy(ni) 2 Rr to its
successor nj. nj then adds phy(nj) 2 Rr tom0 and forwards the result to its
successor, and so forth. This process is illustrated in Figure 5.19b. Whenm0
reaches ni again, it contains the CRS. To inform every node about the CRS,
m0 has to cycle another round without being modified.
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Therefore, in total the message volume is bounded by O(n  (u + r)).
Furthermore, every node only receivesmessages from and sendsmessages to
one other node and the size of this message is bounded byO(u+ r), which
ensures a low communication overhead.
5.4.3 Structural Results
The simple messaging scheme is straight-forward but sends messages be-
tween all pairs of nodes. Therefore, nodes have process many messages and
O(n2)messages traverse the network periodically. In contrast, the improved
messaging scheme requires every node to only receive messages from and
send messages to one other node and the size of this message is bounded by
O(u+ r). This ensures a low CPU overhead on individual nodes. This high
efficiency is achieved by ordering all nodes on a ring and exchanging all infor-
mation along this ring by amessage that is updated by the node that forwards
it. Thus onlyO(n) are exchanged periodicallymaking themessaging scheme
and, thereby, the FS highly scalable.
5.5 Evaluation Conclusions
The analytical investigation in Section 5.1 highlighted cases in which theGδ-
policy is not influencedbyparameter δ andproved that under the assumption
of Leontief utility functions theGδ-policy provides sharing incentive, Pareto
efficiency, strategy proofness, and envy freeness. For this assumption also the
D-policy, i.e., DRF, which is the de facto standard for fair data center resource
allocation, and theC-policy achieve these characteristics.
The simulative investigation in Section 5.2 first pointed out, how parame-
ter δ influencesGδ-allocations and how theGδ-policy provides incentives to
configure VMs correctly, i.e., to choose VMs’ VRs such that they are aligned
with the VMs’ PR utilization. Such incentive is not provided by DRF or any
other policy and important, as it indicates which load to expect from VMs
and thereby enables scheduling VMs more efficiently. It was demonstrated
how unfairness arises among users, when PRs are allocated on a per-VM
basis, even when fairness could have been established without information
fromother nodes or amulti-resource fairness definition (Section 5.3.3.1 con-
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firmed these findings by an analog experiment). Lastly, it was shown that a
policy with global scope is always superior to its local counterpart and that
theGδ-allocation often lies between theC- andD-allocation.
The theoretical investigations in Sections 3.3.4, 5.1, and 5.2 lead to the
conclusion that the Gδ-policy is superior to the D- and C-policy, as it most
intuitive in termsof fairness andprovides incentive to users to configureVMs
correctly.
The experimental investigation in Section 5.3 first evaluated the devel-
oped FS in terms of CPU overhead. It was found that the customized net-
work control leads to high CPU overhead, while without this customization
the overhead is moderate. The customization was necessary to control the
network access by PPs, as libvirt, which is used to control the other PRs, only
allows to assignhard limits tonetwork access. Therefore, libvirtwas extended
to allowcontrollingnetwork access byPPswithminimalCPUoverhead. This
libvirt extension allows all libvirt users and not only the FS to control the net-
work efficiently by PPs. Section 5.3.3.2 showed how the FS coordinated the
PR allocation among different nodes and different PRs to increase the degree
of fairness.
The structural investigation in Section 5.4 developed two messaging
scheme for the FS. The improved messaging scheme presented in Section
5.4.2 allows for exchanging all necessary information among nodes highly
efficiently. In particular, this scheme only produces nmessages periodically,
the size of these messages is bounded byO(u + r) and every node only re-
ceives messages from and sends messages to one other node. This ensures a
low CPU overhead on individual nodes.
The FS in conjunction with theGδ-policy allows Cloud Service Providers
(CSP) to manage their cloud in a simple manner. CSPs only have to cre-
ate accounts and quotas for their users and the FS ensures that users receive
their fair share of the cloud’s resources. In particular, greedy users will receive
less PRs, if a less greedy user starts to utilize the same PRs. This is necessary
to ensure high performance for light users, while greedy users get more re-
sources with less reliability. Different user weights can be taken into account
by assigning users different quotas (which results in different quota credits),
as the larger a user’s quota, the higher the priorities of the user’s VMs will be.
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Summary and Conclusions
Cloud Computing is omnipresent nowadays and deployed by virtu-ally all companies andmany private customers. However, commercial
cloud providers are not always able to satisfy privacy and performance con-
cerns of customers. Therefore, many companies and institutions also operate
a private cloud. In a private cloud, resource allocation is not guided by Ser-
vice Level Agreements (SLAs) and performance goals are not captured in a
machine interpretable manner. Accordingly, nodes treat Virtual Machines
(VMs) as processes of equal importance. As users operate different num-
bers of VMs and these utilize different amounts of Physical Resources (PR),
such as CPU time, RAM, disk I/O, and network access, users often receive
unequal amounts of these resources.
This thesis improves this situation by showing how to define fairness and
enforce this definition in clouds. It was determined how the cloud resource
allocation is best controlled, i.e., how cloud resource allocation is changed
most effectively. An intuitive, generic definition of fairness was developed
169
and refined for the cloud context. The practical applicability of this refine-
ment was certified by a prototypical OpenStack implementation.
6.1 General Conclusions
The greediness of consumers can be defined and quantified based on their
multi-resource self-servings, as shown by questionnaire among more than
600 individuals. Thequestionnaire specified real-life scenarios to (a)not con-
strain the target group in terms of background knowledge and to (b) not dis-
tract participants by technical terms and let them fully concentrate on the
question of fairness and greediness. Participants were given the option to
textually explain the reasoning, which led to their answers. The greediness
metric was developed to formalize the most frequent participant reasoning
and quantifies the greediness of consumers based on the bundles they have
served themselves from a shared resource pool. When applied to the ques-
tionnaire scenarios, the greediness metric results in those options that were
most frequently selected by participants, which also includes identifying an
allocation that maximizes fairness. No other metric, including the cost met-
ric and themetric used byDominant Resource Fairness (DRF), achieves this
favorable result.
A cloud user’s user-greediness is defined as the sum of VM-greediness of
the user’s VMs, whereat VM-greediness is determined by a refinement of the
greediness metric. Cloud fairness is defined as the procedure of prioritizing
VMs inversely to the user-greediness of their owner. Therefore, cloud fair-
ness works without assumptions on utility functions and is intuitively fair
under the premiss that it is fair to constrain greedy consumers in favor of
less greedy consumers. Not relying on utility functions is necessary in the
cloud context, as this thesis showed that dependencies of PRs and perfor-
mance and, therefore, utility functions, are (a) highly complex, (b) work-
load dependent, and sometimes (c) counter-intuitive. These results do not
confirm the idealistic assumptions of Leontief or other well defined utility
functions, which are typically present in work on data center multi-resource
fairness. However, under the common assumption of Leontief utility func-
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tions, cloud fairness is strategy prove, Pareto efficient, and provides sharing
incentive and envy freeness.
A VM’s endowment are the PRs that the cloud budgets for the VM, i.e.,
the PRs the VM is entitled to, if the PRs were not dynamically shared. A
function that calculates the endowment based on a VM’s VRs and the VM’s
host’s PRs was developed. The more a VM’s PR utilization is aligned with
the VM’s endowment, the lower the VM’s VM-greediness. Therefore, cloud
fairness gives incentives to users to configure their VMs as well as possible
with the subsequent PRutilization, whichmakesVRs a good predictor of the
VM’s upcoming utilization. This allows the Cloud Service Providers (CSP)
to place VMs efficiently on nodes.
Cloud fairness is implemented by periodically adapting priorities with
which VMs can access their host’s PRs during runtime. This priority adap-
tion was identified as more capable than scheduling, which is particularly in-
efficient to control cloud resources, when VMs run over long periods. The
priority adaption is coordinated among nodes, such that all users have ac-
cess to a fair amount of PRs via their VMs. This approach was prototypically
implemented by anOpenStack service called nova-fairness, which practically
achieves cloud fairness by periodically (a) quantifying the VM-greediness of
VMs, (b) aggregating the VM-greediness to calculate user-greediness, and
(c) giving priorities to VMs to access the PRs of their host during runtime,
whereat the higher the user-greediness of a user, the lower the priorities as-
signed to the user’s VMs. Step (a) and (c) are implemented by use of libvirt,
making nova-fairness compatible with a multitude of hypervisors.
This implementation requires a process on every node that hosts VMs and
the communication among these processes. This communication deploys
the OpenStack message queues and, therefore, can be decentralized by se-
lecting an according message queue. Due to the structure of the definition
of VM- and user-greediness, both can be calculated in a distributed manner,
such that every node sends and receives messages only from one other node,
making nova-fairness highly scalable.
As nova-fairness changes priorities of running VMs, it is complemen-
tary to scheduling approaches. However, cloud fairness can also be imple-
mented during scheduling. In particular, [30] proposes a scheduling policy
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that achieves DRF by allowing the user with the smallest dominant share to
start the next task. By replacing the dominant share metric in this process by
the greediness metric, cloud fairness is enforced during scheduling.
6.2 Answers to ResearchQuestions
The conclusions for the five motivating questions introduced in Section 1.2
are shortly summarized below.
ResearchQuestion 1: How to best control cloud resources?
While it is most common to control resources of private clouds by
scheduling, it is inefficient to manage resource allocation, particularly when
VMs run over long periods. The reason is that scheduling only allows chang-
ing the order in which VMs are started and, therefore, the effectiveness de-
creases the longer VMs run. Thus, this thesis concludes that cloud resources
have to be controlled by changing the PR allocation among running VMs,
i.e., changing priorities with which VMs can access PRs of their host during
runtime.
While scheduling decisions are often based only on Virtual Resources
(VR), this thesis concludes that PR utilization is a much better basis for al-
locating cloud resources. In particular, a VM can be idle or heavily loaded
resulting in very different PR utilization, while the VM’s VRs do not change.
However, VRs also have to be taken into account, as VMs are placed on
nodes, such that high node utilization is achieved, when a VM’s VRs are
aligned with the VM’s PR utilization. Therefore, if a VM’s VRs and PR uti-
lization strongly deviate, node utilization is either too high or too low. Thus,
allocation decisions have to be based on PR utilization as well as the align-
ment of VRs and PR utilization of VMs.
Research Question 2: Which general resource dependencies with respect to
VM performance exist when allocating node resources to running VMs?
Most data center Multi-Resource Allocation (MRA) approaches assume
clear and simple dependencies among resources and their combined effect
on performance perceived by users. The most prominent example is the as-
sumption of Leontief utility functions when investigating scheduling. The
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structure of Leontief utility functions is simple and examples exist why they
are insufficient to mode scheduling. Nonetheless, several MRA approaches,
including DRF, rely on this assumption.
In order to base the development of a fairness definition on realistic as-
sumptions, this thesis was the first work to investigate dependencies among
PRs and their combined effect on VM performance during runtime. How-
ever, it had to be concluded that those dependencies are (a) highly com-
plex, (b)workloaddependent, and sometimes (c) counter-intuitive. Thiswas
shown by benchmarking the performance of VMs depending on different
VR configurations and stress on the host system. In particular, it was found
that a lack ofRAM often not significantly influences VM performance, even
if theRAMwould be utilized, if it were available. Furthermore, performance
of multi-threaded workloads may decrease with the number the VM’s Vir-
tual CPUs (VCPUs) and single-threaded workloads may profit, if the VM
has multiple VCPUs. This unpredictability prohibits the application of ap-
proaches that assume Leontief or other well-defined utility functions and
confirms that Leontief utility functions are too idealistic also in this case.
Research Question 3: How can the greediness of consumers be quantified
based on the multi-resource bundles they served themselves from a common re-
source pool?
This question arose because of the negative result to Research Question
2. As well-defined utility functions or a well-structured negotiation process
couldnot be assumed,when allocatingPRs to runningVMs, nodeswere con-
ceptualized as “self-serving buffets” for the VMs. Thus, fairness had to be
defined by a fair prioritization process that constrains consumers in case of
overload. The premiss that it is fair to constrain greedy consumers in favor
of less greedy consumers finally led to this research question and was inves-
tigated by a questionnaire among more than 600 participants.
Thequestionnaire revealed that greediness cannot be defined as allocating
consumers bundles of equal price, whereat the price of a bundle is defined as
the sum of prices of resource units in the bundle and the price of a resource
unit is defined based on the overall amount of that resource. One reason for
the inadequacy of prices is that they do not capture that the value of a re-
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source increases the scarcer it is. Unfortunately, also extending the price to
account for the scarcity of resources or the metric used by DRF did not re-
sult in a satisfactory greediness metric. Finally, the questionnaire revealed
that it is perceived as greedy, when consumers exceed their equal share of
resources and not accordingly cede resources to other consumers as com-
pensation. The Greediness Metric (GM) was developed to formally capture
this intuitive notion and, therefore, identifies all most common answers to
the questionnaire.
ResearchQuestion4: Howcan the definition of greediness be refined to define
cloud fairness?
Cloud fairness was defined as the procedure of prioritizing VMs inversely
to the greediness of their users. The greediness of a user u was defined as
the sum of greediness of u’s VMs (subtracted by a number determined by u’s
quota) and the greediness of a VM v was defined by a Refined GM (RGM).
RGM fixed the ratio of GM’s only two parameters (these parameters deter-
mine how strongly ceding resources is rewarded and how strongly excessive
utilization is penalized) and contrasts v’s utilization not to the equal share but
to a vector ev that is determined by v’s VRs and v’s host’s PRs.
A numerical analysis showed that, just as GM, RGM identifies all most
common answers to the questionnaire (as the questionnaire assumed equal-
ity of all consumers, ev was uniformly defined by the equal share). An ana-
lytical investigation proved that v’s refined greediness is minimized, when v’s
utilization perfectly matches ev. As ev is determined by v’s VRs and v’s VRs
are configured by v’s owner, users have incentive to configure VMs perfectly,
in order to minimize their greediness and, thereby, maximize their priority.
The analytical analysis also showed that, if users are uncertain about the up-
coming utilization of their VMs, they still have incentive to configure their
VMs to the best of their knowledge, and that they neither have incentive to
artificially partition their workloads to multiple VMs nor to artificially con-
centrate it on a monolithic VM. Lastly, the analytical investigation showed
that using RGM to prioritize VMs provides sharing incentive, Pareto effi-
ciency, strategy proofness, and envy freeness, whenLeontief utility functions
are assumed. A simulative investigation quantified the greediness of users by
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RGM, the price metric, and the dominant resource metric (used by DRF)
and prioritized VMs accordingly. The investigation revealed that the allo-
cations generated, when using RGM, lie between the other two allocations.
Therefore, RGM is a compromise between two prominent metrics to quan-
tify multi-resource consumption, but the only metric that rewards correct
VMconfiguration. The simulative investigation confirmed that treating VMs
independent of their owners leads to unfairness, even in simple cases.
Research Question 5: How can the new cloud fairness definition be practi-
cally enforced, when allocating node resources to running VMs?
The cloud fairness definition above was implemented for OpenStack by a
prototypical nova service called nova-fairness. Every node that hosts VMs
runs this service. Nova-fairness deploys libvirt to inquire how many PRs
VMs utilize during runtime and to change priorities with which VMs can ac-
cess these PRs. This use of libvirt makes nova-fairness compatible withmost
of the known hypervisors [87]. The high CPU overhead of the prototypical
nova-fairness implementation was caused by controlling network access in
a suboptimal manner. Therefore, libvirt was extended to allow controlling
network access by PPs with minimal CPU overhead. This libvirt extension
allows all libvirt users and not only the FS to control the network efficiently
by PPs. Nova-fairness instances on different nodes exchange messages via
OpenStack message queues, which allows to decentralize this message ex-
change. A messaging scheme to minimize the message overhead was pre-
sented. This scheme achieves high efficiency by ordering all nodes on a ring
and exchanging all information along this ring by a message that is updated
by the node that forwards it. Therefore, every node is required to send and
receivemessages only fromoneother node,makingnova-fairness highly scal-
able.
Nova-fairness proves that it is possible to enforce the new cloud fairness
definition practically. Thus, nova-fairness not only enforces intuitive fairness
but also provides incentive to users to configure VMs correctly. Providing
this incentive is advantageous, as the more the VMs’ configuration is aligned
with their actual consumption, the more efficiently the CSP can place VMs
on nodes. Furthermore, nova-fairness highlights the potential of controlling
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cloud resources by changing priorities with which VMs can access the PRs
of their host during runtime. As discussed in Research Question 1, this ap-
proach is highly advantageous compared to controlling cloud resources by
VM scheduling, which is the standard approach to control cloud resources.
6.3 FutureWork
Futurework encompasses threemajor areas: the improvement of implemen-
tation details of nova-fairness, the development of pricingmodels enabled by
nova-fairness, and the investigation of utility functions in data centers. These
areas are discussed subsequently.
The following implementation details of nova-fairness leave room for im-
provement and further research [75]. Firstly, nova-fairness compares CPU
time across nodes by the nodes’ BogoMIPS [110]. However, BogoMIPS do
not define a scientifically reliablemeasure to compareCPUs,wherefore other
normalization references, such as the SPEC value [96], should be consid-
ered for future improvements. Secondly, nova-fairness currently uses a linear
function to map user-greediness to VM priorities. The precise design of this
function and its effects on the behavior of nova-fairness have to be evaluated.
In particular, asymptotic functions and tradeoffs between starving VMs and
enforcing fairness most vigorously have to be investigated. Thirdly, when a
node is overloaded someVMshave to be live-migrated to other nodes, which
temporarily decreases their performance. Therefore, nova-fairness should in-
fluence these live-migration decisions to migrate VMs of greedy users.
The second area for future work is the investigation of pricing models
enabled by nova-fairness. In particular, nowadays it is common practice in
commercial clouds that customers pay on a per-VM-basis [3]. However, the
telecommunications sector has shown that customers often prefer flat rates
[2, 53, 68], even if a volume-based tariff would reduce costs [50]. With a
cloud flat rate customers pay a monthly fee to get access to a cloud, where
they can start VMs. Just as Internet flat rates come with a maximum band-
width, cloud flat rate customerswould get a certain quota to spawnVMs. The
allocation of PRs to VMs then has to be supported by running nova-fairness
to ensure that all customers receive a fair share of the cloud’s capacity. In par-
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ticular, nova-fairness will ensure that greedy customers receive the majority
of the cloud’s resources on a best-effort basis, while light customers receive
requested resources instantly. Such pricing model also has to account for
resources that are currently not considered by nova-fairness, e.g., Graphics
Processing Units (GPU), disk space, and software licenses.
After no related work on utility functions in data centers was found, this
thesis started according investigations. The results achieved were negative,
i.e., it was concluded on which structure utility functions in clouds do not
have but not which they do have. Therefore, additional research must be
conducted on this topic and positive results formulated as a class of utility
functions, that appropriately reflects technical realities, while also allowing
for an exhaustive theoretical analysis. Establishing a realistic and practical
class of utility functions would allow for the development of highly special-
ized fairness definitions and allocation policies, with high practical applica-
bility. Furthermore, resource allocations could be optimized in terms of ef-
ficiency, irrespective of fairness aspects. Therefore, a realistic class of utility
functions would greatly aid data center resource allocation not only in terms
of fairness. The current lack of work on this topic, despite its value for the
research community, may be caused by the topic’s complexity.
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Appendix
A.1 Questionnaire
The following email was send in English and German to all employees and
students of the University of Zurich on July 9, 2015, as well as shared on
Facebook. When clicking the link to the survey, which is below indicated
by […], participants could first choose the language of the survey (English
and German) and were then presented the questions stated in the three
subsequent sections.
Subject: Evaluation Ihres intuitiven Fairnessverständnisses / Evaluation
of Your Intuitive Understanding of Fairness
***
Der Versand an die ausgewählten Angehörigen der UZH wurde vom
Rektoratsdienst der Universität Zürich ausdrücklich genehmigt.
***
**English translation see below**
[German translation of the text below]
******************************************************
Evaluation of Your Intuitive Understanding of Fairness
What is fair?
Who should cede something if there is not enough for everybody?
The fair allocation of multiple goods or resources is one of the most pro-
found problems that humankind faced throughout its history.
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The Communication Systems Group CSG of the Department of Informat-
ics IFI explores the concept of fairness within a technological context. In
particular, data centers are investigated, as they allow individuals to share
different computational resources. In these infrastructures, traditional definitions
of fairness cannot be verified, wherefore we are trying to define fairness in a way
that is applicable there.
The goal of this survey is to evaluate your understanding of fairness and to
compare it to the definitions developed at CSG so far. In order not to bother you
with technical terms, the questions describe and illustrate simple real-life scenarios
and ask you for your opinion on these. Since fairness is a subjective concept, there
are no right or wrong answers, and you can help us by giving explanations for
your choices in the designated text boxes.
Link to this survey: [link to the survey]
We would really appreciate it, if you would spend 15 minutes of your time
to run through this survey.
No personal data is collected.
Best regards
Patrick Gwydion Poullie
Institut für Informatik
Communication Systems Group
A.1.1 Choosing theMost Fair Allocation (Q1)
Figure A.1 shows the illustrations of A11, A12, A13, and A14 displayed to
participants inQ1of the questionnaire. Thequestionwas phrased as follows:
Three children have six colored pencils and twelve cardboard boxes to play
with. Because they do not get along well, their nursery teachers decide that they
should play on their own, wherefore the painting materials have to be divided
among them while taking into account the three following preferences.
• Child A wants to color, wherefore he only wants pencils (as many as possi-
ble).
• Child B wants to build cardboard houses, wherefore she only wants card-
board boxes (as many as possible).
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(a) A11 (b) A12
(c) A13 (d) A14
Figure A.1: The illustrations presented in Q1 of the questionnaire
• Child C wants to color cardboard boxes, wherefore for each pencil he re-
ceives, he wants two cardboard boxes to color (Child C wants as many of
these sets as possible).
The nursery teachers are unsure how to allocate the pencils and cardboard boxes
among the children and must decide between the following four options.
Here the allocationsweredisplayedby the illustrations shown inTableA.1
and by tables that depicted the allocations numerically.
Which allocation do you think is the fairest?
A.1.2 Allocating based on Requests (Q2)
Figure A.3 shows the illustrations of A21, A22, and A23 displayed to partici-
pants in Q2 of the questionnaire. The question was phrased as follows:
Human resources of a company are being redistributed. The department heads
of two competing subsidiaries A and B must come to an agreement on how 8 ac-
count managers, 8 programmers, and 8 administrators are assigned to their de-
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Figure A.2: The table presented in Q2 of the questionnaire
(a) A21 (b) A22 (c) A23
Figure A.3: The illustrations presented in Q2 of the questionnaire
partments. The professional groups’ workforce does not suffice to meet the depart-
ment heads’ demands simultaneously, which leads to difficult negotiations. Af-
ter these negotiations, they have almost reached an agreement as depicted in the
following table. In particular, the table shows how many professionals the sub-
sidiaries demand after the negotiations. Initially, the demands for accountant
managers also exceeded their availability, but this issue was resolved during the
negotiations. Here the Table in Figure A.2 was shown.
Since there is still one programmer and one administrator missing to imple-
ment the demands, the corporate management has to decide which of the sub-
sidiaries gets one programmer and one administrator less than requested. Since
the two subsidiaries are competing, the management wants to find a fair solution.
What do you think is the fairest solution?
• Subsidiary A gets one programmer and one administrator less. (OptionA)
• Subsidiary B gets one programmer and one administrator less. (Option B)
• One subsidiary gets one programmer less, the other gets one administrator
less. (Option C)
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(a) S31 (b) S32 (c) S33
Figure A.4: The illustrations presented in Q3 of the questionnaire
Here the illustrations in Figure A.3 were shown.
A.1.3 Estimating Greediness (Q3)
Figure A.4 shows the illustrations of S31, S32, and S33 displayed to partici-
pants in Q3 of the questionnaire. The question was phrased as follows:
Three bakers eachwant to bake a cake. To savemoney, they buy the ingredients
(eggs, butter, and flour) together. However, because each baker is using a different
recipe, each baker needs a different amount of ingredients.
To split the ingredients, they put the ingredients on a table and each baker
helps himself. After a while at least one ingredient is depleted, wherefore the bakers
cannot use more of the remaining ingredients; in other words, the ingredients left
on the table cannot be utilized due to the lack of depleted ingredients.
In the following, three scenarios are depicted with what the bakers took from
the table andwhat was available initially. Each scenario is depicted by a table and
a graphic, which both demonstrate how much the bakers took of each ingredient.
Rank the three bakers according to how you perceive their greediness based on
the amounts they have used.
Here the allocationsweredisplayedby the illustrations shown inTableA.4
and by tables that depicted the allocations numerically.
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